I should note that in the past, I maintained an e-mail correspondence with Norman Swartz, the author of the above-linked book, and for a short time he was even a participating member at The Galilean Library,] my home base in cyberspace, where I post as davidm. Alas, the library isn’t very active these days, except for our super secret creative writer’s forum, but this phenomenon of low participation seems endemic to message boards these days. I think most online activity has shifted over to blogs (good) and Twitter (yuck).
"The free-will problem is solved so thoroughly it cannot even be stated coherently."] From the above:NO, that modal fallacy doesn't hold weight, sorry. You have it backwards but there is no convincing you. You need the praise too much to let your worldview go. Physical necessitation DOES force our choices (we can't control events; we can only react to them in the best way we know how), and when that is understood the free-will problem loses it's potency. The free-will problem is a delusion which is why it can't even be stated coherently.Note, finally, how much better the Regularity Theory is as a basis for doing ethics than is presupposing the Autonomy Theory.For once stop offering these theories that have nothing to do with reality. Anyone can offer a theory but does that mean it is right? Of course not.The perennial worry is laid to rest about whether “ought to have done x" (where a person did not do x) is logically compatible with “could have done x."No, you are not going to get away with this awkward logic if I have anything to do with it. You WANT to believe that we have some kind of free will. Why? Because you want the praise. You want to take the credit, isn't that true? It's as simple as that.We want to argue that “ought" implies “can," but you remain troubled about whether a person “really can" do x in those instances where he does not. Problems like these are idle in the Regularity view of physical laws.Another one of your strategies (to find anyone who agrees with what you want to believe is true) but it still doesn't fly David; in fact these theories detract from the truth since only one can be right, and it isn't looking good for you.If you will give up your distorted view of physical necessitation, all these seeming paradoxes fall away, leaving a residuum of genuine problems. What makes an action ethically neutral, praiseworthy, or blameworthy remains a challenge to spell out. But that such categories should rationally be applied to some acts is not in the slightest threatened by adopting the Regularity Theory. Indeed, we can see how it is easier on this account to attribute blame. Persons who are not coerced, who are not hypnotized, who are not drugged, etc., are ‘free’ to choose as they want.This is truly exasperating; that someone who has the intellectual capacity (I give you that much) to understand this discovery, is totally clueless.Persons who are rational, who know well what the consequences of their actions will probably be, who are not forced or coerced to perform evil, but who nonetheless do perform evil, may with perfect appropriateness be blamed. In as strong a sense as one could possibly want, they did not have to do what they did. (Although, of course, what they did was completely physically determined.)You can't even see the contradiction in your last sentence. That is how brainwashed you are. Yes they did have to do what they did, but whether they will WANT to do the same thing in the future based on a no free will environment, is something you cannot answer in any objective way. Empiricism will prove him right and you will have nothing to say then.In short, all the standard ways we go about assigning excuses and blame remain precisely intact. We excuse persons who are irrational, who are too young to be able to anticipate the consequences of their actions, whose actions had unforeseeable consequences, etc.7 And we blame persons who could see the harm of their contemplated actions but who deliberately wreaked havoc anyway, etc.From this comment, you have no understanding regarding antecedent events. You are trying to fit a square into a hole where somehow blame will be justified since there has been no other way to deter people from doing harm. I say again, there is a better way but you won't allow yourself to even entertain the thought that Lessans could be right after all.So far as we can tell, our actions are determined; many of them are free; certainly many of them are praiseworthy, and some others are blameworthy. Being determined, being free, and being praiseworthy or blameworthy are the happiest of bedfellows on the Regularity Theory of grand physical truths (physical laws). There is a tension among them only when you assume that physical laws are something like irresistible forces, compelling us to behave in certain ways. Instead, conceive of those physical laws that subsume our behavior simply as propositions deriving their truth from what we do. Give up the idea that physical necessitation forces events to occur, and the free-will problem is solved so thoroughly that it cannot even be stated coherently.
The perennial worry is laid to rest about whether “ought to have done x" (where a person did not do x) is logically compatible with “could have done x."No, you are not going to get away with this awkward logic, if I have anything to do with it. You are brainwashed big time because you WANT to believe that we have some kind of free will. You know why? Because you want the praise as being an intellectual giant, which you are not.
We want to argue that “ought" implies “can," but you remain troubled about whether a person “really can" do x in those instances where he does not. Problems like these are idle in the Regularity view of physical laws.Another one of your grabs to justify your faulty logic, but it still doesn't fly David; in fact it detracts from it since you have to find somebody's "theory" to justify your position as if it's fact. It is far from it.
If you will give up your distorted view of physical necessitation, all these seeming paradoxes fall away, leaving a residuum of genuine problems. What makes an action ethically neutral, praiseworthy, or blameworthy remains a challenge to spell out. But that such categories should rationally be applied to some acts is not in the slightest threatened by adopting the Regularity Theory. Indeed, we can see how it is easier on this account to attribute blame. Persons who are not coerced, who are not hypnotized, who are not drugged, etc., are ‘free’ to choose as they want.This is truly exasperating; that someone who has the intellectual capacity (I give you that much) to understand this discovery, is totally clueless.
Persons who are rational, who know well what the consequences of their actions will probably be, who are not forced or coerced to perform evil, but who nonetheless do perform evil, may with perfect appropriateness be blamed. In as strong a sense as one could possibly want, they did not have to do what they did. (Although, of course, what they did was completely physically determined.)You can't even see the contradiction in your last sentence. That is how brainwashed you are. Yes they did have to do what they did, but whether they will WANT to do the same thing in the future based on a no free will environment, is something you cannot answer in any objective way. Empiricism will prove him right and you will have nothing to say then.
In short, all the standard ways we go about assigning excuses and blame remain precisely intact. We excuse persons who are irrational, who are too young to be able to anticipate the consequences of their actions, whose actions had unforeseeable consequences, etc.7 And we blame persons who could see the harm of their contemplated actions but who deliberately wreaked havoc anyway, etc.From this comment, you have no understanding regarding antecedent events. You are trying to fit a square into a hole where somehow blame and punishment should be justified even though a person could not have done otherwise (even with threats of punishment) given his life circumstances. I will say again (probably to no avail), there is a better way but you won't allow yourself to even entertain the thought because that would make Lessans right, and after all the laughter at his expense, you could never handle that psychologically.
So far as we can tell, our actions are determined; many of them are free; certainly many of them are praiseworthy, and some others are blameworthy. Being determined, being free, and being praiseworthy or blameworthy are the happiest of bedfellows on the Regularity Theory of grand physical truths (physical laws). There is a tension among them only when you assume that physical laws are something like irresistible forces, compelling us to behave in certain ways. Instead, conceive of those physical laws that subsume our behavior simply as propositions deriving their truth from what we do. Give up the idea that physical necessitation forces events to occur, and the free-will problem is solved so thoroughly that it cannot even be stated coherently.NO, that modal fallacy doesn't hold weight, sorry. You have it backwards but there is no convincing you. You need the praise too much to let your worldview go. Physical necessitation DOES force our move (as in a chess game) in response to events that we have no control over. When this is thoroughly understood the free-will problem loses it's potency, even the compatibilist kind. The free-will problem (note: it is not a problem once it is understood that free will is a delusion) will be gone forever which is why in all these centuries it could never be stated coherently.
If someone is suspected in a murder committed in New York, and it turns out that at the time of the murder she was in San Francisco, then yes, she could not have committed the murder. No one is saying that this constitutes a modal fallacy.She could have because if causal antecedents had been appropriately different she would have been in New York. Only the epistemic possibility closes on discovering she was in San Francisco.
The problem is you are confusing natural language use of modalities with the modal use of language. The whole point of modal logic -- of logic in general, with its formal symbolic structure -- is to avoid the errors to which natural language is prone.Nope.
I never claimed that if you don't have your debit card with you, it constitutes a modal fallacy to say that you "couldn't" pay with your debit card. How could you pay with a card you don't have?But it is just the same modal fallacy to say I could not. The way I could have paid with a debit card is by having a debit card. And I could have had a debit card so could have paid by debit card. Now in your example the way I could have paid by debit card is by having a different want. It's just the same, could have means would have if I wasn't prevented. In my case prevented by not having a debit card and in your case by not wanting to.
What I said, and maintain, is that it constitutes a odal fallacy to say that if you HAVE your debit card with you, and choose NOT to pay with it, then it follows that you COULD NOT have paid with it. You simply DID not, is all.I was prevented by not wanting to use it in your example, as surely as I was prevented by not having it in my example. Either both are modal fallacies or neither is.
I can't and couldn't pay with a debit card if I don't and didn't have such a card in my possession.Yes you can and could have. It is a fallacy to say you can't and couldn't have in the same way it's a fallacy to say we CNHDO. The point is we CNHDO with certain facts as they were. But we could have done otherwise because we would have if certain facts rather than being true had been false. I could have paid with a debit card because I could have had one. In your example I could have chosen to because I could have had a different want.
Persons who are rational, who know well what the consequences of their actions will probably be, who are not forced or coerced to perform evil, but who nonetheless do perform evil, may with perfect appropriateness be blamed. In as strong a sense as one could possibly want, they did not have to do what they did. (Although, of course, what they did was completely physically determined.)The problem is they didn't have an appropriate way of doing what they should have done to be blamed in a strong sense. Would have if they wanted to, might as well be would have if they'd had six toes.
Persons who are rational, who know well what the consequences of their actions will probably be, who are not forced or coerced to perform evil, but who nonetheless do perform evil, may with perfect appropriateness be blamed. In as strong a sense as one could possibly want, they did not have to do what they did. (Although, of course, what they did was completely physically determined.)The problem is they didn't have an appropriate way of doing what they should have done to be blamed in a strong sense. Would have if they wanted to, might as well be would have if they'd had six toes. Well said! I just wish I could move forward (because proof of determinism is not the discovery; it is only the gateway leading to the discovery) but I can't make headway given such strong resistance to this claim, even when absolute proof is staring them in the face.
Persons who are rational, who know well what the consequences of their actions will probably be, who are not forced or coerced to perform evil, but who nonetheless do perform evil, may with perfect appropriateness be blamed. In as strong a sense as one could possibly want, they did not have to do what they did. (Although, of course, what they did was completely physically determined.)The problem is they didn't have an appropriate way of doing what they should have done to be blamed in a strong sense. Would have if they wanted to, might as well be would have if they'd had six toes. Stephen, stipulating that you are correct and we are all in agreement. How does this in any way affect our hardwired ability (survival strategy) to lay blame as well as bestow praise? Does any of the foregoing change anything? It occurs to me that a smoker acts to satisfy a craving, in spite of knowing that the act of smoking also damages his body. Thus the path to greater satisfaction may also lead to lung cancer (and you die). How about global warming? IMO, the proposition addresses individuals, but we are part of a greater whole which in many cases affects our ability to choose other than what is dictated by the greater whole. We may want to drive 60mph in a school zone, except for that little sign which states "school zone 25 mph". If we are not to blame for causing climate change, shall we just continue on our path to self destruction? IMO, it is appropriate to say that even if we have a bushel of healthy apples, a single bad apple can spoil the entire bushel. The bad apple cannot help that it is bad, but its condition "affects" all the apples in the immediate proximity. Shall we remove the bad apple or just say "oh well, it is determinism", we cannot blame the apple for being rotten". I am not concerned with what is, I am concerned if it can be changed in any significant way. IMO, the entire concept that by identifying why and how people act we can somehow change is simplistic idealism, IMO. There is no such thing as ideal, except what nature already has deemed "effective" through "natural selection".
I meant to say that my objection to the compatibilist version of free will is not absurd because the definition given implies that one can do what one doesn't want in favor of what one does want...It doesn't imply that at all, so it looks like your objection is baseless. Of course it does. No, it doesn't.
I think you are so determined to discredit Lessans that you have lost all sensibilities and cannot be taken seriously by anyone who sees the flawed logic inherent in the compatibilist argument.You still have no idea what compatibilism is. I probably understand it better than you. :roll: You don't even believe that yourself, so why post it? Have you figured out what a distinction is yet? Have you worked out why you were lying about how long you've been online?
If we are not to blame for causing climate change, shall we just continue on our path to self destruction?Does the addition of blame help us change course?
IMO, it is appropriate to say that even if we have a bushel of healthy apples, a single bad apple can spoil the entire bushel. The bad apple cannot help that it is bad, but its condition "affects" all the apples in the immediate proximity. Shall we remove the bad apple or just say "oh well, it is determinism".Shall we blame it? Would it make a difference if we did?
I am not concerned with what is, I am concerned if it can be changed in any significant way. IMO, the entire concept that by identifying why and how people act we can somehow change it is idealism, and there is no such thing as ideal, except what nature already has deemed "effective".We do plenty which is ineffective or harmful due to false beliefs, that's why getting them right matters.
If we are not to blame for causing climate change, shall we just continue on our path to self destruction?Does the addition of blame help us change course? IMO, it is a natural method of identifying aberrations to the norm.
IMO, it is appropriate to say that even if we have a bushel of healthy apples, a single bad apple can spoil the entire bushel. The bad apple cannot help that it is bad, but its condition "affects" all the apples in the immediate proximity. Shall we remove the bad apple or just say "oh well, it is determinism".
Do we blame it? Would it make a difference if we did?See above. We identify the problem of rot (lay blame to the rot, not the apple) and we remove the rotten apple.
I am not concerned with what is, I am concerned if it can be changed in any significant way. IMO, the entire concept that by identifying why and how people act we can somehow change it is idealism, and there is no such thing as ideal, except what nature already has deemed "effective".
We do plenty which is ineffective or harmful due to false beliefs, that's why getting them right matters.And removing blame solves the problem? By the foregoing proposition, "false beliefs" would be unalterable because a false belief is still seeking satisfaction and deterministic of our actions. Now multiply this by 6 billion individual minds, each with their own beliefs. IMO, there is no "one size fits all". Its all deterministic, relative to the prevailing conditions. Can we not blame the Inquisition for what they did in pursuit of preventing blasphemy or heresy? How do you change a fundamentalist Muslim from killing you if you do not believe as he does? Are you going to change his mind in any way by arguing that what he does is determined. He will just answer you that God determines what is appropriate and what he does is in accordance with Islamic scripture (Truth).
Persons who are rational, who know well what the consequences of their actions will probably be, who are not forced or coerced to perform evil, but who nonetheless do perform evil, may with perfect appropriateness be blamed. In as strong a sense as one could possibly want, they did not have to do what they did. (Although, of course, what they did was completely physically determined.)The problem is they didn't have an appropriate way of doing what they should have done to be blamed in a strong sense. Would have if they wanted to, might as well be would have if they'd had six toes. Stephen, stipulating that you are correct, how does this in any way affect our hardwired ability (survival strategy) to lay blame as well as praise? Does any of the foregoing change anything? It occurs to me that a smoker acts to satisfy a craving, but in the act of smoking also damages his body. Thus the path to greater satisfaction may also lead to lung cancer (and you die). If we are not to blame for causing climate change, You are using the word blame in place of responsibility. This discovery does not remove one's responsibility, but it does remove the blame.
shall we just continue on our path to self destruction?Of course not but that wouldn't happen under the changed conditions.
IMO, it is appropriate to say that even if we have a bushel of healthy apples, a single bad apple can spoil the entire bushel. The bad apple cannot help that it is bad, but its condition "affects" all the apples in the immediate proximity. Shall we remove the bad apple or just say "oh well, it is determinism".Write4U, why do you think I'm here? I am offering something that can significantly change the trajectory of where our world is headed as a result of a discovery that lies locked behind the door of determinism. It isn't that we condone bad behavior and just say "oh well, it is determinism." The concern has been that if people know their will is not free, they could use it as an excuse to do whatever they want and then just say, "I couldn't help myself because my will is not free." This problem has been addressed in the book and overcome.
I am not concerned with what is, I am concerned if it can be changed in any significant way. IMO, the entire concept that by identifying why and how people act we can somehow change it is idealism, and there is no such thing as ideal, except what nature already has deemed "effective".But this IS a natural law that has not been utilized to its fullest because we didn't have the knowledge until now. It is also true that when we change the conditions of the environment, we can change how people act. This is not idealism as if this kind of world cannot be achieved. This is not going against nature; it is working with our ultimate nature.
If we are not to blame for causing climate change, shall we just continue on our path to self destruction?Does the addition of blame help us change course?
IMO, it is a natural method of identifying aberrations to the norm.
IMO, it is appropriate to say that even if we have a bushel of healthy apples, a single bad apple can spoil the entire bushel. The bad apple cannot help that it is bad, but its condition "affects" all the apples in the immediate proximity. Shall we remove the bad apple or just say "oh well, it is determinism".
we blame it? Would it make a difference if we did?
see above. We identify the problem of rot (lay blame to the rot, not the apple) and we remove the rotten apple.But look at our world. We get rid of one rotten apple and we get three more in its place.
I am not concerned with what is, I am concerned if it can be changed in any significant way. IMO, the entire concept that by identifying why and how people act we can somehow change it is idealism, and there is no such thing as ideal, except what nature already has deemed "effective".
We do plenty which is ineffective or harmful due to false beliefs, that's why getting them right matters.
And removing blame solves the problem? By the foregoing proposition, "false beliefs" would be unalterable because a false belief is still seeking satisfaction and deterministic of our actions. Now multiply this by 6 billion individual minds, each with their own beliefs. IMO, there is no "one size fits all". Its all relatively deterministic. Can we not blame the Inquisition for what they did in pursuit of preventing blasphemy or heresy? How do you change a fundamentalist Muslim from killing you if you do not believe as he does?Change happens slowly but there is progress already being made in the Middle East as people are standing up for their freedom. The internet has helped in this effort. Your question is valid but you need to take a step back before jumping to the conclusion that it is impossible to change belief systems that are destructive. It wasn't long ago that people believed blacks were an inferior race and they felt justified in treating them with disdain. Our attitude has changed dramatically in recent years thanks to a change in our beliefs.
@ peacegirl,
Assigning responsibility is a two way street. If you remove the subset “blame”, you also remove the subset “praise”.
Who do we blame for this mess (assigning responsibility), the Universe or the individual person?
Who do we praise for this excellent work (assigning responsibility), the Universe or the individual person?
You cannot have one without the other. This is how Nature has figured it out for us and it has worked well from an objective and unemotional standpoint. The human race is one of the two most succesful species on earth, in great part due to our ability to blame and praise.
We try to avoid being blamed, instead we try to earn praise. What better incentive is there? Bad behavior is discouraged, good behavior is rewarded.
Which is the more desirable?
Persons who are rational, who know well what the consequences of their actions will probably be, who are not forced or coerced to perform evil, but who nonetheless do perform evil, may with perfect appropriateness be blamed. In as strong a sense as one could possibly want, they did not have to do what they did. (Although, of course, what they did was completely physically determined.)The problem is they didn't have an appropriate way of doing what they should have done to be blamed in a strong sense. Would have if they wanted to, might as well be would have if they'd had six toes. Stephen, stipulating that you are correct and we are all in agreement. How does this in any way affect our hardwired ability (survival strategy) to lay blame as well as praise? That's a good question; indeed, if Stephen is right, I have no choice at all in blaming and punishing people, nor any choice in believing in the free will that he maintains is impossible. Of course, he has no choice in arguing that people should not believe in free will, because by not believing it there will be (allegedly) less destructive moral anger, or whatever. But on his own terms, what we're doing here is a dumb show: We're puppets pulled by strings initiated at the Big Bang. I think that Stephen is wrong, though. So, we are definitely not in agreement. I have argued that even if it were true that we could somehow "replay" the world in exactly the same way it happened, and it turns out that I always choose the same thing, it does not follow that I must do this. To say that we "must" rather than "will" is a clear modal fallacy. We've also discussed the difference between relative and absolute necessity, but he seems to lose the thread of the modal argument when it comes to causal determinism, though he understands it perfectly with respect to logical and epistemic determinism. But in the end it does not matter much. When Stephen says that if we replayed the history of the world with the exact same prior antecedents, we'd always get the same future (same past, same future, including all human acts), he's wrong, in my view. He admits that this can't be proved, but calls it a safe assumption. It's not a safe assumption. It's a wrong assumption, I think, and its wrongness has nothing to do with quantum mechanics, either, since a "same history, same future" formulation would by definition include all the identical antecedent quantum indeterministic occurrences. Of course, QM does show that even on the assumption of a "replayed history" with all identical antecedents intact, the next step is not deterministic but probablistic. However, it can be thought that indeterminism is no friendlier to free will than determinism. But I challenge the "same history, same future" claim of Stephen. even independent of QM. Can he demonstrate why he thinks this is so? So far he has only called it an assumption; but we know how tenuous assumptions are. Stephen, I suggest you read the Chapter Ten to the Swartz book that I linked upthread. Then read chapter 11, here.] It might put the conversation on an interesting new course. I know peacegirl won't read anything, and that's OK because I don't read her posts; but maybe Stephen, GdR, and others might like to read these chapters and discuss them. Even if Stephen, GdR and others do not agree with Swartz, I think the discussion of his views on causal determinism and free will can be very interesting and productive.
That's a good question; indeed, if Stephen is right, I have no choice at all in blaming and punishing people, nor any choice in believing in the free will that he maintains is impossible. Of course, he has no choice in arguing that people should not believe in free will, because by not believing it there will be (allegedly) less destructive moral anger, or whatever. But on his own terms, what we're doing here is a dumb show: We're puppets pulled by strings initiated at the Big Bang.I believe we have a choice in the compatibilist sense. I just don't believe in CCFW.
I have argued that even if it were true that we could somehow "replay" the world in exactly the same way it happened, and it turns out that I always choose the same thing, it does not follow that I must do this. To say that we "must" rather than "will" is a clear modal fallacy. We've also discussed the difference between relative and absolute necessity, but he seems to lose the thread of the modal argument when it comes to causal determinism, though he understands it perfectly with respect to logical and epistemic determinism.I've not lost the thread. It's semantics. In order to do otherwise I'd need different causal antecedents. So in order to have paid by debit card in my example, I'd have needed different causal antecedents so that I had a debit card with me. You say this means I could not have paid by debit card. Then when we talk bout having different wants, which also would have required different causal antecedents, you switch the way you use language and say we could have had different wants and so could have done otherwise..
But in the end it does not matter much. When Stephen says that if we replayed the history of the world with the exact same prior antecedents, we'd always get the same future (same past, same future, including all human acts), he's wrong, in my view. He admits that this can't be proved, but calls it a safe assumption. It's not a safe assumption.I don't mean it's safe to assume the universe is like that. I mean we can assume it for practical purposes because indeterminism can't make any difference to moral responsibility.
However, it can be thought that indeterminism is no friendlier to free will than determinism.Right so that's why we can assume determinism.
But I challenge the "same history, same future" claim of Stephen. even independent of QM. Can he demonstrate why he thinks this is so? So far he has only called it an assumption; but we know how tenuous assumptions are.I don't know if it's true. We just know indeterminism can make no difference to moral responsibility or choice and so we can proceed with determinism as our model of reality.
Stephen, I suggest you read the Chapter Ten to the Swartz book that I linked upthread. Then read chapter 11, here.] It might put the conversation on an interesting new course. I know peacegirl won't read anything, and that's OK because I don't read her posts; but maybe Stephen, GdR, and others might like to read these chapters and discuss them. Even if Stephen, GdR and others do not agree with Swartz, I think the discussion of his views on causal determinism and free will can be very interesting and productive.We've looked into what Norman Swartz says. The problem is we do not have the right way of doing otherwise. Swartz shows we can but that's all. How ever we look at it circumstances not chosen by us would have to be different for us to do otherwise. Swartz just sees free will as could have done otherwise, so thinks he dissolves the problem but it's all about how we could have done otherwise. Assuming determinism the two ways are 1) would have if the big bang had banged appropriately differently and 2) Would have if physical laws were different. Both those ways mean it turns out to be 100% moral luck just like if the way I could have done otherwise were would have if I had six toes.
How ever we look at it circumstances not chosen by us would have to be different for us to do otherwise.True, but not relevant to moral responsibility. We don't need to have control over ancient prior conditions in order to have control over present outcomes.
Assuming determinism the two ways are 1) would have if the big bang had banged appropriately differently and 2) Would have if physical laws were different. Both those ways mean it turns out to be 100% moral luck just like if the way I could have done otherwise were would have if I had six toes.That's not what 'luck' means. It is luck if your decisions and reasoning have nothing to do with the outcome, but not if they are a crucial part of the causal chain leading to that outcome. The latter is the opposite of luck, unless you wish to define luck in such a way as to rob it of any useful meaning.
How ever we look at it circumstances not chosen by us would have to be different for us to do otherwise.True, but not relevant to moral responsibility. We don't need to have control over ancient prior conditions in order to have control over present outcomes. This is equivocation over control. The point is it's 100% luck which choice we make. We can't have control that would overcome any of that luck at all. Imagine it's true that if I had been born 2 seconds later I would be a murderer. We can see it's sheer luck as far as I'm concerned (and my would be victim) that I wasn't born 2 seconds later.
That's not what 'luck' means. It is luck if your decisions and reasoning have nothing to do with the outcome, but not if they are a crucial part of the causal chain leading to that outcome. The latter is the opposite of luck, unless you wish to define luck in such a way as to rob it of any useful meaning.Two statements are true. 1) If circumstances not of my choosing had been appropriately different I would have done otherwise. 2) In order to have done otherwise circumstances not chosen by me would have had to have been different. These two statements are useful because it's these that need to be denied for us to be morally responsible as ordinarily understood. When I use the term luck in this context that is what I mean.
This is equivocation over control. The point is it's 100% luck which choice we make. We can't have control that would overcome any of that luck at all.I am not equivocating. I am pointing out that we can have control over events without having control over their distal causes. This is true in the only sense that 'control' has any real meaning. The kind of 'control' that would also require control over all antecedent causes all the way back to the Big Bang is as useless and preposterous as the libertarian conception of free will.
Imagine it's true that if I had been born 2 seconds later I would be a murderer. We can see it's sheer luck as far as I'm concerned (and my would be victim) that I wasn't born 2 seconds later.It's only sheer luck if the difference made is independent of your own reasoning and decision-making.
Two statements are true. 1) If circumstances not of my choosing had been appropriately different I would have done otherwise. 2) In order to have done otherwise circumstances not chosen by me would have had to have been different. These two statements are useful because it's these that need to be denied for us to be morally responsible as ordinarily understood. When I use the term luck in this context that is what I mean.Then you have indeed robbed the term 'luck' of any useful meaning, and you are not using it as people normally do. Normally, an event is a matter of luck if your own desires and decisions have no causal bearing on the outcome.
This is equivocation over control. The point is it's 100% luck which choice we make. We can't have control that would overcome any of that luck at all.I am not equivocating. I am pointing out that we can have control over events without having control over their distal causes. This is true in the only sense that 'control' has any real meaning. The kind of 'control' that would also require control over all antecedent causes all the way back to the Big Bang is as useless and preposterous as the libertarian conception of free will. But that's what would be required to deserve blame. We don't have the right sort of opportunity to do what we ought to do (in cases in which we don't) Because the opportunity is would if we'd been lucky enough to have different causal antecedents stretching back to the big bang.
This is equivocation over control. The point is it's 100% luck which choice we make. We can't have control that would overcome any of that luck at all.I am not equivocating. I am pointing out that we can have control over events without having control over their distal causes. This is true in the only sense that 'control' has any real meaning. The kind of 'control' that would also require control over all antecedent causes all the way back to the Big Bang is as useless and preposterous as the libertarian conception of free will. But that's what would be required to deserve blame... I think blame is a separate question from control vs. luck. You could argue that the kind of control we have that separates our actions and choices from mere luck isn't enough to warrant blame. But this is itself a value judgment. We are free to choose what kind of control warrants praise and blame. It's up to us. It certainly isn't a factual matter or something entailed by determinism. And I see no stronger basis for saying that blame should require the nonsensical super-control we both acknowledge to be impossible, than for saying it requires only the perfectly meaningful kind of control we both acknowledge that we do have. I see it as no more than an unexamined prejudice to insist that blame requires control over more than just the outcome in question.