Facts like these make this discussion never-ending, but also fundamentally otiose. Sometimes I'm tempted to agree with natural.atheist that philosophy is useless -- well, not useless, as he thinks, but pretty futile, if our objective is to actually find things out that we can act on.Well, he's an atheist and a naturalist and he's used philosophy to come to that conclusion. It's really quite similar.
Facts like these make this discussion never-ending, but also fundamentally otiose. Sometimes I'm tempted to agree with natural.atheist that philosophy is useless -- well, not useless, as he thinks, but pretty futile, if our objective is to actually find things out that we can act on.Well, he's an atheist and a naturalist and he's used philosophy to come to that conclusion. It's really quite similar. Actually, the knowledge that man's will is not free is scientific, although the discovery of this law was borne out of philosophical thought.
It's not what she meant. We went over this with her again and again at FF. She repeatedly insisted, and insisted until quite recently right here, that the modal status of a truth changes from "contingent" before the act or event to "necessary" afterward. Now she is changing her tune, though of course she will deny that she is.I think so too. And I think when she moves to another forum, she will say it the same way again.
And, though better, it's STILL a modal fallacy. "But you didn't want to, therefore you couldn't," should read "But you didn't want to, therefore you didn't." That removes the modal fallacy.I stand corrected.
Anyhow, her changed argument is beginning to sound a lot like compatibilism -- which she never heard of before she came to FF, and which, to the very present moment, she strenuously denies supporting. Go figure.Yeah, I noticed that too. Especially that 'we are not dominoes' and 'we can do nothing which is not according our free will'. But then follows 'BUT THAT IS NOT FREE WILL'. And why? Because we can only act according to our greatest satisfaction. Which I would call (a rather extremist version of) compatibilist free will, which in it most simple form, is: you have free will if you can do what you want. From peacegirl's standpoint one must define free will as being able to do what you do not want. That is pretty absurd.
It's not what she meant. We went over this with her again and again at FF. She repeatedly insisted, and insisted until quite recently right here, that the modal status of a truth changes from "contingent" before the act or event to "necessary" afterward. Now she is changing her tune, though of course she will deny that she is.I think so too. And I think when she moves to another forum, she will say it the same way again.
And, though better, it's STILL a modal fallacy. "But you didn't want to, therefore you couldn't," should read "But you didn't want to, therefore you didn't." That removes the modal fallacy.I stand corrected.
Anyhow, her changed argument is beginning to sound a lot like compatibilism -- which she never heard of before she came to FF, and which, to the very present moment, she strenuously denies supporting. Go figure.Yeah, I noticed that too. Especially that 'we are not dominoes' and 'we can do nothing which is not according our free will'. But then follows 'BUT THAT IS NOT FREE WILL'. And why? Because we can only act according to our greatest satisfaction. Which I would call (a rather extremist version of) compatibilist free will, which in it most simple form, is: you have free will if you can do what you want. From peacegirl's standpoint one must define free will as being able to do what you do not want. That is pretty absurd. Actually, it is not absurd. Free will states that we can choose A or B equally even if B is not preferable in comparison to A. That is why in any comparison where there is a meaningful difference, desire is compelled to choose that option which is most desired, or which gives the greatest satisfaction in the continual weighing of the pros and cons of each choice. This is why FREE choice (it has already been established that having options does not automatically grant free will) is a delusion because we cannot choose that which we believe is worse for ourselves (regardless of what others think) when there is something better available.
From peacegirl's standpoint one must define free will as being able to do what you do not want. That is pretty absurd.1) people believe the absurd version is true. 2) People do consider being able to do other than we want an important freedom. So the control to be able to do something for good consequential reasons despite not wanting to. 3) compatibilist free will rests on it being possible to be forced against our will. I.e not do what we want.
Actually, it is not absurd. Free will states that we can choose A or B equally even if B is not preferable in comparison to A.That's a version of free will people usually believe in yes. But it is absurd because it makes a nonsense of selecting from options so a nonsense of choice itself.
I watched a murder mystery. A suspect was ruled out, she couldn’t have done it. Modal fallacy?
I couldn’t pay by debit card because I didn’t have it. Modal fallacy?
It’s Bullshit. There is no good reason to think peacegirl was doing other than using language as we often correctly do.
Actually, it is not absurd. Free will states that we can choose A or B equally even if B is not preferable in comparison to A.That's a version of free will people usually believe in yes. But it is absurd because it makes a nonsense of selecting from options so a nonsense of choice itself. I meant to say that my objection to the compatibilist version of free will is not absurd because the definition given implies that one can do what one doesn't want in favor of what one does want. This IS absurd because it makes a mockery of choice itself. What's the point of deliberation if not to pick the most preferable option based on the considerations being contemplated?
I meant to say that my objection to the compatibilist version of free will is not absurd because the definition given implies that one can do what one doesn't want in favor of what one does want...It doesn't imply that at all, so it looks like your objection is baseless.
I meant to say that my objection to the compatibilist version of free will is not absurd because the definition given implies that one can do what one doesn't want in favor of what one does want...It doesn't imply that at all, so it looks like your objection is baseless. Of course it does. It is a judgment, by others, that one should have picked something other than what he did. The blame and judgment are then justified on the grounds that this person could have chosen otherwise given the compatibilist definition, but we see that using threats of punishment as a deterrent is only partially successful. It doesn't stop those who want something badly enough, and those usually are the ones who do the worst crimes. I think you are so determined to discredit Lessans that you have lost all sensibilities and cannot be taken seriously by anyone who sees the flawed logic inherent in the compatibilist argument.
I meant to say that my objection to the compatibilist version of free will is not absurd because the definition given implies that one can do what one doesn't want in favor of what one does want...It doesn't imply that at all, so it looks like your objection is baseless. Of course it does. No, it doesn't.
I think you are so determined to discredit Lessans that you have lost all sensibilities and cannot be taken seriously by anyone who sees the flawed logic inherent in the compatibilist argument.You still have no idea what compatibilism is.
From peacegirl's standpoint one must define free will as being able to do what you do not want. That is pretty absurd.1) people believe the absurd version is true. Really? Ask people: is free will that you can do what you want, or is free will that you do what you do not want. What answers will you get, you think?
2) People do consider being able to do other than we want an important freedom. So the control to be able to do something for good consequential reasons despite not wanting to.You mean that people are not a unity, that they have different drives and motivations that are not consistent. When somebody needs some strain not do do what his immediate lust does not mean he does not do that he wants to do.
3) compatibilist free will rests on it being possible to be forced against our will. I.e not do what we want.It is not based on it: it is an example of not acting according your will.
This is just what is being said in Pecs example. I couldn't have paid by credit card if I confine could to could with precisely the same causal antecedents. But I could have because I could have wanted to, meaning I would have wanted to if causal antecedents had been appropriately different.Playing "What If" has no place in a rational discussion, but since we are discussing Lessans book, it is quite appropriate, please carry on.
I watched a murder mystery. A suspect was ruled out, she couldn't have done it. Modal fallacy? I couldn't pay by debit card because I didn't have it. Modal fallacy? It's Bullshit. There is no good reason to think peacegirl was doing other than using language as we often correctly do.Quite ridiculous examples. If someone is suspected in a murder committed in New York, and it turns out that at the time of the murder she was in San Francisco, then yes, she could not have committed the murder. No one is saying that this constitutes a modal fallacy. The problem is you are confusing natural language use of modalities with the modal use of language. The whole point of modal logic -- of logic in general, with its formal symbolic structure -- is to avoid the errors to which natural language is prone. I never claimed that if you don't have your debit card with you, it constitutes a modal fallacy to say that you "couldn't" pay with your debit card. How could you pay with a card you don't have? What I said, and maintain, is that it constitutes a modal fallacy to say that if you HAVE your debit card with you, and choose NOT to pay with it, then it follows that you COULD NOT have paid with it. You simply DID not, is all.
There are plenty of things I cannot do, and could not do in the past tense, and saying I can’t or couldn’t do these things does not constitute a modal fallacy, and I never claimed that it did.
I can’t sprout wings and fly to the moon, and couldn’t have done so at any time in the past. I can’t and couldn’t travel faster than light. I can’t and couldn’t pay with a debit card if I don’t and didn’t have such a card in my possession. None of these are modal fallacies and I never said they were.
I meant to say that my objection to the compatibilist version of free will is not absurd because the definition given implies that one can do what one doesn't want in favor of what one does want...It doesn't imply that at all, so it looks like your objection is baseless. Of course it does. No, it doesn't.
I think you are so determined to discredit Lessans that you have lost all sensibilities and cannot be taken seriously by anyone who sees the flawed logic inherent in the compatibilist argument.You still have no idea what compatibilism is. I probably understand it better than you. :roll:
I watched a murder mystery. A suspect was ruled out, she couldn't have done it. Modal fallacy? I couldn't pay by debit card because I didn't have it. Modal fallacy? It's Bullshit. There is no good reason to think peacegirl was doing other than using language as we often correctly do.Quite ridiculous examples. If someone is suspected in a murder committed in New York, and it turns out that at the time of the murder she was in San Francisco, then yes, she could not have committed the murder. No one is saying that this constitutes a modal fallacy. The problem is you are confusing natural language use of modalities with the modal use of language. The whole point of modal logic -- of logic in general, with its formal symbolic structure -- is to avoid the errors to which natural language is prone. Funny thing is the fact that this apparent logical formality is problematic thereby doing the very thing it is aimed at preventing (ie., since the logic may appear valid but the "proof" of no free will is unsound. Logic can be very misleading as is seen here).
I never claimed that if you don't have your debit card with you, it constitutes a modal fallacy to say that you "couldn't" pay with your debit card. How could you pay with a card you don't have? What I said, and maintain, is that it constitutes a modal fallacy to say that if you HAVE your debit card with you, and choose NOT to pay with it, then it follows that you COULD NOT have paid with it. You simply DID not, is all.It most certainly does mean that you could not have paid with it. You have absolutely no understanding of Lessans' proposal, nada! You don't even address it yet you say your synopsis is better than mine. What gumption!!! >:-(
There are plenty of things I cannot do, and could not do in the past tense, and saying I can't or couldn't do these things does not constitute a modal fallacy, and I never claimed that it did. I can't sprout wings and fly to the moon, and couldn't have done so at any time in the past. I can't and couldn't travel faster than light. I can't and couldn't pay with a debit card if I don't and didn't have such a card in my possession. None of these are modal fallacies and I never said they were.Leaving the example aside that has gotten you so wound up, even if you could do certain things such as debit your card because you had it with you at the time does not grant you the freedom to choose that card if there are/were better alternatives presented to you. So sprouting wings and flying to the moon [bullshit] does nothing to counter Stephen's most accurate rebuttal.
“The free-will problem is solved so thoroughly it cannot even be stated coherently.”]
From the above:
Note, finally, how much better the Regularity Theory is as a basis for doing ethics than is presupposing the Autonomy Theory. The perennial worry is laid to rest about whether “ought to have done x" (where a person did not do x) is logically compatible with “could have done x." We want to argue that “ought" implies “can," but you remain troubled about whether a person “really can" do x in those instances where he does not. Problems like these are idle in the Regularity view of physical laws. If you will give up your distorted view of physical necessitation, all these seeming paradoxes fall away, leaving a residuum of genuine problems. What makes an action ethically neutral, praiseworthy, or blameworthy remains a challenge to spell out. But that such categories should rationally be applied to some acts is not in the slightest threatened by adopting the Regularity Theory. Indeed, we can see how it is easier on this account to attribute blame. Persons who are not coerced, who are not hypnotized, who are not drugged, etc., are ‘free’ to choose as they want. Persons who are rational, who know well what the consequences of their actions will probably be, who are not forced or coerced to perform evil, but who nonetheless do perform evil, may with perfect appropriateness be blamed. In as strong a sense as one could possibly want, they did not have to do what they did. (Although, of course, what they did was completely physically determined.) In short, all the standard ways we go about assigning excuses and blame remain precisely intact. We excuse persons who are irrational, who are too young to be able to anticipate the consequences of their actions, whose actions had unforeseeable consequences, etc.7 And we blame persons who could see the harm of their contemplated actions but who deliberately wreaked havoc anyway, etc. So far as we can tell, our actions are determined; many of them are free; certainly many of them are praiseworthy, and some others are blameworthy. Being determined, being free, and being praiseworthy or blameworthy are the happiest of bedfellows on the Regularity Theory of grand physical truths (physical laws). There is a tension among them only when you assume that physical laws are something like irresistible forces, compelling us to behave in certain ways. Instead, conceive of those physical laws that subsume our behavior simply as propositions deriving their truth from what we do. Give up the idea that physical necessitation forces events to occur, and the free-will problem is solved so thoroughly that it cannot even be stated coherently.
In the above-linked book chapter, it is important to read the section that begins, “Epilogue to the Martian’s First Seminar,” which begins on Page 129.