That does not work, peacegirl. All these arguments about who has an open or closed mind… Why should I go on reading your father’s book, when I see that the basics already wrong?
I asked you to consider that ‘could have chosen dish 7’ as past tense of ‘can choose dish 7’. You did not even try. You stick to an obviously shift of context in meaning of these sentences: in the present tense you do as if you can choose between 10 dishes, but in the past tense it changes in ‘you have no choice between 10 dishes’: the absurdity is obvious if I put the sentence also in present tense. If you have a choice, then you had a choice. If you can choose dish 7 instead of dish 5, then you could have chosen dish 7 instead of dish 5, i.e. you could have done otherwise.
You cannot give a correct account why the excuse ‘I could not do otherwise’ works for me in the cantina situation, but doesn’t in the restaurant where you had a choice of 10 dishes. From the view of determinism both situations are the same, but really, for us they are not. And the reason is that the options in the restaurant are real. There are (were!) 10 dishes on the menu card.
Or do you really think I should accept your excuse for eating white beans in the restaurant?
That does not work, peacegirl. All these arguments about who has an open or closed mind... Why should I go on reading your father's book, when I see that the basics already wrong?The basics are not wrong. Your reasoning is unsound.
I asked you to consider that 'could have chosen dish 7' as past tense of 'can choose dish 7'. You did not even try.It is true that you had 10 dishes to pick from. At the moment of choice, those options were available to you but that in no way means you had the free will to choose those options equally, which free will implies. IOW, free will implies that you could just as easily have chosen dish 5 instead of dish 7 even when there was a distinct difference in your preference for dish 7. It is impossible to choose an option that gives you less satisfaction in comparison to the available alternatives, therefore it would have been impossible to have chosen dish 5 under the same exact conditions. Now if someone said in advance that he can prove that he doesn't have to choose dish 7 (which is what the modal fallacy contends), then obviously his considerations --- based on a new set of conditions ---- have changed based on what he is now trying to prove, thus causing a change in his preference. None of this disproves the fact that he had no choice once it was made. The fact that the tense changes from "before" to "after" does not negate this fact.
You stick to an obviously shift of context in meaning of these sentences: in the present tense you do as if you can choose between 10 dishes, but in the past tense it changes in 'you have no choice between 10 dishes': the absurdity is obvious if I put the sentence also in present tense. If you have a choice, then you had a choice.You did have a choice, but that doesn't mean it was a free one.
If you can choose dish 7 instead of dish 5, then you could have chosen dish 7 instead of dish 5, i.e. you could have done otherwise.No you could not have chosen dish 5. I never said you didn't have options, but the word 'choice" is misleading for it assumes you have two or more possibilities. This is a delusion. It is obvious that in the cantina example you only were given one option so you had nothing to consider as far as menu items, but this doesn't mean that given more than one choice to consider you now have free will. I cut and pasted this already but I'll paste it again. I'm not sure what it is you don't understand. The word ‘choice’ itself indicates there are meaningful differences otherwise there would be no choice in the matter at all as with A and A. The reason you are confused is because the word choice is very misleading for it assumes that man has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction, compels a person to prefer of differences what he, not someone else, considers better for himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented for his consideration he is compelled by his very nature to prefer not that one which he considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better or more satisfying for the particular set of circumstances involved.
You cannot give a correct account why the excuse 'I could not do otherwise' works for me in the cantina situation, but doesn't in the restaurant where you had a choice of 10 dishes. From the view of determinism both situations are the same, but really, for us they are not. And the reason is that the options in the restaurant are real. There are (were!) 10 dishes on the menu card. Or do you really think I should accept your excuse for eating white beans in the restaurant?In the new world you wouldn't question my reason for eating the white beans. You would already know that I didn't purposely mean to mess up our plans.
Wait! Before I even read the rest of this post, where is there any free will (libertarian or compatibilist) if we had to select the option of our choice. Please respond.1) It's a matter of defining free will. It can be defined as compatible with anything at all, not rightly so but it can. And that's the thing to see, You are talking about free will by one definition which used to be called the freedom of indifference and is now called contra casual free will. And GdB is talking about something else. Why he chooses to do that when he knows you are talking about contra causal free will I don't know. 2) Also it was theoretically possible for you to have done otherwise and that's the compatibilist version of CHDO.
Theoretically anything is possible, but I'm not talking theory. I'm talking reality.I know and GdB knows too. But he changes the meaning of CHDO from what you're talking about to something else and then says he disagrees with you. You've just gotta smile. But circling and circling over that is no good, just see what he's doing and work with it.
Regardless of what is physically possible (i.e., it is possible that I could choose a hamburger over fish) does not mean that, in reality, I could have done this once I chose the hamburger. The fact that we cannot predict what a person will choose does not negate the fact that he must choose what gives him greater satisfaction. If you want to defend your argument, prove to me that under the same exact conditions a person could have chosen otherwise, which everyone seems to be conveniently overlooking.I don't want to defend my argument. I'm pointing out that GdB agrees we CNHDO under the same exact conditions. He's defining CHDO differently. The only thing I'm defending is you don't disagree and it would be helpful for you to know that.
That is what I was trying to say. That if there was anything different in the chain of events that drove one to choose what he did, then we could say his will was free to choose otherwise. But this is impossible given the same exact situation he was faced with, along with his predispositions, environment, experiences, and so on.That's right. And GdB thinks that's right. So you are in complete agreement.
It is possible to have compatibilist free will with adequate macro determinism.No it isn't. :question: Now for one time kkwan writes something that is true, and you deny it? Of course he should have formulated better, that without adequate determinism, free will would be impossible. That was not what he meant. What he's saying is free will can be compatible with determinism if determinism is defined as adequate determinism. But free will cannot be compatible with determinism if determinism is defined as strict determinism. When you say free will is compatible with determinism people often think you mean the free will they have in mind is compatible with deteterminism and since they see that's impossible they imagine you're playing around with the meaning of determinism a bit. That's really quite common.
It seems to me you also live under this confusion: you also think CHDO means 'under exactly the same circumstances'.I think in this case the correct interpretation is we "could have" by virtue of the fact we "would have if". But if someone is using CHDO to mean under exactly the same circumstances then I don't say to them we CHDO without first agreeing with them that we CNHDO in the sense they mean, because that's incredibly confusing.
That's why you think that the past should have been differently to have done something else. So you are under the same semantic spell as peacegirl.I think, assuming determinism if I had done otherwise either the (distant) past would have been different or the laws of nature would be different. And that has to be the case meaning otherwise indeterminism would be true. So that's just the logical consequences of determinism. So although I do have causal power in my own right, there is a clear sense in which what I get to do is 100% luck. If I had been born 1 minute later than I was that would be enough for my life to be quite different I should think, perhaps better perhaps worse, sheer luck in that sense.
Wait! Before I even read the rest of this post, where is there any free will (libertarian or compatibilist) if we had to select the option of our choice. Please respond.1) It's a matter of defining free will. It can be defined as compatible with anything at all, not rightly so but it can. And that's the thing to see, You are talking about free will by one definition which used to be called the freedom of indifference and is now called contra casual free will. And GdB is talking about something else. Why he chooses to do that when he knows you are talking about contra causal free will I don't know. 2) Also it was theoretically possible for you to have done otherwise and that's the compatibilist version of CHDO. I know and GdB knows too. But he changes the meaning of CHDO from what you're talking about to something else and then says he disagrees with you. You've just gotta smile. But circling and circling over that is no good, just see what he's doing and work with it.
Regardless of what is physically possible (i.e., it is possible that I could choose a hamburger over fish) does not mean that, in reality, I could have done this once I chose the hamburger. The fact that we cannot predict what a person will choose does not negate the fact that he must choose what gives him greater satisfaction. If you want to defend your argument, prove to me that under the same exact conditions a person could have chosen otherwise, which everyone seems to be conveniently overlooking.I don't want to defend my argument. I'm pointing out that GdB agrees we CNHDO under the same exact conditions. He's defining CHDO differently. The only thing I'm defending is you don't disagree and it would be helpful for you to know that.
That is what I was trying to say. That if there was anything different in the chain of events that drove one to choose what he did, then we could say his will was free to choose otherwise. But this is impossible given the same exact situation he was faced with, along with his predispositions, environment, experiences, and so on.That's right. And GdB thinks that's right. So you are in complete agreement. But we're not in agreement in one important aspect. If we CNHDO, we CHDO under any condition, even the free will definition compatibilists argue for. It' just an attempt to make it appear that some choices are more free than others and therefore those actions are blameworthy. It is true that compulsions and obsessions look less free than let's say choosing between cereal or eggs for breakfast. And it also appears that having no choice on a menu is qualitatively different than having a choice, but if you carefully analyze each situation you will see that none are free in the sense that we could have done otherwise once a choice has been made.
Ok, let’s try a recap again.
First: I am a determinist (for all practical purposes, we forget about QM). So pointed at the kind of situations we are exploring here, this means that if all conditions are exactly the same, then exactly the same result will happen. So it is determined you will take dish 5. So in this sense, which I will call the physical sense, nothing else could have happened. Or as you both like to say it: ‘you could not have done otherwise’. In sofar I think we agree. We all agree that libertarian free will does not exist.
Now this situation is the same if I look at it before the event or after the event. It is just because of the complexity of all processes that it is practically impossible to predict that you will take dish 5. But Laplace’s daemon, who knows everything in the necessary details (which includes my brainstate to the last atom), can predict that you will take dish 5. In other words, my knowledge, or lack thereof, doesn’t make a physical difference: there is no way that you can choose something else than dish 5, because the causal conditions are just so that you will do that. This, peacegirl, is a consistent, determinist view on you getting dish 5. There is no context switch: you, getting dish 5 is determined, and that is true before the fact, and that is true after the fact. Seen from this view point there is even no choice.
Now there is another viewpoint, the one that we were mostly discussing. There is a very real way of stating that in the restaurant you have a choice between 10 dishes, where you have no choice in the cantina, because they only serve one dish. We can describe it in such a way that we do not get in conflict with determinism (a bit artificial, but natural language has a tendency to fool people): what dish you will take, depends, at the moment of choice, only on you (Of course you have a long causal history that made you what you are now). The dish you will get is causally dependent on your choice. That is also true, it was before the fact, and it is after the fact. We express this fact with: you can choose between 10 dishes. It can be dish 5 or 7, or still another one. And also quite important to know: you cannot choose dish 11, because it just is not there.
Again, stay with me: it is true that you can choose one of the dishes 1 till 10 (but not 11). It is true in a very real sense. Therefore, in exactly the same way, it is true, a day later, that there was a choice out of 10 dishes. In the same way, there was no choice for dish 11. It is also true that yesterday the fact that you got dish 5, was dependent on your choice. (Note: I nowhere dropped the fact that everything is determined!). Now, at this moment, it is still definitely true that you could not have chosen dish 11, because it was no option. But then, in a very real sense again, it is true that you could have chosen dish 7, because that was an option.
The way you are arguing is that you jump from the second context to the first. But they are totally different. You can tell everything in the physical context, in which there really is no choice at all (what is the physical status of an option in physics???). Or you can tell it in the second context in which having options and choosing have a meaning, but then you must stick to it. And in this sense you could have chosen otherwise. To make your point you mix two different discourses: the physical one in which you cannot do something else then you do, and therefore also could not have done otherwise; and the one where you have options and a choice, in which you can choose between options, and there also could have done otherwise. This phrase ‘could have done otherwise’ can have different meanings, dependent on the context.
You say that it is a choice, but not free will. I say that it exactly is free will, because it can bear the load of assigning responsibility. You think it can’t, but you can only defend that by shifting the meaning of the phrase ‘could have done otherwise’ in your argumentation. In a discourse about choices and options ‘could have done otherwise’ simply does not has the meaning as it gets in the physical context. You are doing a kind of stage magician’s trick: for all of us ‘could have done otherwise’ looks the same in both contexts (it is exactly the same words), but it is not the same phrase, because it has different meanings. You are deluding us with a language trick. And I assume, because you really believe you have a point, you are deluding yourself.
Now one short note about this:
It is true that you had 10 dishes to pick from. At the moment of choice, those options were available to you but that in no way means you had the free will to choose those options equally, which free will implies. IOW, free will implies that you could just as easily have chosen dish 5 instead of dish 7 even when there was a distinct difference in your preference for dish 7.This notion of free will is absurd. I have all preferences for dish 5, it is on the menu card, so I choose it, and not that disgusting dish 7 with brussels sprouts. That is what free will is. The only meaning I could distill from your idea, is that you can control yourself: even that you prefer dish 9, because it would taste so much better, you do not take it, because it is all just fat and calories. That is another conception of free will, but still: I recognise the reasons for choosing dish 5 as my own reasons, as I would have if I would have taken dish 9. It is true you are freer if you do not always strive for immediate satisfaction, but that is because you also include other long term options.
You realise you did not answer my question? Is 'I was determined' a good excuse?You cannot give a correct account why the excuse 'I could not do otherwise' works for me in the cantina situation, but doesn't in the restaurant where you had a choice of 10 dishes. From the view of determinism both situations are the same, but really, for us they are not. And the reason is that the options in the restaurant are real. There are (were!) 10 dishes on the menu card. Or do you really think I should accept your excuse for eating white beans in the restaurant?In the new world you wouldn't question my reason for eating the white beans. You would already know that I didn't purposely mean to mess up our plans.
Ok, let's try a recap again. First: I am a determinist (for all practical purposes, we forget about QM). So pointed at the kind of situations we are exploring here, this means that if all conditions are exactly the same, then exactly the same result will happen. So it is determined you will take dish 5. So in this sense, which I will call the physical sense, nothing else could have happened. Or as you both like to say it: 'you could not have done otherwise'. In sofar I think we agree. We all agree that libertarian free will does not exist.I'm very happy that you are at least in agreement with this understanding because I don't know how I could counter your false refutation if you did not accept certain premises as self explanatory. It would be like accepting that you're Santa Clause because the premise started out that you are Santa Clause. How ridiculous is this?
Now this situation is the same if I look at it before the event or after the event. It is just because of the complexity of all processes that it is practically impossible to predict that you will take dish 5.You even said "what does prediction have to with it." Those were your very own words. Why are you renegging on this when you said early on that prediction has nothing to do with it? I just need an explanation. I am not accusing you of anything.But Laplace's daemon, who knows everything in the necessary details (which includes my brainstate to the last atom), can predict that you will take dish 5. In other words, my knowledge, or lack thereof, doesn't make a physical difference: there is no way that you can choose something else than dish 5, because the causal conditions are just so that you will do that. This, peacegirl, is a consistent, determinist view on you getting dish 5. There is no context switch: you, getting dish 5 is determined, and that is true before the fact, and that is true after the fact. Seen from this view point there is even no choice.So where in the world is there room for free will? Why are you insisting that we have this kind of ability; the kind that justifies blame and punishment if we cannot choose other than what we must choose?Now there is another viewpoint, the one that we were mostly discussing. There is a very real way of stating that in the restaurant you have a choice between 10 dishes, where you have no choice in the cantina, because they only serve one dish. We can describe it in such a way that we do not get in conflict with determinism (a bit artificial, but natural language has a tendency to fool people): what dish you will take, depends, at the moment of choice, only on you (Of course you have a long causal history that made you what you are now).You said that what dish you will take depends on the moment of choice. And it is true that the moment of choice has a long causal history but the word cause is misleading for it assumes something other than you is causing you to do what you do. You have yet to understand any of this which is unacceptable in a scientific investigation.The dish you will get is causally dependent on your choice. That is also true, it was before the fact, and it is after the fact. We express this fact with: you can choose between 10 dishes. It can be dish 5 or 7, or still another one. And also quite important to know: you cannot choose dish 11, because it just is not there.You keep saying this as if the options available determine whether your will is free or not. I will state, once again, that how many options you have available to you has nothing to do with, nor does it negate, the fact that you must move in the direction of greater satisfaction (which is why will is not free).Again, stay with me: it is true that you can choose one of the dishes 1 till 10 (but not 11). It is true in a very real sense. Therefore, in exactly the same way, it is true, a day later, that there was a choice out of 10 dishes.I'm staying with you. But no one is denying that you didn't have options 1-10. This is not equivalent to having free will.In the same way, there was no choice for dish 11. It is also true that yesterday the fact that you got dish 5, was dependent on your choice. (Note: I nowhere dropped the fact that everything is determined!). Now, at this moment, it is still definitely true that you could not have chosen dish 11, because it was no option. But then, in a very real sense again, it is true that you could have chosen dish 7, because that was an option.IF YOU HAD WANTED TO; IF YOU HAD DESIRED DISH 11. Lessans states that you can use the term "free will" in this context. I chose dish 5 of my own free will, which only means I chose this of my own desire BECAUSE IT GAVE ME GREATER SATISFACTION. I say I chose something of my own free will all the time, but this doesn't mean I actually have freedom of the will. Do you see the confusion with words?The way you are arguing is that you jump from the second context to the first. But they are totally different. You can tell everything in the physical context, in which there really is no choice at all (what is the physical status of an option in physics???). Or you can tell it in the second context in which having options and choosing have a meaning, but then you must stick to it. And in this sense you could have chosen otherwise. To make your point you mix two different discourses: the physical one in which you cannot do something else then you do, and therefore also could not have done otherwise; and the one where you have options and a choice, in which you can choose between options, and there also could have done otherwise. This phrase 'could have done otherwise' can have different meanings, dependent on the context.Your reasoning is all scrambled. As I said earlier, you can have 100 options, or no options at all, but this in no way changes the direction we are compelled to go. If this thread is going to be saved you need to admit that "greater satisfaction" is not dependent on the conditions. I could be in a prison with no options at all and still my every move (based on these strict conditions) is still in the direction of greater satisfaction than what the present position offers. The problem is you have not read the first chapter with a desire to learn. The fact that you told me you listened to Chapter One and got nothing out of it proves my case.You say that it is a choice, but not free will. I say that it exactly is free will, because it can bear the load of assigning responsibility. You think it can't, but you can only defend that by shifting the meaning of the phrase 'could have done otherwise' in your argumentation. In a discourse about choices and options 'could have done otherwise' simply does not has the meaning as it gets in the physical context. You are doing a kind of stage magician's trick: for all of us 'could have done otherwise' looks the same in both contexts (it is exactly the same words), but it is not the same phrase, because it has different meanings. You are deluding us with a language trick. And I assume, because you really believe you have a point, you are deluding yourself.No, it is YOU that is the magician for how could you do otherwise when you could not have done otherwise given the exact circumstances that were before you? Your words are just that, words. They do not correspond with reality. You are now talking gobbledygook. No matter how valid something appears, it does not mean it is sound.Now one short note about this:Lessans never argued that we can use the term "free will" in this context. I chose dish 5 because dish 7 had brussel sprouts which I don't prefer. I chose dish 5 of my own free will, of my own desire. Who is arguing with you here? :-/It is true that you had 10 dishes to pick from. At the moment of choice, those options were available to you but that in no way means you had the free will to choose those options equally, which free will implies. IOW, free will implies that you could just as easily have chosen dish 5 instead of dish 7 even when there was a distinct difference in your preference for dish 7.This notion of free will is absurd. I have all preferences for dish 5, it is on the menu card, so I choose it, and not that disgusting dish 7 with brussels sprouts. That is what free will is.The only meaning I could distill from your idea, is that you can control yourself: even that you prefer dish 9, because it would taste so much better, you do not take it, because it is all just fat and calories. That is another conception of free will, but still: I recognise the reasons for choosing dish 5 as my own reasons, as I would have if I would have taken dish 9. It is true you are freer if you do not always strive for immediate satisfaction, but that is because you also include other long term options.Now your words are getting completely scrambled. This is the problem, unraveling your words which are not reflective of what is going on in reality. You are under a compulsion every moment of your life to move in the direction of greater satisfaction, so where do you have control? And how can you not strive for greater satisfaction when this is an immutable law which you cannot escape from?
But we're not in agreement in one important aspect. If we CNHDO, we CHDO under any condition, even the free will definition compatibilists argue for. It' just an attempt to make it appear that some choices are more free than others and therefore those actions are blameworthy.We're not blameworthy in the way people suppose. And it's important so I'm with you. But is the compatibilist doing what you say? Take speeding fines. Do you agree with them? I do. One of the things the compatibilists say is it only makes sense to make people pay the fines who can respond to the prospect of a fine. In the past tense could have responded. So there is a real point to compatibilist CHDO and I should think it's the real sort of reason we are interested in what else people could have done in the first place.
The author did get to the point but you're not willing to invest the time to find out. The fact that he makes extraordinary claims does not mean he's wrong for making them especially if he is right in his analysis. How do you know his findings are not revolutionary if you don't know what they are? The author demonstrates why man's will is not free, and then extends this knowledge into every area of human relation. Philosophers down through the ages looked at determinism and could not get past the implications for if man's will is not free, we cannot blame. The question becomes: How in the world can we not blame people who hurt us, and wouldn't this make man even less responsible? This impasse has been a difficult stumbling block to overcome since blame and punishment is the cornerstone of our civilization. I cannot give a quick synopsis as it will not do this work justice. You fell asleep that fast? Sorry to have bored you.The blame theory is not "a stumbling block", it just plain wrong and I can't understand why you have been unable to work this out. Humans blame others for the same deterministic reasons we do anything. Even a world of determinists will try to assess blame--fot the simple reason that we are determined by unconscious factors to do it. If everyone on earth became a hard determinist tomorrow we would still blame and punish for the simple reason that what we do and the paths we take are not a matter of free will. Even determinists fall into the irrational trap of thinking that the idea of blame is a stumbling block. It is no such thing. If blame and punishment are the cornerstones of our civilization, it's not because humans created it through free will. It was created by the same determining influences that determine everything else we do and think, none of which we have any control over. Accepting that we have no free will does not change our determining influences. This is basic. Lois
The author did get to the point but you're not willing to invest the time to find out. The fact that he makes extraordinary claims does not mean he's wrong for making them especially if he is right in his analysis. How do you know his findings are not revolutionary if you don't know what they are? The author demonstrates why man's will is not free, and then extends this knowledge into every area of human relation. Philosophers down through the ages looked at determinism and could not get past the implications for if man's will is not free, we cannot blame. The question becomes: How in the world can we not blame people who hurt us, and wouldn't this make man even less responsible? This impasse has been a difficult stumbling block to overcome since blame and punishment is the cornerstone of our civilization. I cannot give a quick synopsis as it will not do this work justice. You fell asleep that fast? Sorry to have bored you.The blame theory is just plain wrong and I can't understand why you have been unable to work this out. Humans blame others for the same deterministic reasons we do anything. Even world of determinists will try to assess blame--because we are determined by unconscious factors to do it. If everyone on earth became a hard determinist tomorrow we would still blame and punish for the simple reason that what we do and the paths we take are not a matter of free will. Even determinists fall into this irrational trap. If blame and punishment are the cornerstones of our civilization, it's not because humans created it through free will. It was created by determining influences, most of which we are unaware of and have no control over, like everything else. Lois I'm afraid you're plain wrong Lois. Belief in Libertarian free will influences thoughts emotions and actions. Therefore if we didn't believe in it we would behave differently.
The author did get to the point but you're not willing to invest the time to find out. The fact that he makes extraordinary claims does not mean he's wrong for making them especially if he is right in his analysis. How do you know his findings are not revolutionary if you don't know what they are? The author demonstrates why man's will is not free, and then extends this knowledge into every area of human relation. Philosophers down through the ages looked at determinism and could not get past the implications for if man's will is not free, we cannot blame. The question becomes: How in the world can we not blame people who hurt us, and wouldn't this make man even less responsible? This impasse has been a difficult stumbling block to overcome since blame and punishment is the cornerstone of our civilization. I cannot give a quick synopsis as it will not do this work justice. You fell asleep that fast? Sorry to have bored you.The blame theory is just plain wrong and I can't understand why you have been unable to work this out. Humans blame others for the same deterministic reasons we do anything. Even world of determinists will try to assess blame--because we are determined by unconscious factors to do it. If everyone on earth became a hard determinist tomorrow we would still blame and punish for the simple reason that what we do and the paths we take are not a matter of free will. Even determinists fall into this irrational trap. If blame and punishment are the cornerstones of our civilization, it's not because humans created it through free will. It was created by determining influences, most of which we are unaware of and have no control over, like everything else. Lois I'm afraid you're plain wrong Lois. Belief in Libertarian free will influences thoughts emotions and actions. Therefore if we didn't believe in it we would behave differently. It may influence thoughts and emotions but we have no control over whether it does or how much. We can't possibly know how our conscious beliefs will affect our determinism. It is not something that can be effectively measured or even depended upon. Lois
It may influence thoughts and emotions but we have no control over whether it does or how much. We can't possibly know how our conscious beliefs will affect our determinism. It is not something that can be effectively measured or even depended upon. LoisSo you don't believe in homeopathy and you do believe in science based medicine. But you can't tell whether you would take a bottle of basically water or medicine prescribed by the doctor if you needed to. Sorry Lois but you've been saying this stuff for quite a while. it's really silly.
The author did get to the point but you're not willing to invest the time to find out. The fact that he makes extraordinary claims does not mean he's wrong for making them especially if he is right in his analysis. How do you know his findings are not revolutionary if you don't know what they are? The author demonstrates why man's will is not free, and then extends this knowledge into every area of human relation. Philosophers down through the ages looked at determinism and could not get past the implications for if man's will is not free, we cannot blame. The question becomes: How in the world can we not blame people who hurt us, and wouldn't this make man even less responsible? This impasse has been a difficult stumbling block to overcome since blame and punishment is the cornerstone of our civilization. I cannot give a quick synopsis as it will not do this work justice. You fell asleep that fast? Sorry to have bored you.The blame theory is not "a stumbling block", it just plain wrong and I can't understand why you have been unable to work this out. I'm not sure what you mean by "been able to work this out". Could you explain?
Humans blame others for the same deterministic reasons we do anything. Even a world of determinists will try to assess blame--for the simple reason that we are determined by unconscious factors to do it. If everyone on earth became a hard determinist tomorrow we would still blame and punish for the simple reason that what we do and the paths we take are not a matter of free will. Even determinists fall into the irrational trap of thinking that the idea of blame is a stumbling block. It is no such thing.It actually is a stumbling block but that does not mean it can't be overcome. I hope you follow this discovery which hasn't even been revealed. Do you see how everyone jumps to premature conclusions based on their faulty reasoning?
If blame and punishment are the cornerstones of our civilization, it's not because humans created it through free will. It was created by the same determining influences that determine everything else we do and think, none of which we have any control over. Accepting that we have no free will does not change our determining influences. This is basic. LoisThat is very true, but that does not mean that we cannot do better based on our new knowledge. To say we can do better is an understatement because this knowledge prevents the very thing that blame and punishment came into existence (i.e., to try to deter people from hurting others using threats of punishment).
But we're not in agreement in one important aspect. If we CNHDO, we CHDO under any condition, even the free will definition compatibilists argue for. It' just an attempt to make it appear that some choices are more free than others and therefore those actions are blameworthy.We're not blameworthy in the way people suppose. And it's important so I'm with you. But is the compatibilist doing what you say? Take speeding fines. Do you agree with them? I do. One of the things the compatibilists say is it only makes sense to make people pay the fines who can respond to the prospect of a fine. In the past tense could have responded. Who cannot respond to the prospect of a fine? 98% of the population could, but this in no way negates determinism. We're really talking at each other, not with each other.
So there is a real point to compatibilist CHDO and I should think it's the real sort of reason we are interested in what else people could have done in the first place.But they could only have done what they have done. There is no doubt that they had options but they were moving toward greater satisfaction than what their previous position offered. This is why the concept of "greater satisfaction" is valid and sound yet no one seems interested. I will elaborate if people have questions but they are so convinced that their own analysis is correct that they aren't hearing me.
It may influence thoughts and emotions but we have no control over whether it does or how much. We can't possibly know how our conscious beliefs will affect our determinism. It is not something that can be effectively measured or even depended upon. LoisSo you don't believe in homeopathy and you do believe in science based medicine. But you can't tell whether you would take a bottle of basically water or medicine prescribed by the doctor if you needed to. Sorry Lois but you've been saying this stuff for quite a while. it's really silly. Lois seems the most integrated in her thinking, so please stop putting her down Stephen just so you can support your worldview, which is not supported by careful observation.
Who cannot respond to the prospect of a fine? 98% of the population could, but this in no way negates determinism. We're really talking at each other, not with each other.So should we fine the 2% if they break the rule? Should we let them have a driving licence? What about someone who's speeding because a man with a gun is in the car and has told him to speed up. Should he pay the fine? Yes I know this does not negate determinism.
But they could only have done what they haveby one definition yes.
There is no doubt that they had options but they were moving toward greater satisfaction than what their previous position offered.Right so if selecting a different option had been a move towards greater satisfaction they would have selected that option instead.
This is why the concept of "greater satisfaction" is valid and sound yet no one seems interested. I will elaborate if people have questions but they are so convinced that their own analysis is correct that they aren't hearing me.I hear you and agree on the sense in which we CNHDO. I also agree that this has moral significance, things change for the better if we get this right. But that doesn't mean all compatibilists are wrong. They can merely be defining terms differently. And that's what I think you need to check for.
Who cannot respond to the prospect of a fine? 98% of the population could, but this in no way negates determinism. We're really talking at each other, not with each other.So should we fine the 2% if they break the rule? Should we let them have a driving licence? What about someone who's speeding because a man with a gun is in the car and has told him to speed up. Should he pay the fine? Yes I know this does not negate determinism. This situation wouldn't even come up in the new world. Do you see what you are doing? If you would just stay with me you would begin to understand why you cannot project your thoughts based on the vantage point of a free will society, which is not going to be accurate.
But they could only have done what they have by one definition yes.I will repeat that this has nothing to do with definition. Definitions mean NOTHING as far as reality is concerned.
There is no doubt that they had options but they were moving toward greater satisfaction than what their previous position offered.
Right so if selecting a different option had been a move towards greater satisfaction they would have selected that option instead.Exactly, so how can their will be free to choose other than what they are compelled to choose given their environment, circumstances, and heredity. IOW, their biology and biography?
This is why the concept of "greater satisfaction" is valid and sound yet no one seems interested. I will elaborate if people have questions but they are so convinced that their own analysis is correct that they aren't hearing me.
I hear you and agree on the sense in which we CNHDO. I also agree that this has moral significance, things change for the better if we get this right.You have no idea how significant these findings are. I just hope you bear with me.
But that doesn't mean all compatibilists are wrong. They can merely be defining terms differently. And that's what I think you need to check for.No definition is wrong. You can define something in any way you choose, but this doesn't mean it is accurate when it comes to reality.
It may influence thoughts and emotions but we have no control over whether it does or how much. We can't possibly know how our conscious beliefs will affect our determinism. It is not something that can be effectively measured or even depended upon. LoisSo you don't believe in homeopathy and you do believe in science based medicine. But you can't tell whether you would take a bottle of basically water or medicine prescribed by the doctor if you needed to. Sorry Lois but you've been saying this stuff for quite a while. it's really silly. Sorry, Stephen, but you have been repeating the same objections for quite a while and it's really silly. You apparently see everyone who has a world view different from yours as "silly." i will keep that in mind. These are some of the most inane comments in a sea of inane comments that you have made here. Lois
This situation wouldn't even come up in the new world. Do you see what you are doing? If you would just stay with me you would begin to understand why you cannot project your thoughts based on the vantage point of a free will society, which is not going to be accurate.So you're saying in the new world we won't need rules with penalties. I can see that might be possible. But compatibilists are dealing with things as they are now, how do we decide who pays the fines?
Exactly, so how can their will be free to choose other than what they are compelled to choose given their environment, circumstances, and heredity. IOW, their biology and biography?Some will say free will is freedom of action, so as long as the action depends upon our will that's fine. But we are interested in what restricts us from having a different will too. So someone with a fear of confined spaces is unable to get in a lift, she could do it if she didn't have a fear of confined spaces but that wouldn't count as free will not just because the action is restricted by the will but the will is also restricted in a particular way. So will free from certain restrictions.
This is why the concept of "greater satisfaction" is valid and sound yet no one seems interested. I will elaborate if people have questions but they are so convinced that their own analysis is correct that they aren't hearing me.
You have no idea how significant these findings are. I just hope you bear with me.I think it's a pretty big deal perhaps we could get to where we don't need to blame or punish at all eventually. But no I can see I don't think it's as big a deal as you do.
No definition is wrong. You can define something in any way you choose, but this doesn't mean it is accurate when it comes to reality.What I'm saying is the compatibilist version of CHDO does seem to have it's uses when it comes to working out who should pay the fine in my example.