That is the whole point of compatibilism; to try to hold onto moral responsibility in a determined world. It can't be done, yet they are trying to make it all fit without there being any contradiction. But their logic is false. No matter how they try it doesn't add up because determinism and freedom of the will (I am not talking about other types of freedom so defining the words are necessary in order to have a basis for communication) are mutually exclusive concepts.They can hold onto moral responsibility but the meaning needs to be different than what most of us have in mind before reflection. They want to do that because they think it's dangerous not to. Also we do need to hold each other responsible and the compatibilist points out that it doesn't make sense to do so unless people are responsible in some sense. I would very much like to say we are not morally responsible because there definitely is a very nasty piece of fiction incompatible with determinism commonly believed in. But I see the compatibilists points.
That is the whole point of compatibilism; to try to hold onto moral responsibility in a determined world. It can't be done, yet they are trying to make it all fit without there being any contradiction. But their logic is false. No matter how they try it doesn't add up because determinism and freedom of the will (I am not talking about other types of freedom so defining the words are necessary in order to have a basis for communication) are mutually exclusive concepts.They can hold onto moral responsibility but the meaning needs to be different than what most of us have in mind before reflection. They want to do that because they think it's dangerous not to. Also we do need to hold each other responsible and the compatibilist points out that it doesn't make sense to do so unless people are responsible in some sense. I would very much like to say we are not morally responsible because there definitely is a very nasty piece of fiction incompatible with determinism commonly believed in. But I see the compatibilists points. I do too Stephen, but as you said there is a very nasty piece of fiction that is incompatible with determinism. Moreover, we cannot be free and unfree at the same time, which is the very thing compatibilists are trying to make us believe in order to keep this dichotomy at bay. But if will is not free, the corollary to this is that we cannot hold people morally responsible. This is not something the general public is comfortable with since our penal system is dependent on the belief that man has a free choice, therefore, when he makes the wrong one he must be punished as just desert and to deter him from doing this "wrong" act again. This is the cornerstone of our civilization, so it's no wonder people respond with such strong emotion. What is revolutionary about this discovery is that Lessans entered the vestibule of determinism and extended the corollary to see where it leads. Many philosophers down through the ages could not get past the implications for they couldn't understand how we cannot blame and punish those who hurt us. Durant entered the vestibule of determinism but was forced to turn back. So were many others.
peacegirl, I just googled a little, and found this], dated February 13, 2013. Since then only one contentless positive review was written.This guy completely misrepresented the book. He didn't like Lessans' claim regarding light and sight, which motivated him to give this awful review. I was almost in tears when I read it because he never even purchased the book. He talked about force. He manufactured this because there is no talk of force in the entire book. I have to admit that I sometimes am influenced by negative reviews and will not buy a product because of it. My hope is that when this book is marketed and read by people interested in this topic, there will be plenty of positive reviews.
You missed the gist of my intention: it is 2 years later now, and there is only one short and contentless positive review. You claimed that there would be many. For years you are trying to get attention for your father's work at fora like these. You get the same kind of reactions again and again, even by people who looked into this first chapter. Your strategy (or should I say marketing?) does not work. I am open to discuss your (father's) ideas. But here. In this forum.I realize that philosophy forums are not the best vehicle for getting this knowledge brought to light, but I do not have a way to publicize this type of work without lots of money. I am trying twitter (which is how I found this forum) in the hope that I will be able to reach an interested audience. When you say I got the same reaction, this in no way reflects the veracity of this knowledge, which you are trying to imply. Isn't that placing the proverbial cart before the horse, especially since you haven't done your own thinking but instead have concluded that these snippets of conversation are more valid than the actual book? After all, that's all people have gotten is snippets. And even if there were some who read a portion of the book, their refutations have not been shown to hold any weight.
The Golden Rule states "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." That is a good rule to follow but it doesn't always work. What if you are in need of food to feed your family and no one will give you any. The only option you have is to steal it from a grocery store. Obviously, you wouldn't want someone to do that to you if you were the grocery store owner, but you feel that you must do it in order to survive.
Right, that is a rational argument against the Golden Rule (which does not necessary mean it is a valid argument). But you did not answer my question: what is the difference between the Golden Rule and the ideas of your father? You are great in avoiding to really present your father's ideas. This raises my suspicion that it is not the ideas you want to convince us of, but to buy the book.I answered this. It is true that empathy and putting oneself in another person's shoes is part of the reason why conscience forbids certain behaviors, but if a situation is justified then conscience will allow one to do to another what he would not want done to himself, which is the opposite of the Golden Rule. Therefore in certain situations the Golden Rule doesn't work. I gave the hypothetical example of a man having to steal food for his family because he couldn't get it any other way. Of course, he would rather not have to steal and hurt the owner of the store by taking food that he can't afford to buy, but if not to do this makes matters worse for himself, he is forced to choose this as the lesser of two evils.
He wasn't complaining. He was sharing what he went through. There's nothing wrong with that.
There is nothing morally wrong with that. But it is wrong as a strategy, because it lets the 'crackpot-alarm' go off in most people.Once again, this is nothing more than biased thinking. I thought this was a scientific thinking group that judges the value of a work based on its own merit, not on a faulty comparison.
He would have said that we are products of both biology and biography, but he would have disagreed that determinism is a necessary condition for free will, as we have no free will. Having the ability to choose is the standard definition of free will, but this does not mean we actually have freedom of the will.
To say that we have no free will because we are determined is not a strong argument against compatibilists who say that in order to have free will we need determinism. I am not sure what you are saying: you say that the standard definition of free will is the ability to choose. Do you deny that we have this ability, or are you saying that free will is something else, but this' something else' does not exist?I am saying that the ability to choose (which I am not denying since this is what allows human beings to weigh the pros and cons of any given situation) does not grant us free will. The standard definition states that this ability IS what constitutes freedom of the will. This is false because free will states that we can choose one thing over another equally, which is impossible when one choice is the most preferable. Obviously, if the choices that are at our disposal are equally preferable, then it does not have the compulsion that necessity demands when choosing between alternatives where the differences ARE meaningful. This would be like comparing A to A, or one apple to another apple (with all of its characteristics being identical). It would make no difference which apple was chosen and in that case a flip of a coin would suffice. This type of situation does not grant us free will, which some people have tried to argue.
The problem is we cannot have free will and determinism in the same sentence.
Well you just did! :roll:Where?
In your sentence! Sorry, it was just a joke. The sentence 'The problem is we cannot have free will and determinism in the same sentence' contains 'free will' and 'determinism' in the same sentence. If you know what I mean.I do, I just wasn't looking for the joke because I'm defending a very important position and I can't let my guard down or I'll be crucified. Once I get to know people I'm sure I'll be able to laugh along with everyone. Looking back, that comment was humorous. :)
Again, the fact that your actions arise from your wishes, feelings and beliefs does not grant you free will because free will states that you can choose A over B or B over A equally when there are meaningful differences between the available options. This can't be done.
Why can't this be done? If I prefer cauliflower over brussels sprouts, and I have the choice, I can take the cauliflower. Would free will mean that, even that I find brussels sprouts disgusting, I take it, and not the cauliflower? Can you explain what you mean using this simple example?Of course you can take the brussel sprouts instead of the cauliflower, especially if you are trying to prove a point that you don't have to eat the cauliflower, which is the modal fallacy that is often brought up by libertarians. There is a problem with the conventional definition of determinism in that it is believed that if we are subject to deterministic laws there can be no alternative course of decision or action, as if to say our destiny has already been predetermined, even though we know our choices are contingent on factors that may take us off that "predetermined" course. There is a problem with this argument; just because our choices are contingent on factors such as our experiences, our circumstances, our desires, and our predispositions does not mean that we could have chosen otherwise at any given moment in time. This argument does not give us the escape hatch from determinism that libertarians believe. He gives an example in Chapter One similar to the one you just asked, which is why it is important to read the chapter.
How do you know before you even know what his discovery is about?
It simply means that I am not impressed at all by the promise that if everybody would adapt this idea, we would abolish all evil. You need to do more to get me really interested.This is what you don't understand. Once these principles are applied globally, world peace will be inevitable. I know you don't understand this right now but you'll just have to bear with me until you do. This revolutionary knowledge has the power to bring about what blame and punishment could never accomplish.
When people at the very outset challenge me and tell me that they won't attempt to learn what this is about unless I do things their way, it turns into a power struggle which I don't want to be a part of.
I am prepared to discuss your father's ideas. But only here, in this forum. Only when you can show me here that he is really at something I will read his book.That's fine with me, although I can't be here 24/7. I can only be here for short intervals.
You said you listened to the first chapter and there was nothing revealed. That is totally false and makes me realize that either you don't want to hear what he has to say because you want to believe free will exists, or it went over your head completely.And right there is why I don't respect your request. You can only ask someone to consider your idea, not demand. If they consider it and don't agree with you, you can attack them like this if you want, but it gets you nowhere. If you are unwilling to help someone understand what you think, then you are not in dialog, your are making demands. If you truly have something that the rest of us don't, it's your job to educate. If you tell people they aren't capable of getting it, what do you expect? Either they believe you, and therefore there's no reason to try, or they think there is something wrong with how you are presenting the idea, or the idea itself. Either way, you've lost your audience.
You said you listened to the first chapter and there was nothing revealed. That is totally false and makes me realize that either you don't want to hear what he has to say because you want to believe free will exists, or it went over your head completely.And right there is why I don't respect your request. You can only ask someone to consider your idea, not demand. If they consider it and don't agree with you, you can attack them like this if you want, but it gets you nowhere. If you are unwilling to help someone understand what you think, then you are not in dialog, your are making demands. If you truly have something that the rest of us don't, it's your job to educate. If you tell people they aren't capable of getting it, what do you expect? Either they believe you, and therefore there's no reason to try, or they think there is something wrong with how you are presenting the idea, or the idea itself. Either way, you've lost your audience. I'm sorry you feel that way. I wasn't demanding anything. You said you listened to the audio, but from your response to my inquiry as to what it was about, I can tell that you did not. If I am wrong, correct me. Give me a reason to believe that you really did listen. I am not insisting that you agree or even understand this body of work, and I'm willing to help educate, but I can't help anyone if they refuse to meet me half way.
I answered this. It is true that empathy and putting oneself in another person's shoes is part of the reason why conscience forbids certain behaviors, but if a situation is justified then conscience will allow one to do to another what he would not want done to himself, which is the opposite of the Golden Rule. Therefore in certain situations the Golden Rule doesn't work. I gave the hypothetical example of a man having to steal food for his family because he couldn't get it any other way. Of course, he would rather not have to steal and hurt the owner of the store by taking food that he can't afford to buy, but if not to do this makes matters worse for himself, he is forced to choose this as the lesser of two evils.Again, you show why the Golden Rule does not work. You do not say what the differences with your father's ideas are.
Once again, this is nothing more than biased thinking. I thought this was a scientific thinking group that judges the value of a work based on its own merit, not on a faulty comparison.But these are exactly the kind of arguments every aggrieved crackpot presents. You need to do more to convince that your father's work is really what you pretend it is.
free will states that we can choose one thing over another equally, which is impossible when one choice is the most preferable.Who states that this is what free will is? Never heard of it. Are you seriously saying that choosing brussels sprouts, even if I find it disgusting, is an example of free will? I can only think of situations in which I am forced to eat it, because of the circumstances, or somebody is coercing me to do it. Both are examples of actions that are not free.
Of course you can take the brussel sprouts instead of the cauliflower, especially if you are trying to prove a point that you don't have to eat the cauliflower, which is the modal fallacy that is often brought up by libertarians.Why would this be the modal fallacy? And, just to note, I am not a libertarian. My view is compatibilist.
just because our choices are contingent on factors such as our experiences, our circumstances, our desires, and our predispositions does not mean that we could have chosen otherwise at any given moment in time.That depends on what you mean with 'could have done otherwise'. Say you are in a cheap cantina, and there is only one dish you can get there. So you take it, you could not have done otherwise. Compare wit a restaurant with 10 different dishes on the menu card. Say you choose dish 5. Now, in an essential way, you could have done otherwise: you could have chosen dish 7. That you did not depended on you biological and personal history. It was determined that you would choose dish 7, but you chose it. Without your choosing you would have starved to death. 'Choosing' means: there are different, real options (e.g. dish 1 till 10) and what will being served depends on you. If you had preferred something else, you could have taken it. It does not matter that your will does not spring from nowhere, uncaused.
I answered this. It is true that empathy and putting oneself in another person's shoes is part of the reason why conscience forbids certain behaviors, but if a situation is justified then conscience will allow one to do to another what he would not want done to himself, which is the opposite of the Golden Rule. Therefore in certain situations the Golden Rule doesn't work. I gave the hypothetical example of a man having to steal food for his family because he couldn't get it any other way. Of course, he would rather not have to steal and hurt the owner of the store by taking food that he can't afford to buy, but if not to do this makes matters worse for himself, he is forced to choose this as the lesser of two evils.Again, you show why the Golden Rule does not work. You do not say what the differences with your father's ideas are. The difference is that the Golden Rule is an idea that if everyone followed, the world would be better. It also is telling people what they "ought" to do. The law discovered and its application forces a change in behavior due to a drastic change in environment, but it tells no one what they "ought" to do.
Once again, this is nothing more than biased thinking. I thought this was a scientific thinking group that judges the value of a work based on its own merit, not on a faulty comparison.
But these are exactly the kind of arguments every aggrieved crackpot presents. You need to do more to convince that your father's work is really what you pretend it is.Where am I pretending and why would you say this when you have no idea what this knowledge is about? :-S
free will states that we can choose one thing over another equally, which is impossible when one choice is the most preferable.
Who states that this is what free will is? Never heard of it.Let's try this again. The dictionary states that free will is the power of self-determination regarded as a special faculty of choosing good and evil without compulsion or necessity. Made, done, or given of one’s own free choice; voluntary.
Are you seriously saying that choosing brussels sprouts, even if I find it disgusting, is an example of free will?No, that's not what I was doing. I was showing why you don't have free will in your effort to prove that you do.
I can only think of situations in which I am forced to eat it, because of the circumstances, or somebody is coercing me to do it. Both are examples of actions that are not free.But so is the example you gave me. One is obviously not of your own free will because food is being shoved down your throat by someone else's will. This does not remove the lack of free will involved in your choice to eat brussel sprouts over cauliflower.
Of course you can take the brussel sprouts instead of the cauliflower, especially if you are trying to prove a point that you don't have to eat the cauliflower, which is the modal fallacy that is often brought up by libertarians.
Why would this be the modal fallacy? And, just to note, I am not a libertarian. My view is compatibilist.Compatibilists are difficult to talk to (at least the ones I have met) because they think that compatibilism is the only way to reconcile the problem of moral responsibility (holding people morally accountable using their idiosyncratic definition of "free will") with determinism. I don't know if I can break through this barrier.
just because our choices are contingent on factors such as our experiences, our circumstances, our desires, and our predispositions does not mean that we could have chosen otherwise at any given moment in time.
That depends on what you mean with 'could have done otherwise'. Say you are in a cheap cantina, and there is only one dish you can get there. So you take it, you could not have done otherwise. Compare wit a restaurant with 10 different dishes on the menu card. Say you choose dish 5. Now, in an essential way, you could have done otherwise:No you could not have chosen otherwise even though there were more options available than in the cheap cantina.
you could have chosen dish 7.No you could not have once dish 5 was chosen.
That you did not depended on you biological and personal history. It was determined that you would choose dish 7, but you chose it.No you could not. If you were compelled to choose 5 based on your decision that this was your preference, you could not have chosen 7.
Without your choosing you would have starved to death. 'Choosing' means: there are different, real options (e.g. dish 1 till 10) and what will being served depends on you. If you had preferred something else, you could have taken it. It does not matter that your will does not spring from nowhere, uncaused.What you just said is true. You had options and you chose the option that you felt, at that moment, was the better one which drove or compelled you to pick it. Decline and Fall of All Evil: Chapter One: The Hiding Place p. 49 Choosing, or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature, but to reiterate this important point...he is compelled to prefer of alternatives that which he considers better for himself and though he chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never given any choice at all. Although the definition of free will states that man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable alternative each and every moment of time?
The difference is that the Golden Rule is an idea that if everyone followed, the world would be better. It also is telling people what they "ought" to do. The law discovered and its application forces a change in behavior due to a drastic change in environment, but it tells no one what they "ought" to do.What change in the environment?
Where am I pretending and why would you say this when you have no idea what this knowledge is about? :-SYou pretend it abolishes all evil.
The dictionary states that free will is the power of self-determination regarded as a special faculty of choosing good and evil without compulsion or necessity. Made, done, or given of one’s own free choice; voluntary.That is the libertarian variant of free will: self-determination. I define free will as follows: The capability to act according someone's own wishes and believes unconstrained by those of somebody else. Now you tell me - - why this does not count as free will? - where is the contradiction with determinism? I get lost in the way you treat my brussels sprout vs cauliflower example. I hate brussels sprouts and I love cauliflower. Why, I don't know: determined by my biology or biography. So if I can choose, I take the cauliflower. If I can act according this choice then I am free. If somebody with a gun forces me take the brussels sprouts, then I cannot do what I want: I am doing what the other person is wanting me to do. In that case I cannot act according my desire: then I am not free.
Why would this be the modal fallacy? And, just to note, I am not a libertarian. My view is compatibilist.Compatibilists are difficult to talk to (at least the ones I have met) because they think that compatibilism is the only way to reconcile the problem of moral responsibility (holding people morally accountable using their idiosyncratic definition of "free will") with determinism. I don't know if I can break through this barrier. And you did not even answer my question. Where did I commit the modal fallacy?
No you could not have chosen otherwise even though there were more options available than in the cheap cantina.What then, in your opinion is the meaning of having more options?
you could have chosen dish 7.No you could not have once dish 5 was chosen. Yeah. Once I chose dish 5 I cannot change the past anymore. But there is still a way that I could have chosen another dish, an option I did not have in the cheap cantina. Now you made a beautiful example of the modal fallacy: because I chose dish 5 you say it was necessary that I chose dish 5. See here ]for an explanation.
No you could not. If you were compelled to choose 5 based on your decision that this was your preference, you could not have chosen 7.If I choose something based on my preferences, then am not compelled by it. That is misuse of language. My choosing of dish 5 is part of the causal chain that lead to the result that I got dish 5. If I had chose dish 7, I would have got dish 7.
Decline and Fall of All Evil: Chapter One: The Hiding Place p. 49 Choosing, or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature, but to reiterate this important point...he is compelled to prefer of alternatives that which he considers better for himself and though he chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never given any choice at all. Although the definition of free will states that man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable alternative each and every moment of time?So now you gave me a reason not to read your father's book: being compelled by your own good reasons is just rubbish. That is a wide overstretching of language. With such a kind of analysis you cannot distinguish between my freedom of choice in the restaurant or the cheap cantina; or not between me choosing cauliflower or being forced to eat the brussels sprouts.
The difference is that the Golden Rule is an idea that if everyone followed, the world would be better. It also is telling people what they "ought" to do. The law discovered and its application forces a change in behavior due to a drastic change in environment, but it tells no one what they "ought" to do.What change in the environment? The whole point of the book is how the environment will force a major paradigm shift based on no blame. But there is so much missing here that you will misconstrue what I just told you. That is why condensing this work into a few words will not do it justice. Where am I pretending and why would you say this when you have no idea what this knowledge is about? :-S GdB, we're getting along just fine. Don't ruin it by telling me that this knowledge cannot accomplish what it can. You have no basis upon which to judge whether it can or whether it can't. You haven't even delved into his writings. You would never do that with a famous philosopher from the past, would you? You would be frowned upon. But you are treating this discovery as if it's faulty just because no one knows about it. That is not the sign of someone who is a serious investigator.
That is the libertarian variant of free will: self-determination. I define free will as follows: The capability to act according someone's own wishes and believes unconstrained by those of somebody else. Now you tell me - - why this does not count as free will? - where is the contradiction with determinism?I know what compatiliism is and it has major faults. Just because a person can do something without coersion does not grant him free will. I'm confounded as to what compatibilists consider to be free since any determinist position (which they agree to) considers ALL actions as unfree given the definition of what constitutes NO FREE WILL. The fact that one's actions are not coerced, once again, does not mean that the person acted freely.
I get lost in the way you treat my brussels sprout vs cauliflower example. I hate brussels sprouts and I love cauliflower. Why, I don't know: determined by my biology or biography. So if I can choose, I take the cauliflower. If I can act according this choice then I am free.What are you talking about? You are free just because you chose to take the cauliflower? No, it gave you "greater satisfaction" to take the cauliflower based on your biology and environment. The only direction we can move is in the direction of what gives us greater satisfaction. Bet you never heard of this because you never read the chapter.
If somebody with a gun forces me take the brussels sprouts, then I cannot do what I want: I am doing what the other person is wanting me to do. In that case I cannot act according my desire: then I am not free.Absolutely incorrect. There is nothing stopping you from choosing the cauliflower, even in this dire situation if you want to, but obviously you don't want to given the circumstances of trying to prove that you can choose brussel sprouts. This in no way negates your lack of free will.
Why would this be the modal fallacy? And, just to note, I am not a libertarian. My view is compatibilist.Compatibilists are difficult to talk to (at least the ones I have met) because they think that compatibilism is the only way to reconcile the problem of moral responsibility (holding people morally accountable using their idiosyncratic definition of "free will") with determinism. I don't know if I can break through this barrier.
And you did not even answer my question. Where did I commit the modal fallacy?By saying, before the fact, that you will choose something not you must. But this doesn't do anything whatsoever to prove that what you end up doing, you could have done differently.
No you could not have chosen otherwise even though there were more options available than in the cheap cantina.
What then, in your opinion is the meaning of having more options?Having two options or a thousand options doesn't change the direction we are compelled to go, which is toward what offers us greater satisfaction from our present position. We cannot move toward what gives us less satisfaction when considering the options that we have available.
you could have chosen dish 7.No you could not have once dish 5 was chosen.
Yeah. Once I chose dish 5 I cannot change the past anymore. But there is still a way that I could have chosen another dish, an option I did not have in the cheap cantina.No one is saying you didn't have an option. That is what differentiates us from other animals. But this is where the difference ends, since there is nothing free just because you have the ability to contemplate. You are compelled to choose what you prefer (based on your circumstances), not what you don't prefer. Think about it before answering because I have found people are very quick to give knee jerk reactions in order maintain their worldview. Have you ever chosen among the options you are considering what you don't want when a more preferable alternative is available? Don't just gloss over this just because it sounds too easy.
Now you made a beautiful example of the modal fallacy: because I chose dish 5 you say it was necessary that I chose dish 5. See here ]for an explanation.It was necessary that you chose option 5 but not until you actually chose it. No one in this world can predict what any individual will choose, which is the misconception of determinism (i.e, that we must be able to predict every action of every human being in the world in order to change their behavior when it comes to those behaviors that are deemed wrong or hurtful). Isn't that the point of why this discussion is so important; to prevent those actions that hurt others? Otherwise, what a person does is immaterial. It makes no difference because they are hurting no one.
No you could not. If you were compelled to choose 5 based on your decision that this was your preference, you could not have chosen 7.
If I choose something based on my preferences, then am not compelled by it. That is misuse of language. My choosing of dish 5 is part of the causal chain that lead to the result that I got dish 5. If I had chose dish 7, I would have got dish 7.You have it completely backwards. I'm not sure if I can change your ideology because of your determination to defend your position at all costs even when I will show you that you are incorrect. That is the biggest stumbling block of all.
Decline and Fall of All Evil: Chapter One: The Hiding Place p. 49 Choosing, or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature, but to reiterate this important point...he is compelled to prefer of alternatives that which he considers better for himself and though he chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never given any choice at all. Although the definition of free will states that man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable alternative each and every moment of time?
So now you gave me a reason not to read your father's book: being compelled by your own good reasons is just rubbish. That is a wide overstretching of language. With such a kind of analysis you cannot distinguish between my freedom of choice in the restaurant or the cheap cantina; or not between me choosing cauliflower or being forced to eat the brussels sprouts.There is no distinction if you understand the principle of "greater satisfaction". But of course you can't because you haven't studied this work. Is that a fair and balanced analysis on your part? And given your grievance, compatibilists don't have their own definition of free will in order to fit a hole into a square and make it all look great on paper? Come on Gdb, give me a break.
I am wondering: what is this free will you are denying: the capability to choose independent of what you are? Tell me what kind of free will would that be? How would that be your free will? And you did not answer my previous question (see italics above). You only stated that it does not count as free will, but not why.That is the libertarian variant of free will: self-determination. I define free will as follows: The capability to act according someone's own wishes and believes unconstrained by those of somebody else. Now you tell me - - why this does not count as free will? - where is the contradiction with determinism?I know what compatiliism is and it has major faults. Just because a person can do something without coersion does not grant him free will. I'm confounded as to what compatibilists consider to be free since any determinist position (which they agree to) considers ALL actions as unfree given the definition of what constitutes NO FREE WILL. The fact that one's actions are not coerced, once again, does not mean that the person acted freely.
You are free just because you chose to take the cauliflower? No, it gave you "greater satisfaction" to take the cauliflower based on your biology and environment.Yes. Satisfaction in this case is the reason why I take the cauliflower, and because it is my reason, it was a free action of mine.
By saying, before the fact, that you will choose something not you must. But this doesn't do anything whatsoever to prove that what you end up doing, you could have done differently.This sentence does not run. I don't know what you are saying here.
Having two options or a thousand options doesn't change the direction we are compelled to go, which is toward what offers us greater satisfaction from our present position.Being 'compelled' by your own reasons and act accordingly is exactly what free will is.
We cannot move toward what gives us less satisfaction when considering the options that we have available.I wouldn't even want to. Doing what you not want, is that free will? This is becoming absurd, peacegirl.
No one is saying you didn't have an option. That is what differentiates us from other animals.And how do you call this capability we have, but animals don't? And how is it possible that evolution selected for it? It must have causal impact, otherwise those ancient humans did not have an evolutionary advantage.
You have it completely backwards. I'm not sure if I can change your ideology because of your determination to defend your position at all costs even when I will show you that you are incorrect. That is the biggest stumbling block of all.These are discussion killers, peacegirl. With the same right I could say that to you. Don't do this again, or I am ready with you.
There is no distinction if you understand the principle of "greater satisfaction". But of course you can't because you haven't studied this work. Is that a fair and balanced analysis on your part?Yes, I already gave it to you: my anticipated satisfaction is my reason for taking the cauliflower. Actions I do based on what I recognise as being my reasons, are free actions. Being capable to act freely means I have free will.
And given your grievance, compatibilists don't have their own definition of free will in order to fit a hole into a square and make it all look great on paper?Again, watch your words. I did not say you are an aggrieved crackpot. And no, the compatibilist version of free will is the only one that makes sense. It shows that our reasons are causes for our behaviour, but that my reasons are not uncaused themselves. The latter would lead to an absurd notion of free will, which has nothing to do with what and who we are. It is a denial of our character. Such an idea about free will is absurd. But you use this concept of free will so that you can easily deny that we have free will. I would suggest you do some reading: read my postings here] and here]. And then show me that you really have read them by arguing against them with a fine pincet, and not a gross 'it is compatibilism and I have already shown that compatibilism is wrong'. And it's only 2 postings not a 60 pages chapter.
That is the libertarian variant of free will: self-determination. I define free will as follows: The capability to act according someone's own wishes and believes unconstrained by those of somebody else. Now you tell me - - why this does not count as free will? - where is the contradiction with determinism?I know what compatiliism is and it has major faults. Just because a person can do something without coersion does not grant him free will. I'm confounded as to what compatibilists consider to be free since any determinist position (which they agree to) considers ALL actions as unfree given the definition of what constitutes NO FREE WILL. The fact that one's actions are not coerced, once again, does not mean that the person acted freely.
I am wondering: what is this free will you are denying: the capability to choose independent of what you are? Tell me what kind of free will would that be? How would that be your free will?The capability to choose independent of what we are doesn't exist, but the fact that we choose dependent on what we are does not mean we have free will because we can only move in one direction. There are no parallel worlds that could have been created because we could not have chosen otherwise.
And you did not answer my previous question (see italics above). You only stated that it does not count as free will, but not why.Because free will states that we can choose either option without any compulsion but if there are meaningful differences in that comparison, there is always compulsion to choose that which is most preferable. The dictionary states that free will is the power of self-determination regarded as a special faculty of choosing good and evil without compulsion or necessity. Made, done, or given of one’s own free choice; voluntary.
You are free just because you chose to take the cauliflower? No, it gave you "greater satisfaction" to take the cauliflower based on your biology and environment.
Yes. Satisfaction in this case is the reason why I take the cauliflower, and because it is my reason, it was a free action of mine.No, you were not free at all, not in the sense of "freedom of the will". You can say "I did something of my own free will", if you mean you did it "of your own desire". But this does not mean your will is free. p. 53 The expression, ‘I did it of my own free will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which only means ‘of my own desire.’
By saying, before the fact, that you will choose something not you must. But this doesn't do anything whatsoever to prove that what you end up doing, you could have done differently.
This sentence does not run. I don't know what you are saying here.The modal fallacy says that it isn't necessary that you do a particular thing. So you can't say in advance that you must choose this over that; you can say I will choose this over that. But that also does not grant one free will just because he can change his mind and do something other than what was predicted.
Having two options or a thousand options doesn't change the direction we are compelled to go, which is toward what offers us greater satisfaction from our present position.
Being 'compelled' by your own reasons and act accordingly is exactly what free will is.That is not what free will is. The word "compelled", even if it's due to your own reasons does not mean that you could have chosen otherwise given the same exact circumstances.
We cannot move toward what gives us less satisfaction when considering the options that we have available.
I wouldn't even want to. Doing what you not want, is that free will? This is becoming absurd, peacegirl.Me neither, but the point is that we can't. It is impossible to choose something that is less preferable in comparison to other options that are more preferable, therefore we can only move in one direction all through life. Free will suggests that we can choose A over B or B over A equally. Now that is absurd.
No one is saying you didn't have an option. That is what differentiates us from other animals.
And how do you call this capability we have, but animals don't? And how is it possible that evolution selected for it? It must have causal impact, otherwise those ancient humans did not have an evolutionary advantage.Determinism is a universal law. It did not evolve. Animals are also under the control of determinism, but they don't have the ability to contemplate which has caused a lot of confusion in the freewill/determinism debate.
You have it completely backwards. I'm not sure if I can change your ideology because of your determination to defend your position at all costs even when I will show you that you are incorrect. That is the biggest stumbling block of all.
These are discussion killers, peacegirl. With the same right I could say that to you. Don't do this again, or I am ready with you.I'll try to remember Gdb.
There is no distinction if you understand the principle of "greater satisfaction". But of course you can't because you haven't studied this work. Is that a fair and balanced analysis on your part?
Yes, I already gave it to you: my anticipated satisfaction is my reason for taking the cauliflower. Actions I do based on what I recognise as being my reasons, are free actions. Being capable to act freely means I have free will.No, it does not. Once again, the expression you did it "of your own free will" only means you did it of your own desire, which is perfectly true, but this does not mean you have freedom of the will. I hope you are willing to understand these principles.
And given your grievance, compatibilists don't have their own definition of free will in order to fit a hole into a square and make it all look great on paper?
Again, watch your words. I did not say you are an aggrieved crackpot.I didn't accuse you of this.
And no, the compatibilist version of free will is the only one that makes sense. It shows that our reasons are causes for our behaviour, but that my reasons are not uncaused themselves. The latter would lead to an absurd notion of free will, which has nothing to do with what and who we are. It is a denial of our character. Such an idea about free will is absurd. But you use this concept of free will so that you can easily deny that we have free will. I would suggest you do some reading: read my postings here] and here]. And then show me that you really have read them by arguing against them with a fine pincet, and not a gross 'it is compatibilism and I have already shown that compatibilism is wrong'.I read some of the thread, and it's much longer than 6 pages. I invite Lois and George to come to this thread because they are already leaning toward hard determinism, which would make it easier for me.
And it's only 2 postings not a 60 pages chapter.I would read a 60 page paper if I thought it might help me understand a proposition that interests me.
The capability to choose independent of what we are doesn't exist, but the fact that we choose dependent on what we are does not mean we have free will because we can only move in one direction. There are no parallel worlds that could have been created because we could not have chosen otherwise.You argue: 'A has happened, so it was necessary that A happened, because the world is deterministic, so B could impossibly have happened'. What you are saying is that any sentence of the form 'if B would have occurred, then ...' is meaningless in a deterministic world. That is rubbish. Counterfactual sentences are essential in understanding what causality is, and therefore also to understand what causal determinism is. There is no reason to exempt human actions and their reasons from counterfactuals, because they are just as determined as the rest of the universe. But with that 'X could have done B' is not a representation of some special human faculty, but of a normal counterfactual sentence. You fell completely in the hole of the modal fallacy. Interesting that you started accusing me of that.
The capability to choose independent of what we are doesn’t exist, but the fact that we choose dependent on what we are does not mean we have free will because we can only move in one direction. There are no parallel worlds that could have been created because we could not have chosen otherwise.There are no parallel worlds, but the meaning of any counterfactual can be analysed with possible worlds. There is a way that the sentence 'I could have chosen dish 7' is true in a way that the sentence 'I could have chose another meal in the cantina' is not. First you mus see this. Then the followup is that you see that 'X could have done otherwise' is completely covered by the standard counterfactual analysis. And as last step you must see that this is enough for the use of 'X could have done otherwise' in the context of understanding free will.
Because free will states that we can choose either option without any compulsion but if there are meaningful differences in that comparison, there is always compulsion to choose that which is most preferable.Sorry, I am ready with that one. When I am 'compelled' by my own good reasons to do something, then I call that free will. I do not even want a free will that, having good reasons to do something, I inexplicable do something else . At most that would be psychological weakness, or ... a compulsory personality disorder.
No, you were not free at all, not in the sense of "freedom of the will". You can say "I did something of my own free will", if you mean you did it "of your own desire". But this does not mean your will is free.Now that is the cart in front of the horse. 'Free will' does not mean 'free from causes': it means 'free to act according my own reasons'. In this sense there is only the daily meaning of free will as 'I did something of my own free will', and it is the basis for assigning responsibility. Free will is just that, and nothing more, it never was: the whole stuff is just one metaphysical confusion created by theologians and philosophers, and your father fully fell into it.
You did not answer my question: - how can it be, that evolution selected for the capability to contemplate, when it has no causal consequences at all? What is the evolutionary advantage of contemplating?And how do you call this capability we have, but animals don't? And how is it possible that evolution selected for it? It must have causal impact, otherwise those ancient humans did not have an evolutionary advantage.Determinism is a universal law. It did not evolve. Animals are also under the control of determinism, but they don't have the ability to contemplate which has caused a lot of confusion in the freewill/determinism debate.
No, it does not. Once again, the expression you did it "of your own free will" only means you did it of your own desire, which is perfectly true, but this does not mean you have freedom of the will. I hope you are willing to understand these principles.As you see, I am not willing to, because they are wrong. The whole thing is based on the false understanding of the role of counterfactuals in the context of free will.
You only have to read my 2 postings. George is not a member anymore, and Lois has shown in endless discussions that she cannot understand what it is all about. And she also wasn't around here for a long time. Edit: PS The determinism of compatibilists is just as hard as that of so called hard determinists. One could even say that it is harder, because compatibilists see determinism as a necessary condition for free will to exist.I would suggest you do some reading: read my postings here] and here]. And then show me that you really have read them by arguing against them with a fine pincet, and not a gross 'it is compatibilism and I have already shown that compatibilism is wrong'.I read some of the thread, and it's much longer than 6 pages. I invite Lois and George to come to this thread because they are already leaning toward hard determinism, which would make it easier for me.
First, so awesome to have another thread about free will!
And to this from peacegirl
You have no basis upon which to judge whether it can or whether it can’t. You haven’t even delved into his writings. You would never do that with a famous philosopher from the past, would you? You would be frowned upon. But you are treating this discovery as if it’s faulty just because no one knows about it. That is not the sign of someone who is a serious investigator.Why do you think I should treat this book the same as I would Plato's Republic? We aren't talking about a famous musician who is made famous by millions of teenage girls. We're talking about philosophers, who become famous based on the enduring quality of their works. A few, like Ayn Rand, become famous despite bad philosophy, but they are heavily commented on. I could have a long conversation with someone who had read only commentary on Ayn Rand but not her books. What you're saying is, there is no reason why one philosopher becomes famous and another does not. You have obviously not read much philosophy. Philosophy builds on earlier philosophy. Either the philosophers themselves directly comment on earlier philosophers, or the people who analyze FAMOUS philosophers compare and contrast them. So, yes, I'm basing my opinion on this book partly on the lack of attention it has received. Unless you have a crazy story about it being hidden in a clay jar for 30 years, I see no reason to believe that it has not been reviewed by people who are way better at reading philosophy than me. It's perfectly valid reasoning in a modern world, full of philosophies.
First, so awesome to have another thread about free will!Isn't it great? It pops up again and again.
First, so awesome to have another thread about free will!Isn't it great? It pops up again and again. Y'all just can't help yourselves. :cheese:
The capability to choose independent of what we are doesn't exist, but the fact that we choose dependent on what we are does not mean we have free will because we can only move in one direction. There are no parallel worlds that could have been created because we could not have chosen otherwise.
You argue: 'A has happened, so it was necessary that A happened, because the world is deterministic, so B could impossibly have happened'. What you are saying is that any sentence of the form 'if B would have occurred, then ...' is meaningless in a deterministic world. That is rubbish. Counterfactual sentences are essential in understanding what causality is, and therefore also to understand what causal determinism is. There is no reason to exempt human actions and their reasons from counterfactuals, because they are just as determined as the rest of the universe. But with that 'X could have done B' is not a representation of some special human faculty, but of a normal counterfactual sentence. You fell completely in the hole of the modal fallacy. Interesting that you started accusing me of that.No I haven't. I only said that the modal fallacy has merit in the sense that we cannot state in advance what a person must do. That is absurd, but that does not mean that what a person does could be otherwise, once his choice is made. A has happened so it was necessary that A had to happen is a true statement, but it comes after the fact not before. Before the fact, there is no way to know whether A would happen, so B is always a possibility which is the whole point of contemplation. X could have done B if X wanted to do B, but X did not want to do B so looking back X could not have done B.
The capability to choose independent of what we are doesn’t exist, but the fact that we choose dependent on what we are does not mean we have free will because we can only move in one direction. There are no parallel worlds that could have been created because we could not have chosen otherwise.
There are no parallel worlds, but the meaning of any counterfactual can be analysed with possible worlds. There is a way that the sentence 'I could have chosen dish 7' is true in a way that the sentence 'I could have chose another meal in the cantina' is not. First you mus see this. Then the followup is that you see that 'X could have done otherwise' is completely covered by the standard counterfactual analysis. And as last step you must see that this is enough for the use of 'X could have done otherwise' in the context of understanding free will.It is obvious that if the choice is not available as in the cantina, it couldn't have been chosen, but the followup X could have done otherwise is only in imagination. As I said, before the action it is a possibility that X could choose dish 7, but he did not choose dish 7 because it did not give him greater satisfaction to do so, and we are compelled to move in this direction rendering any other choice an impossibility at that moment in time.
Because free will states that we can choose either option without any compulsion but if there are meaningful differences in that comparison, there is always compulsion to choose that which is most preferable.
Sorry, I am ready with that one. When I am 'compelled' by my own good reasons to do something, then I call that free will.But that's the problem. You can make any definition up you want to suit your purposes. Obviously, this definition given by compatibilists is useful in that they can now be comfortable holding people responsible and at the same time keep determinism intact. But definitions mean nothing when it comes to reality.
I do not even want a free will that, having good reasons to do something, I inexplicable do something else . At most that would be psychological weakness, or ... a compulsory personality disorder.But the free will you are defining is also an unreality. It's just another convenient definition.
No, you were not free at all, not in the sense of "freedom of the will". You can say "I did something of my own free will", if you mean you did it "of your own desire". But this does not mean your will is free.
Now that is the cart in front of the horse. 'Free will' does not mean 'free from causes': it means 'free to act according my own reasons'.Who said otherwise Gdb?
In this sense there is only the daily meaning of free will as 'I did something of my own free will', and it is the basis for assigning responsibility. Free will is just that, and nothing more, it never was: the whole stuff is just one metaphysical confusion created by theologians and philosophers, and your father fully fell into it.Nope, it is YOU that fell for the definition so you wouldn't have cognitive/dissonance. I have to speak my mind and if you are offended, I'm really sorry but that won't stop me from expressing what I know to be true.
And how do you call this capability we have, but animals don't? And how is it possible that evolution selected for it? It must have causal impact, otherwise those ancient humans did not have an evolutionary advantage.Determinism is a universal law. It did not evolve. Animals are also under the control of determinism, but they don't have the ability to contemplate which has caused a lot of confusion in the freewill/determinism debate.
You did not answer my question: - how can it be, that evolution selected for the capability to contemplate, when it has no causal consequences at all? What is the evolutionary advantage of contemplating?Who said contemplation doesn't have an advantage for human beings? I don't know why human beings were given this gift, but in my estimation it is a wonderful gift to have because we're not just dominoes falling over each other without any say in our choices. But this ability to contemplate does not grant us free will. There is great confusion here, and it seems that you will not bend at all, or even listen to what I have to say.
No, it does not. Once again, the expression you did it "of your own free will" only means you did it of your own desire, which is perfectly true, but this does not mean you have freedom of the will. I hope you are willing to understand these principles.
As you see, I am not willing to, because they are wrong. The whole thing is based on the false understanding of the role of counterfactuals in the context of free will.So then why are you in this thread? You won't convince me that you're right because I know you're not. I know you don't want to hear this but I am 100% positive that man does not have free in any way, shape, or form.
I would suggest you do some reading: read my postings here] and here]. And then show me that you really have read them by arguing against them with a fine pincet, and not a gross 'it is compatibilism and I have already shown that compatibilism is wrong'.I read some of the thread, and it's much longer than 6 pages. I invite Lois and George to come to this thread because they are already leaning toward hard determinism, which would make it easier for me.
You only have to read my 2 postings. George is not a member anymore, and Lois has shown in endless discussions that she cannot understand what it is all about. And she also wasn't around here for a long time.From the few posts of hers I read, she seems very enlightened.
Edit: PS The determinism of compatibilists is just as hard as that of so called hard determinists. One could even say that it is harder, because compatibilists see determinism as a necessary condition for free will to exist.But you cannot have free will and determinism together in one basket. They are mutually exclusive, just like you can't have life and death in the same breath.
No I haven't. I only said that the modal fallacy has merit in the sense that we cannot state in advance what a person must do. That is absurd, but that does not mean that what a person does could be otherwise, once his choice is made. A has happened so it was necessary that A had to happen is a true statement, but it comes after the fact not before. Before the fact, there is no way to know whether A would happen, so B is always a possibility which is the whole point of contemplation. X could have done B if X wanted to do B, but X did not want to do B so looking back X could not have done B.Assume, yesterday you choose dish 5 in the restaurant. Yesterday it was March, 17th. Is the following sentence necessarily true: peacegirl ate dish 5 in the restaurant at March, 17th. Now assume it is March, 16th. I know we are determined, but predictions what you will eat are impossible. However, of course I already know that the restaurant offers 10 different dishes. So I write down 10 sentences: 1. peacegirl will eat dish 1 in the restaurant at March, 17th. ... 5. peacegirl will eat dish 5 in the restaurant at March, 17th. ... 10. peacegirl will eat dish 10 in the restaurant at March, 17th. Now I know one of these sentences is true (of course it is number 5). So here is my question: is sentence 5 necessarily true?
It is obvious that if the choice is not available as in the cantina, it couldn't have been chosen, but the followup X could have done otherwise is only in imagination. As I said, before the action it is a possibility that X could choose dish 7, but he did not choose dish 7 because it did not give him greater satisfaction to do so, and we are compelled to move in this direction rendering any other choice an impossibility at that moment in time.Again a set of questions: 1. Is the sentence 'If I heat up a kettle of water, it will boil after a time' true? 2. Is the sentence 'If I tomorrow heat up a kettle of water, it will boil after a time' true? 3. Is the sentence 'If I yesterday would have heated up a kettle of water, it would have boiled after a time' true? Now, I don't even have a kettle, I heat my tea water with a water cooker. So above sentences are definitely all in my imagination. Now are they true or not? 4. Is the sentence 'We can choose between 10 different dishes in the restaurant' true? 5. Is the sentence 'You can choose dish 5 in the restaurant' true? 6. Is the sentence 'You can choose dish 7 in the restaurant' true? Now, yesterday we went to the restaurant and you chose dish 5. 7. Is the sentence 'Yesterday you could have chosen menu 5 in the restaurant' true? 8. Is the sentence 'Yesterday you could have chosen menu 7 in the restaurant' true? As variations you can answer the following variants: a. Assume choices are determined. b. Assume our choices are not determined. c. Answer all the same questions, but now replace 'true' with 'necessarily true'. If this leads you to different answers, then please explain. I hope I will find some time later to react on other points in your post.
No I haven't. I only said that the modal fallacy has merit in the sense that we cannot state in advance what a person must do. That is absurd, but that does not mean that what a person does could be otherwise, once his choice is made. A has happened so it was necessary that A had to happen is a true statement, but it comes after the fact not before. Before the fact, there is no way to know whether A would happen, so B is always a possibility which is the whole point of contemplation. X could have done B if X wanted to do B, but X did not want to do B so looking back X could not have done B.
Assume, yesterday you choose dish 5 in the restaurant. Yesterday it was March, 17th. Is the following sentence necessarily true: peacegirl ate dish 5 in the restaurant at March, 17th. Now assume it is March, 16th. I know we are determined, but predictions what you will eat are impossible. However, of course I already know that the restaurant offers 10 different dishes. So I write down 10 sentences: 1. peacegirl will eat dish 1 in the restaurant at March, 17th. ... 5. peacegirl will eat dish 5 in the restaurant at March, 17th. ... 10. peacegirl will eat dish 10 in the restaurant at March, 17th. Now I know one of these sentences is true (of course it is number 5). So here is my question: is sentence 5 necessarily true?It doesn't work that way. That's just a problem with the conventional definition of determinism, not that determinism is false. Just because it cannot be predicted in advance that number 5 will be necessarily chosen does not mean that number 5, once chosen, could have been dish 7 or dish 10 as you speculate. How can anyone predict what someone will do in advance of him doing it? We don't know what will give someone "greater" satisfaction because we're not them, but this IS the direction we are compelled to go, so if number 7 and 10 are not as preferable as number 5 (for whatever reason), then number 5 is the only choice that could have been made. But if someone says I will show you that it's not necessary that I choose number 5; I will purposely choose dish 10 (the modal fallacy brought up to try to negate determinism), then the antecedent condition has changed such that this person now desires to prove that it's not necessary that he choose number 5 (what he would normally choose if this effort to prove determinism false didn't enter into his consideration). This is all in accordance with the deterministic law of "greater satisfaction", which is the reason will is not free.
It is obvious that if the choice is not available as in the cantina, it couldn't have been chosen, but the followup X could have done otherwise is only in imagination. As I said, before the action it is a possibility that X could choose dish 7, but he did not choose dish 7 because it did not give him greater satisfaction to do so, and we are compelled to move in this direction rendering any other choice an impossibility at that moment in time.
a set of questions: 1. Is the sentence 'If I heat up a kettle of water, it will boil after a time' true?Yes.
Is the sentence 'If I tomorrow heat up a kettle of water, it will boil after a time' true?Yes
3. Is the sentence 'If I yesterday would have heated up a kettle of water, it would have boiled after a time' true?Yes
Now, I don't even have a kettle, I heat my tea water with a water cooker. So above sentences are definitely all in my imagination. Now are they true or not? 4. Is the sentence 'We can choose between 10 different dishes in the restaurant' true?If there are 10 different dishes to pick from.
5. Is the sentence 'You can choose dish 5 in the restaurant' true?Yes, if there are 5 dishes to pick from.
6. Is the sentence 'You can choose dish 7 in the restaurant' true?Absolutely.
Now, yesterday we went to the restaurant and you chose dish 5. 7. Is the sentence 'Yesterday you could have chosen menu 5 in the restaurant' true?Yes, before you chose it, it was one of the options.
8. Is the sentence 'Yesterday you could have chosen menu 7 in the restaurant' true?Yes, before you chose option 5, option 7 was a possibility. This in no way proves free will. IOW, before the fact we have an array of possible choices. After choosing 5, you could not have chosen 7 because, at that moment, it did not give you greater satisfaction to choose 7. Choice 5 in your comparison was the more preferable choice which is the only direction our desire can take us. It is impossible to move in the direction of what gives us less satisfaction when something of greater value to us is offered as an alternative, therefore it was necessarily true that choice 7 could not have been picked.
As variations you can answer the following variants: a. Assume choices are determined. b. Assume our choices are not determined. c. Answer all the same questions, but now replace 'true' with 'necessarily true'. If this leads you to different answers, then please explain. I hope I will find some time later to react on other points in your post.Okay
It doesn't work that way. That's just a problem with the conventional definition of determinism, not that determinism is false.I did not want to point to problems with determinism, I wanted to point to problems you have with modalities. I know that, at least in the practical sense, determinism does not mean 'predictable'. I said that already. The problem you have is that the sentence 'peacegirl eats dish 5 at March 17th.' does not change its modality (from simply true to necessarily true') just because it happened. It is, and was, not necessarily true because there were other dishes to choose from. It has nothing to do with my lack of foreknowledge of what you will choose. Given determinism, it was fixed that you would eat dish 5, even that we could not know that fact. It is true before, and it is true after the fact happened. But when I know you are going to the cantina, then I know that there is no choice, so you will eat tomorrow's only available dish. In fact we went to this restaurant together, and I took dish 7. So today, I fully justified can say (e.g. because dish 5 was not as good as you hoped): 'You could have chosen dish 7'. How do I know? Because I chose it! This is the normal meaning of 'You could have chosen dish 7', the rest is metaphysical mumbo jumbo. And this normal meaning of 'could have done otherwise' can bear the justification for blaming, praising and assigning responsibility. So you agree with all my sentences: 1. If I heat up a kettle of water, it will boil after a time. 2. If I tomorrow heat up a kettle of water, it will boil after a time. 3. If I yesterday would have heated up a kettle of water, it would have boiled after a time. But they are all part of my imagination! And they are still true! So being true of these sentences is independent of the fact if I really did heat up a kettle with water yesterday. So that 'only in my imagination' is irrelevant. I can have true sentences in my imagination or false sentences, but 'being in my imagination' does not belong to the criteria if a sentence is true or not.
This is funny. If the tense of the sentence is changed, then you turn completely. So what was true today 'I can choose dish 7' is not true anymore when it is in the past: 'I could have chosen dish 7'. How is this possible? I can tell you: you shift the perspective. If you look into the future you see the real options (dishes 1..10) between which you can choose and you do not take yourself into account. But if you look in the past, then you do take yourself into account, and say 'there was only one way open for me, I could not have taken another dish'. You confuse the whole thing because you put 'predictability' into the equation: instead of saying 'We can choose between 10 different dishes in the restaurant', you consistently should have said 'I can only choose one menu, even if I do not know yet which one'. So now see the sentences with new eyes: look at them from the view of real options: a) I can choose from 10 different dishes b) I could have chosen from 10 different dishes. Or if you want: a) I can take dish 7, but I prefer dish 5. b) I could have taken dish 7, bit I preferred dish 5. Without changing the perspective, there is nothing special with the sentences b). They are the same as the sentences a), but in the past tense. And this, totally unproblematic meaning of 'could have done otherwise' is enough basis for our practice of blaming, praising and assigning responsibility. ('Why did you take dish 5, you knew that there were brussels sprouts in it. You could have taken dish 7').4. Is the sentence 'We can choose between 10 different dishes in the restaurant' true?If there are 10 different dishes to pick from.5. Is the sentence 'You can choose dish 5 in the restaurant' true?Yes, if there are 5 dishes to pick from.6. Is the sentence 'You can choose dish 7 in the restaurant' true?Absolutely.Now, yesterday we went to the restaurant and you chose dish 5. 7. Is the sentence 'Yesterday you could have chosen menu 5 in the restaurant' true?Yes, before you chose it, it was one of the options.8. Is the sentence 'Yesterday you could have chosen menu 7 in the restaurant' true?Yes, before you chose option 5, option 7 was a possibility. This in no way proves free will. IOW, before the fact we have an array of possible choices. After choosing 5, you could not have chosen 7 because, at that moment, it did not give you greater satisfaction to choose 7. Choice 5 in your comparison was the more preferable choice which is the only direction our desire can take us. It is impossible to move in the direction of what gives us less satisfaction when something of greater value to us is offered as an alternative, therefore it was necessarily true that choice 7 could not have been picked.
It doesn't work that way. That's just a problem with the conventional definition of determinism, not that determinism is false.I did not want to point to problems with determinism, I wanted to point to problems you have with modalities. I know that, at least in the practical sense, determinism does not mean 'predictable'. I said that already. The problem you have is that the sentence 'peacegirl eats dish 5 at March 17th.' does not change its modality (from simply true to necessarily true') just because it happened. It is, and was, not necessarily true because there were other dishes to choose from. It has nothing to do with my lack of foreknowledge of what you will choose. Given determinism, it was fixed that you would eat dish 5, even that we could not know that fact. It is true before, and it is true after the fact happened. But when I know you are going to the cantina, then I know that there is no choice, so you will eat tomorrow's only available dish. It is absolutely 100% true that, although there were other dishes, I had to choose dish 5. But there is no way of knowing that in advance of my choosing dish 5. Before I chose dish 5, I contemplated which dish I think I would prefer. Humans have the ability to mull over options that are available, but this in no way takes away from determinism.
In fact we went to this restaurant together, and I took dish 7. So today, I fully justified can say (e.g. because dish 5 was not as good as you hoped): 'You could have chosen dish 7'. How do I know? Because I chose it! This is the normal meaning of 'You could have chosen dish 7', the rest is metaphysical mumbo jumbo. And this normal meaning of 'could have done otherwise' can bear the justification for blaming, praising and assigning responsibility.No GdB. Just because you ate dish 7, and said to me after the fact that I could have chosen dish 7, it is true I could have chosen dish 7 if I had had the information that I now have. But I did not at the time know that I would not enjoy dish 5 so at that moment I opted for dish 5. I could not have done otherwise given this situation but my future choice, given the same situation, would be different because I would have new knowledge that would prompt me to try something else. So what is mumbo jumbo here? If Lessans was right (which he was but you don't know that yet), it is important to follow his reasoning. He is not saying to just stop blaming or punishing. He says let's follow the corollary to see where it leads us .
So you agree with all my sentences: 1. If I heat up a kettle of water, it will boil after a time. 2. If I tomorrow heat up a kettle of water, it will boil after a time. 3. If I yesterday would have heated up a kettle of water, it would have boiled after a time. But they are all part of my imagination! And they are still true! So being true of these sentences is independent of the fact if I really did heat up a kettle with water yesterday. So that 'only in my imagination' is irrelevant. I can have true sentences in my imagination or false sentences, but 'being in my imagination' does not belong to the criteria if a sentence is true or not.I meant by imagination that the thought is not part of reality; it's just something made up in your head that has no corresponding accuracy.
4. Is the sentence 'We can choose between 10 different dishes in the restaurant' true?If there are 10 different dishes to pick from.5. Is the sentence 'You can choose dish 5 in the restaurant' true?Yes, if there are 5 dishes to pick from.6. Is the sentence 'You can choose dish 7 in the restaurant' true?Absolutely.Now, yesterday we went to the restaurant and you chose dish 5. 7. Is the sentence 'Yesterday you could have chosen menu 5 in the restaurant' true?Yes, before you chose it, it was one of the options.8. Is the sentence 'Yesterday you could have chosen menu 7 in the restaurant' true?Yes, before you chose option 5, option 7 was a possibility. This in no way proves free will. IOW, before the fact we have an array of possible choices. After choosing 5, you could not have chosen 7 because, at that moment, it did not give you greater satisfaction to choose 7. Choice 5 in your comparison was the more preferable choice which is the only direction our desire can take us. It is impossible to move in the direction of what gives us less satisfaction when something of greater value to us is offered as an alternative, therefore it was necessarily true that choice 7 could not have been picked.
This is funny. If the tense of the sentence is changed, then you turn completely. So what was true today 'I can choose dish 7' is not true anymore when it is in the past: 'I could have chosen dish 7'. How is this possible? I can tell you: you shift the perspective. If you look into the future you see the real options (dishes 1..10) between which you can choose and you do not take yourself into account. But if you look in the past, then you do take yourself into account, and say 'there was only one way open for me, I could not have taken another dish'.But that is absolutely true GdB. Sometimes we don't know ourselves which choice we are going to make, so we can say "I can choose dish 7" if I want to. IOW, this dish is available for my consideration. But if I look back after making a choice and I did not choose dish 7, I could not have chosen dish 7 because it obviously gave me less satisfaction than to choose dish 5, and it is impossible to choose an option that is less satisfying in comparison. You really need to understand the concept of "greater satisfaction" or you'll get lost.
You confuse the whole thing because you put 'predictability' into the equation: instead of saying 'We can choose between 10 different dishes in the restaurant', you consistently should have said 'I can only choose one menu, even if I do not know yet which one'. So now see the sentences with new eyes: look at them from the view of real options: a) I can choose from 10 different dishes (IF I WANT TO) b) I could have chosen from 10 different dishes. (IF I HAD WANTED TO) Or if you want: a) I can take dish 7, but I prefer dish 5. b) I could have taken dish 7, bit I preferred dish 5. Without changing the perspective, there is nothing special with the sentences b). They are the same as the sentences a), but in the past tense. And this, totally unproblematic meaning of 'could have done otherwise' is enough basis for our practice of blaming, praising and assigning responsibility. ('Why did you take dish 5, you knew that there were brussels sprouts in it. You could have taken dish 7').The truth is you could not have taken dish 7 because your preference, at that moment, was to take dish 5. The first example is not the same: I could have chosen from 10 different dishes indicates that you didn't choose from those 10 dishes, even though you could have if you had wanted to. It should have read: a) I can choose from 10 different dishes. (All this means is that you have the option to choose between 10 different dishes). b) I could have chosen from 10 different dishes (but I preferred to get my usual dish 5 so I didn't look at the others).