Revolution In Thought

Philosophy
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Motivations are what drives one's choices in the direction of greater satisfaction, so where is the free will? Having options that are not burdened by external constraint is a distinction that is contrived to make it appear as if free will and determinism can co-exist. Please let his words sink in.
I did, and after examination, they fell through. You still don't see the point what we are discussing about:
- You say we would need libertarian free will to assign people responsibility
There is no other kind of free will than libertarian. If your will is free in any sense, you are at liberty (libertarian) to choosse one thing over another without compulsion). You are playing a semantic game that has no corresponding accuracy in reality. You're just dealing with words.
- I say we need compatibilist free will to assign people responsibility We both agree that libertarian free will does not exist.
You are trying to make it seem that the compatibilist definition is legitimate but the reasoning is flawed. You, and all the compatibilists out there, are trying to figure out a way to justify blame and punishment in a determined world. There is contradiction whether you want to accept it or not. I understand the problem, for if there is no free will whatsoever how can we justify holding people accountable?
- Your reaction: we must draw the consequences of this! My father proves we can make it a better world when we think this through! - My reaction: so what?
You don't care that this knowledge can prevent the very things that no amount of punishment could ever accomplish -- the end of war, crime, and poverty?
What we do [of our own free will; of our own desire because we want to] is not done of our own free will.
You see you get trouble formulating what you mean? You use 'free will' in 2 different meanings, so you recognise it is a form of free will.
He uses "free will" as a synonym for "of my own accord." Compatibilists and libertarians use this to mean "freedom of the will". You are the one giving it more 2 different meanings by making a fundamental error in reasoning when you say that being physically constrained or by having serious compulsions (like OCD), or having a drug addiction are qualitatively different than the choices that you consider "free" enough for blameworthiness.
The only step you must make now is that the second, red one, is based on an unfounded metaphysical idea, and then examine if the first, green one, can bear the load of assigning responsibility.
Not between your 'causal history' and what your wishes and beliefs are.
Huh? Don't your motivations and actions come from your beliefs and wishes? :gulp:
Out of context my phrase means nothing. (It not even sentence). I am saying that free will means that our reasons determine our actions.
If our reasons determine our actions and those reasons are the wishes and desires that culminate in our making a particular choice, how in the world can our choice be free? Obviously, if we had other reasons to influence our choice, those reasons would take the forefront and compel us to pick a different choice.
The objection that my reasons themselves are caused has nothing to with it, as long as we are grown up normally and are not a victim of Cuthbertj's daemon. As long as we can anticipate the future, evaluate options for actions, and know what society abhors, I can decide what do do and I am free. That my considering is a determined process has nothing to do with it.
You must not have read my last post carefully. This was key yet you didn't even address it. We are not caused to do what we do by external forces, by our heredity or environment, or by God himself such that we don't have options in the present. Our history, our heredity, our experiences, and the options available to us compel us to desire choosing one thing over another, but they don't cause. There is a big elephant in the room confusion here because, once again, nothing can cause or force us (the standard definition of determinism) to do what we don't want to do; but just because we can't be forced by determinism to do what we do does not grant us free will.
The kind of coercion that is defined as determinism in the conventional literature is not reflective of what is actually going on in reality.
So what is actually going on in reality, apart from just one huge causal process?
Please scroll back to the previous post, or better yet please read Chapter One with a real desire to understand.
Yes, I am responsible for having diarrhea, so what? I haven't caused you any serious pain.
No. But you threw our holiday into the water. It has consequences for me, and therefore I make you responsible, and therefore I am justified angry.
You can be disappointed. Humans have feelings, but to blame me for what I had no control over is a very serious problem which needs to be corrected in order for a world of peace to become a reality.
There is nothing wrong with saying "if I had not eaten dish 7, I would not have diarrhea; but I did eat dish 7 which looking back, given my frame of mind, and the situation before me, I could not have acted otherwise.
Yes, in the metaphysical sense you could not have done otherwise.
In any sense I could not have done otherwise, metaphysical or not.
But in the normal, daily meaning you could have taken another dish. And even if you were determined, it was you who did it, and therefore you accept your responsibility.
You are mixing up two different definitions of responsibility. I did it; I made the choice. No one else made this choice. But I am not worthy of blame because I could not have done otherwise. We're very close to getting to the understanding of the two-sided equation but until you grasp the concept of "greater satisfaction" which is why will is not free, I can't move on.
If the idea that you are determined does change something in your attitude, then it is not that you are not responsible, but that you see that your act of taking dish 5 just has its consequences, and you timidly accept my anger as completely justified in the situation you created. You know you can do otherwise, next time, and in this sense (think about Stephen's example with he tea and coffee), you also could have done otherwise.
Your anger obviously has a bearing on my next move, but when it comes to heinous crimes, threats of blame and punishment often backfire. In fact, they actually provide the necessary justification to follow through with the act. I know you don't understand this yet, but there is a better way to achieve the kind of world we've all been praying (hoping) for.
You are skewing the definition of free will in order to make it compatible with determinism, but there is a serious flaw.
There is no flaw: the flaw lies completely in the idea that we need libertarian free will to support our praxis of assigning responsibility.
There is a huge flaw regarding the assignation of responsibility. This begins Chapter Two. He shows, as we extend the corollary, Thou Shall Not Blame, how we get a better outcome, an outcome that will cause a major evolutionary leap in where we are headed.
There is no convincing you GdB. You sound like another compatibilist I talked to who was so adamant that we have this special kind of free will (the kind that is not compulsive and is not caused by external constraints), that he was deaf to hearing my explanation.
It will not wonder you, that I of course think the same of you. And it is no special kind of free will: it is the only one we have, being able to do what you want. Your 'free will' I made green above.
And as I stated, having two options or a thousand doesn't give you any more free will than if someone had a gun to your head where you knew your only choice would be to tell them what they wanted to know. The difference is in quantity only. Just because some differences are so obviously superior in value that no hesitation is required to determine which choice is preferable doesn't change the direction that we are compelled to go, which offers us ONE choice only; the choice that gives us the greatest satisfaction.
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If our reasons determine our actions and those reasons are the wishes and desires that culminate in our making a particular choice, how in the world can our choice be free? Obviously, if we had other reasons to influence our choice, those reasons would take the forefront and compel us to pick a different choice.
Yep, exactly. Except that word compel. What are 'we', that 'object' that is being compelled? My soul? I did not point it out yet, but I'll do it now: the correlate of both forms of incompatibilism is dualism: the believer in libertarian free will must suppose that we are something apart from our body and that can steer the body; the incompatibilist determinist must suppose that we are something that can be compelled. But that is an illusion. When you see that we are what the brain does, then the so called problem of free will evaporates.
We are not caused to do what we do by external forces, by our heredity or environment, or by God himself such that we don't have options in the present. Our history, our heredity, our experiences, and the options available to us compel us to desire choosing one thing over another, but they don't cause.
That is interesting: what, in a deterministic view, is the difference between compelling and causing?
163
If our reasons determine our actions and those reasons are the wishes and desires that culminate in our making a particular choice, how in the world can our choice be free? Obviously, if we had other reasons to influence our choice, those reasons would take the forefront and compel us to pick a different choice.
Yep, exactly. Except that word compel. What are 'we', that 'object' that is being compelled? My soul? I did not point it out yet, but I'll do it now: the correlate of both forms of incompatibilism is dualism: the believer in libertarian free will must suppose that we are something apart from our body and that can steer the body; the incompatibilist determinist must suppose that we are something that can be compelled. But that is an illusion. When you see that we are what the brain does, then the so called problem of free will evaporates. I'm not sure where you get from "we are what the brain does" to the evaporation of free will.
We are not caused to do what we do by external forces, by our heredity or environment, or by God himself such that we don't have options in the present. Our history, our heredity, our experiences, and the options available to us compel us to desire choosing one thing over another, but they don't cause.
That is interesting: what, in a deterministic view, is the difference between compelling and causing?
It depends how the two words are used. When you say I was caused to do something, it appears that you are being caused to do what you do against your will. Here are some examples: My childhood made (or caused) me to kill him. It was my genetics that caused me to do it. Past circumstances caused me to do it. None of these are true because nothing can cause a person to do anything he doesn't want to do, not even God himself (which the standard definition of determinism suggests). Rather, our experiences, genetics, predispositions, and the options available to us present conditions that arouse our desire to choose one thing over another, or push us in a particular direction. I think that's what you were trying to say when you said determinism doesn't cause. The expression, "I was compelled of my own free will" is purposely used throughout the book to emphasize that even though you did something "of your own free will" or "of your own desire" (again, it is fine to use this expression in the context it is being used) you were still compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction rendering freedom of the will an illusion.
164

Don’t have much time to spare, but I just wanted to say how very surprised I am that no one has responded. It’s amazing to me that a center for inquiry has no inquiry. It seems to me (I may be wrong) that when a position is different from those who have a different point of view, the stamp of disapproval will be swift and sure. Is this fair? If this is the final decree that Lessans had nothing to offer, where is this author to go? I know that forums are not the answer. I just wanted to express myself. I will move on to other venues that will at the very least read the text. No one has done that, and yet he is already being condemned for being a troll. This just shows me that this “think tank” is nothing more than regurgitating what has already been regurgitated. Lois clarified that when she said that there has been no such idea in the literature that we should not blame and punish. Hellooooooo. I will repeat that this knowledge is unprecedented so how could any philosopher know the implications of this particular philosopher who was never given a chance. It’s really sad, but I know deep down (which helps to give me peace of mind) that this is how is has to be until it is not how it has to be. That is the gift of determinism.

165

I define free will as the ability to consciously overcome our determining influences and I reject the concept altogether. . I don’t add adhectives to free will to make it more palatable to some people. There is free will and there is derterminism. IMO, you can’t have a little of each. It’s like arguing that a woman can be a little bit pregnant by claiming that there can be libertarian pregnancy and compatibilist pregnanncy.
Too many people try to argue free will and determinism by watering down the definition of free will. I am a hard determinist. I am not going to pretend there is another form of determinism that allows free will to exist in certain situations. It doesn’t matter to me how many adjectives you attach to free will (or pregnancy). I am not going to accept any of them… There are a lot of people you can argue with about this. I’m not one of them.
Lois

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I define free will as the ability to consciously overcome our determining influences and I reject the concept altogether. . I don't add adhectives to free will to make it more palatable to some people. There is free will and there is derterminism. IMO, you can't have a little of each. It's like arguing that a woman can be a little bit pregnant by claiming that there can be libertarian pregnancy and compatibilist pregnanncy. Too many people try to argue free will and determinism by watering down the definition of free will. I am a hard determinist. I am not going to pretend there is another form of determinism that allows free will to exist in certain situations. It doesn't matter to me how many adjectives you attach to free will (or pregnancy). I am not going to accept any of them.. There are a lot of people you can argue with about this. I'm not one of them. Lois
Lois, you're preaching to the choir. I am a hard determinist. We cannot have free will and determinism at the same time as if these two things can coexist without there being a contradiction. It would be like saying that we can be dead and alive at the same time or as you said, a little bit pregnant. Lessans uses the term "I did something of my own free will" or "volition", only to mean "I did something because I wanted to", which is a true statement. This is a very important point because a lot of people say (in a court of law) that they were made to do what they did. But no one can make a person do something (whatever it is) if they don't want to, not even the threat of death. Another way of putting it is that nothing can make or force someone to do something without his consent. No watering down of free will here because we don't have any. Libertarians and compatibilists claim that being able to do something without external force or coersion IS the very definition of free will. This is where Lessans said you can use the term "I did it of my own free will" if it is intended to mean "I did something of my own accord (without there being a gun to my head), but this in no way means we actually have freedom of the will. This discovery and its extension is based on the absolute truth of determinism but here again there is confusion in how this term is defined. So why wouldn't you, as a hard determinist, be interested in learning more when this knowledge is unprecedented and the prospect of world peace is on the line? I know people are incredulous but that shouldn't stop the scientifically minded from being as unbiased as possible. This is truly a revolution in thought, hence the name of this thread. For me to try to convince compatibilists and libertarians that they are incorrect in their analysis is a losing battle. Unfortunately, those who would give this man the time of day are hard to come by, but I know they are there; it's just a matter of finding them. Determinism is beginning to get a foothold in the scientific community, but it's a very slow process due to the issue of moral responsibility. It's very hard to be the odd man out in a forum where the majority of people are already committed to an opposing belief system. I can't make any headway.
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It’s true, humans act as if we have free will, most think we have free will and we speak as if we have free will, but that has no bearing on the actual truth of the matter. We speak as if the sun rises and sets, too, even though the sun does not move in relation to the earth. The difference, of course, is that most people accept the truth about the sun, but too many people refuse to accept the truth about free will. Language has no bearing on truth. Nor do feelings. IMO, free will does not exist, no matter how much we speak as if it does and no matter how much anyone wishes for it to exist.
I notice that nobody talks about a compatibilist or libertarian sun. Most people have accepted that the sun doesn’t move in relation to the earth, even though it sems to.
Lois

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Hello, just a quick note, I’ve read the book, ask Janis about “instant vision”.

169
I define free will as the ability to consciously overcome our determining influences and I reject the concept altogether. .
Yep, that's a good definition of contra causal free will. Determinism remains the same, it's the definition of free will which get's watered down by compatibilists..
170

The question comes down to the definition of determinism and free will. If you say that any influence, no matter how slight, that affects a decision and is deterministic, then that is the end of the discussion. If you claim that you can only have free will if every decision is free of any influence, you have also ended the discussion. However there is a possibility that both influences and decision making lie on a spectrum and where each decision falls on this spectrum will determine whether the decision was made freely or not. For example is it possible that a decision could only be slightly influenced and therefore made relatively freely? Is it possible that most decisions are not completely free or completely determined?

171
Determinism remains the same, it's the definition of free will which get's watered down by compatibilists..
It's not watered down. It is undone from its unempirical, unfounded and metaphysical ballast. With the concept of libertarian free will, we can also do away with the idea of ultimate responsibility, i.e. a responsibility that is is not rooted in society, but in some metaphysical or divine realm.
172
The question comes down to the definition of determinism and free will. If you say that any influence, no matter how slight, that affects a decision and is deterministic, then that is the end of the discussion. If you claim that you can only have free will if every decision is free of any influence, you have also ended the discussion. However there is a possibility that both influences and decision making lie on a spectrum and where each decision falls on this spectrum will determine whether the decision was made freely or not. For example is it possible that a decision could only be slightly influenced and therefore made relatively freely? Is it possible that most decisions are not completely free or completely determined?
That is nonsense. Everything is full determined (ok, except QM ...). The question is, if somebody clearly shows that libertarian free will does not exist, do we have to change our practice of assigning people responsibility? Do, e.g. Lois and peacegirl not think that they are responsible for their actions? I could do an offer to Lois and peacegirl: I will not call compabilist free will 'free will' anymore. When we say 'free will' we mean libertarian free will. So: yes, we agree in the end! Free will does not exist! I confess! But how do we call this daily, 'I did it from my own free will' now? OK, let's call it volition. Now my question is: what do we need for assigning responsibility: free will or volition? Do I punish somebody who killed a person per accident? Do I punish somebody who killed somebody voluntarily? Why? Remember, from the viewpoint of determinism both actions are exactly the same: both followed from factors over which they had no control.
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I'm not sure where you get from "we are what the brain does" to the evaporation of free will.
Most people who yell that we have no free will, do not take into account that they must suppose that there is somebody who is not free. So here 'I' am, and 'I' am determined by... by what? Well, not by myself, that would be nonsense. So by my brain? Now, if I am a dualist, I can conceptually say this. Here 'I' am, my soul, but whatever I do, it is determined by my brain. That makes logically sense. But it makes no sense to say that my brain is determined by my brain. When I am what the brain does, saying that I am not free because I am determined by my brain is an empty statement. So it makes no sense to say that we have no free will because were determined. Of course, it also makes no sense to say that we have free will because we are determined. A falling stone has no free will. It also has not no free will: it has no will. So determinism as only condition has nothing to say about free will at all. But, as you know if you really understand compatibilism, determinism is a necessary condition for free will.
When you say I was caused to do something, it appears that you are being caused to do what you do against your will.
That is not what I mean. All my actions are caused, free or not. They are only not caused in the same way: in some of them fear played a role, in another a long process of consciously thinking, in some them my feelings for others, in others just my pleasure etc etc. Depending on the mix, my caused action counts as free or not.
I think that's what you were trying to say when you said determinism doesn't cause.
I said that determinism does not mean that something is forced.
The expression, "I was compelled of my own free will" is purposely used throughout the book to emphasize that even though you did something "of your own free will" or "of your own desire" (again, it is fine to use this expression in the context it is being used) you were still compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction rendering freedom of the will an illusion.
peacegirl, this 'compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction' does not make sense. I do what I do based on reasons, some are good, some are bad, some are highly moral, others aren't, some are intensively reflected, some are without even thinking. But as long as I recognise that I acted according to my own reasons, I acted from free will.
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The question comes down to the definition of determinism and free will. If you say that any influence, no matter how slight, that affects a decision and is deterministic, then that is the end of the discussion. If you claim that you can only have free will if every decision is free of any influence, you have also ended the discussion. However there is a possibility that both influences and decision making lie on a spectrum and where each decision falls on this spectrum will determine whether the decision was made freely or not. For example is it possible that a decision could only be slightly influenced and therefore made relatively freely? Is it possible that most decisions are not completely free or completely determined?
That is nonsense. Everything is full determined (ok, except QM ...). The question is, if somebody clearly shows that libertarian free will does not exist, do we have to change our practice of assigning people responsibility? Do, e.g. Lois and peacegirl not think that they are responsible for their actions? I could do an offer to Lois and peacegirl: I will not call compabilist free will 'free will' anymore. When we say 'free will' we mean libertarian free will. So: yes, we agree in the end! Free will does not exist! I confess! But how do we call this daily, 'I did it from my own free will' now? OK, let's call it volition. Now my question is: what do we need for assigning responsibility: free will or volition? Do I punish somebody who killed a person per accident? Do I punish somebody who killed somebody voluntarily? Why? Remember, from the viewpoint of determinism both actions are exactly the same: both followed from factors over which they had no control. How do you differentiate free will and volition? "Related to VOLITION Synonyms accord, autonomy, choice, self-determination, free will, will " from this definition, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/volition
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It's true, humans act as if we have free will, most think we have free will and we speak as if we have free will, but that has no bearing on the actual truth of the matter. We speak as if the sun rises and sets, too, even though the sun does not move in relation to the earth. Tedifference, of course, is that most people accepy the truth about the aun, but too many people refuse to accept the truth abput free will. Language has no bearing on truth. Nor do feelings. IMO, free will does not exist, no matter how much we speak as if it does and no matter how much anyone wishes for it to exist. I notice that nobody talks about a compatibilist or libertarian sun. Most people have accepted that the sun doesn't move in relation to the earth, even though it sems to. Lois
Very true, but the knowledge of determinism is only the first step toward world peace. This IS NOT the discovery. If you are already half way there, it would seem to me you would be interested in how he extends this knowledge. So why not give it a chance?
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Hello, just a quick note, I've read the book, ask Janis about "instant vision".
You are creating new names for yourself and following me around the internet. I think you're Spacemonkey and I have no desire to talk to you.
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The question comes down to the definition of determinism and free will. If you say that any influence, no matter how slight, that affects a decision and is deterministic, then that is the end of the discussion. If you claim that you can only have free will if every decision is free of any influence, you have also ended the discussion. However there is a possibility that both influences and decision making lie on a spectrum and where each decision falls on this spectrum will determine whether the decision was made freely or not. For example is it possible that a decision could only be slightly influenced and therefore made relatively freely? Is it possible that most decisions are not completely free or completely determined?
There are no decisions that are made without an influence from one's biology or biography.
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Determinism remains the same, it's the definition of free will which get's watered down by compatibilists..
It's not watered down. It is undone from its unempirical, unfounded and metaphysical ballast. With the concept of libertarian free will, we can also do away with the idea of ultimate responsibility, i.e. a responsibility that is is not rooted in society, but in some metaphysical or divine realm. But ultimate responsibility is not possible in either a libertarian or compatibilist sense, no matter how certain your logic may appear.
179
The question comes down to the definition of determinism and free will. If you say that any influence, no matter how slight, that affects a decision and is deterministic, then that is the end of the discussion. If you claim that you can only have free will if every decision is free of any influence, you have also ended the discussion. However there is a possibility that both influences and decision making lie on a spectrum and where each decision falls on this spectrum will determine whether the decision was made freely or not. For example is it possible that a decision could only be slightly influenced and therefore made relatively freely? Is it possible that most decisions are not completely free or completely determined?
That is nonsense. Everything is full determined (ok, except QM ...). The question is, if somebody clearly shows that libertarian free will does not exist, do we have to change our practice of assigning people responsibility? Do, e.g. Lois and peacegirl not think that they are responsible for their actions? I could do an offer to Lois and peacegirl: I will not call compabilist free will 'free will' anymore. When we say 'free will' we mean libertarian free will. So: yes, we agree in the end! Free will does not exist! I confess! But how do we call this daily, 'I did it from my own free will' now? OK, let's call it volition. Now my question is: what do we need for assigning responsibility: free will or volition? Do I punish somebody who killed a person per accident? Do I punish somebody who killed somebody voluntarily? Why? Remember, from the viewpoint of determinism both actions are exactly the same: both followed from factors over which they had no control. You are absolutely right. We do not punish either. But then the question becomes: Won't our world become less responsible if we don't assign responsibility to the person who is responsible for the action? This is where this knowledge demonstrates how not holding anyone ultimately responsible (because we now know that they can only move in one direction) actually makes responsibility go up, not down. That is the paradox, yet no one seems interested in how this occurs. People seem only to want to hear their own voices.
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I'm not sure where you get from "we are what the brain does" to the evaporation of free will.
Most people who yell that we have no free will, do not take into account that they must suppose that there is somebody who is not free. So here 'I' am, and 'I' am determined by... by what? Well, not by myself, that would be nonsense. So by my brain? Now, if I am a dualist, I can conceptually say this. Here 'I' am, my soul, but whatever I do, it is determined by my brain. That makes logically sense. But it makes no sense to say that my brain is determined by my brain. When I am what the brain does, saying that I am not free because I am determined by my brain is an empty statement. So it makes no sense to say that we have no free will because were determined. Of course, it also makes no sense to say that we have free will because we are determined. A falling stone has no free will. It also has not no free will: it has no will. So determinism as only condition has nothing to say about free will at all. But, as you know if you really understand compatibilism, determinism is a necessary condition for free will. You are determined to do what you do based on nature and nurture. Some of those determining factors are part of your genetics and make-up and part are determined by your experiences (from childhood on up). Ultimately, our choices come from our brain because that's where our decision making takes place. Having a will unlike a stone does not change the fact that will is not free. If will is not free, it cannot be a necessary condition for free will. That is twisted logic.
When you say I was caused to do something, it appears that you are being caused to do what you do against your will.
That is not what I mean. All my actions are caused, free or not. They are only not caused in the same way: in some of them fear played a role, in another a long process of consciously thinking, in some them my feelings for others, in others just my pleasure etc etc. Depending on the mix, my caused action counts as free or not.
What you just said is a contradiction: "All my actions are caused, free or not." If your actions are caused, they are not free. :ohh:
I think that's what you were trying to say when you said determinism doesn't cause.
I said that determinism does not mean that something is forced.
Maybe not, but you do believe that a person could have done otherwise by trying to make the present, past, and future appear synonymous.
The expression, "I was compelled of my own free will" is purposely used throughout the book to emphasize that even though you did something "of your own free will" or "of your own desire" (again, it is fine to use this expression in the context it is being used) you were still compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction rendering freedom of the will an illusion.
peacegirl, this 'compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction' does not make sense. I do what I do based on reasons, some are good, some are bad, some are highly moral, others aren't, some are intensively reflected, some are without even thinking. But as long as I recognise that I acted according to my own reasons, I acted from free will.
You did no such thing. Having reasons does not render you free; it renders you UNFREE! You have no understanding of "greater satisfaction"; it makes absolute sense unlike your explanation which is total folly!