The problem with a necessary link between past and present can be expressed as a problem of luck. If there is a rule I shouldn't break, in order not to break it I need the distant past to be a certain way so the past, in conjunction with the law of nature, leads to me obeying the rule. I didn't choose the (distant) past nor do I have any control over it whatsoever. 1) Circumstances not of my choosing would have had to have been different for me to have done otherwise. 2) If circumstances not of my choosing had been appropriately different I would have done otherwise. Once that's understood it's obvious that bringing more luck into it in the form of indeterminism won't help. And that's it, people just dig their heels in because they don't want to believe it.Well, some people dig in their heels, not because they don't want to believe, but because they deny it's true. ;-) But you deny it's true because you don't want it to be true. Otherwise you'd agree since its so simple to run through the possible ways I CHDO and see that which ever way you do it those two statements are true.
Yes, but Swartz's point is that these "unknown" laws are unknowable in principle, because they do not exist, until a first instance of them is realized. But more on this later.Yeah, this is exactly it. The thing is laws like that, and I don't think they even deserve the name laws, are useless to us. We can't use them to talk about "what will happen if" since they merely come from what will happen. I Can't sensibly say the kettle will boil if I flick the switch, since the truth of that statement just depends upon what does happen after I flick the switch. And I can't sensibly say the kettle would not have boiled if I hadn't flicked the switch. Swartz is as crazy as Lessans. Just much cleverer with it.
But you deny it's true because you don't want it to be true.No, Stephen, that's not the case. Arguments to motive are invalid and frankly rather insulting. I always want to know what's true, if it is possible to know that, regardless of whether the truth is uncomfortable. It's you, honestly, who seems like a dogmatic stuck record, unwilling to entertain any notion that in the least conflicts with what you have decided to be (want to be?) true. After all, wanting to believe that we are not morally responsible for anything is something that a lot of people would love to be true. Maybe that's why you believe it?
Yes, but Swartz's point is that these "unknown" laws are unknowable in principle, because they do not exist, until a first instance of them is realized. But more on this later.Yeah, this is exactly it. The thing is laws like that, and I don't think they even deserve the name laws, are useless to us. We can't use them to talk about "what will happen if" since they merely come from what will happen. I Can't sensibly say the kettle will boil if I flick the switch, since the truth of that statement just depends upon what does happen after I flick the switch. And I can't sensibly say the kettle would not have boiled if I hadn't flicked the switch. Swartz is as crazy as Lessans. Just much cleverer with it. You have thoroughly mischaracterized Swartz's arguments in the two chapters that I linked. Have you read them? Anyway, the above is just a restatement of the problem of induction, and that's a philosophical problem independent of this discussion, though there is overlap.
Stephen, to do justice to Swartz’s argument, you have to understand the distinction he makes between a necessitarian theory of physical law, and a regularity theory of law. I don’t think you understand the distinction, which is fine; but you’re free to read the two chapters that I linked form his book “The Concept of Physical Law,” and indeed to read the whole book. If you still disagree, great. Swartz himself notes that most philosophers disagree with him even after understanding his arguments. But to call him as crazy as Lessans is pretty unfortunate. Swartz was a distinguished professor of philosophy at Simon Fraser University, whose philosophy department has a strong reputation.
Stephen, to do justice to Swartz's argument, you have to understand the distinction he makes between a necessitarian theory of physical law, and a regularity theory of law. I don't think you understand the distinction, which is fine; but you're free to read the two chapters that I linked form his book "The Concept of Physical Law," and indeed to read the whole book. If you still disagree, great. Swartz himself notes that most philosophers disagree with him even after understanding his arguments. But to call him as crazy as Lessans is pretty unfortunate. Swartz was a distinguished professor of philosophy at Simon Fraser University, whose philosophy department has a strong reputation.I understand the distinction. Plus the distinction is a red herring, since what he's saying is new laws are created when they happen, which is something else. Bottom line is we can't have more control, freedom, or responsibility than same past same future style determinism gives. The reason for that is the problem is one of luck, I would have needed circumstances not chosen by me to have been different for me to have done otherwise. This is true which ever model we work with. So Swartz does not overcome the problem of luck at all.
Stephen, to do justice to Swartz's argument, you have to understand the distinction he makes between a necessitarian theory of physical law, and a regularity theory of law. I don't think you understand the distinction, which is fine; but you're free to read the two chapters that I linked form his book "The Concept of Physical Law," and indeed to read the whole book. If you still disagree, great. Swartz himself notes that most philosophers disagree with him even after understanding his arguments. But to call him as crazy as Lessans is pretty unfortunate. Swartz was a distinguished professor of philosophy at Simon Fraser University, whose philosophy department has a strong reputation.I understand the distinction. Plus the distinction is a red herring, since what he's saying is new laws are created when they happen, which is something else. Bottom line is we can't have more control, freedom, or responsibility than same past same future style determinism gives. The reason for that is the problem is one of luck, I would have needed circumstances not chosen by me to have been different for me to have done otherwise. This is true which ever model we work with. So Swartz does not overcome the problem of luck at all. Swartz writes:
We cannot, of course, conduct the experiment. We can’t back up or reverse this world and approach a decision point for a second time to see whether the same outcome will occur the second time through. The best we can do is to postulate another possible world identical in its history to this world up to some time t and ask whether the Principle of Determinism really requires that that world have the same future, subsequent to t, that the actual world has. I claim that the Principle of Determinism requires no such conclusion.Bold mine. Swartz may be wrong about this, of course. But if he's right, you're wrong to say "this is true which ever model we work with." Swartz is explicitly denying that given antecedent conditions in conjunction with physical law, then we will (though not must) do x. So he is rejecting your argument.
Yes, but Swartz's point is that these "unknown" laws are unknowable in principle, because they do not exist, until a first instance of them is realized. But more on this later.Hmmm... A physical law is supposed to be timelessly true. For me that means 'being true' but 'not known' at the same time. One can say that a physical law does not exist as long it is not described, but I think that the regularities that could be described by physical laws already exist before a description of it is found. But I'll wait for your longer reaction. Yes, this is right, but Swartz isn't saying that a physical law does not exist as long as it is not described. Quite the opposite, I think. He's saying they do not exist NOW, but will exist at some point in the future. And there are timelessly true descriptions of those future laws, but we can't know the truth value of those descriptions because right now, we just can't know what those future laws are. I will try in the next couple of days to write a longish post on these matters. Interesting discussion all around, and mercifully photon-free.
But you deny it's true because you don't want it to be true.No, Stephen, that's not the case. Arguments to motive are invalid and frankly rather insulting. I always want to know what's true, if it is possible to know that, regardless of whether the truth is uncomfortable. It's you, honestly, who seems like a dogmatic stuck record, unwilling to entertain any notion that in the least conflicts with what you have decided to be (want to be?) true. After all, wanting to believe that we are not morally responsible for anything is something that a lot of people would love to be true. Maybe that's why you believe it? I'm motivated by what I want to believe just as you are. But what some of us want to believe coincides with what is true. . The problem is one of luck, so if standard determinism is true we'd need circumstances in the distant past to have been as they would have needed to be for us to do what we should do. This luck can't be overcome which ever model of the universe you work with. If I'm wrong you can simply describe a way in which something else could happen which overcomes the problem.
But you deny it's true because you don't want it to be true.No, Stephen, that's not the case. Arguments to motive are invalid and frankly rather insulting. I always want to know what's true, if it is possible to know that, regardless of whether the truth is uncomfortable. It's you, honestly, who seems like a dogmatic stuck record, unwilling to entertain any notion that in the least conflicts with what you have decided to be (want to be?) true. After all, wanting to believe that we are not morally responsible for anything is something that a lot of people would love to be true. Maybe that's why you believe it? I'm motivated by what I want to believe just as you are. But what some of us want to believe coincides with what is true. . The problem is one of luck, so if standard determinism is true we'd need circumstances in the distant past to have been as they would have needed to be for us to do what we should do. This luck can't be overcome which ever model of the universe you work with. If I'm wrong you can simply describe a way in which something else could happen which overcomes the problem. See the linked chapters 10 and 11 of Swartz's book for the answer to your question.
I'm motivated by what I want to believe just as you are.I'm not motivated by what I want to believe. I'm motivated by the search for what is true, insofar as we can discover what is true. Full stop. My preferences are irrelevant. I, for instance, would like to believe that after I die, Jesus gives me a cookie in the sky. I don't believe that because there is no evidence for it whatsoever, and moreover the idea is preposterous on too many levels to even describe.
Swartz may be wrong about this, of course.Not really. He's redefining determinism I don't think someone can be wrong to do that exactly. Standard determinism is same past same future. He changes this by adding the concept of laws being created when the event happens.
But if he's right, you're wrong to say "this is true which ever model we work with." Swartz is explicitly denying that given antecedent conditions in conjunction with physical law, then we will (though not must) do x. So he is rejecting your argument.No because that is not my argument. The argument is free will must be compatible with the same past same future model of the universe for us to have it. That is because circumstances not chosen by us would have had to have been different for us to have done otherwise, regardless.
See the linked chapters 10 and 11 of Swartz's book for the answer to your question.It's not there. And if it was you would simply tell me the answer.
Pec, Basically you’ve been suckered into believing a meme on the internet spread by Swartz because you have a desire for Libertarian Free Will.
I'm motivated by what I want to believe just as you are.I'm not motivated by what I want to believe. Only a fool would believe that.
I'm motivated by what I want to believe just as you are.I'm not motivated by what I want to believe. Only a fool would believe that. If I were a moderator I would react with a blue sentence here. Please, get a bit less offensive, Stephen. Try to stick to the argument. Something becomes not more or less true by the motivation why somebody defends a viewpoint.
I'm motivated by what I want to believe just as you are.I'm not motivated by what I want to believe. Only a fool would believe that. OK, you're an idiot. I thought you were someone worth talking to, but basically you're just another Internet troll. Of course you won't read the linked chapters, or the entire book as you should, because you, like Lessans and Peacegirl, have a dogmatic belief system and will not brook any challenge to it.
Pec, Basically you've been suckered into believing a meme on the internet spread by Swartz because you have a desire for Libertarian Free Will.You are quite stupid. Swartz is not a Libertarian.
I'm motivated by what I want to believe just as you are.I'm not motivated by what I want to believe. Only a fool would believe that. If I were a moderator I would react with a blue sentence here. Please, get a bit less offensive, Stephen. Try to stick to the argument. Something becomes not more or less true by the motivation why somebody defends a viewpoint. Yeah it was a bit offensive. But the point is obviously we are all motivated by what we want to believe. If a belief makes us particularly uncomfortable we will not believe it. Atheists are comfortable being atheists. Christians are comfortable being Christians and so on. In this instance Pec is comfortable believing in libertarian free will and that's why he believes it. Swartz doesn't make a dent in the free will problem because the problem is that circumstances not chosen by me would have had to have been different for me to have done otherwise. It would be simple to counter that claim with an example but Pec won't make any attempt to do that because he wants to believe Swartz has somehow dissolved the free will problem by redefining determinism from same past same future to his particular version.
Again, the notion that I believe something to be true because I want it to be true is false and insulting. That does seem to be the case for you, however, Stephen. This is a classic case of projection.