Emphasizing The Connection Perspective

The Scientific and Physicalist view is that Consciousness is somehow located in the Neurons. It is a reasonable assumption given that Conscious Activity is Correlated with Neural Activity. But Science has no Theory, Hypothesis, or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons. Science has not been able to show for example, how something like the Experience of Redness is some kind of effect of Neural Activity. In fact, the more you think about the Redness Experience and then think about Neural Activity, the less likely it seems that the Redness Experience is actually some sort of Neural Activity. Science has tried in vain for a hundred years to figure this out. If the Experience of Redness actually was in the Neurons, Science would have had a lot to say about it by now. Something has got to be wrong with their perspective on the problem.

The Inter Mind Model can accommodate Consciousness as being in the Neurons, but it can also accommodate other concepts of Consciousness. The Inter Mind Model is structurally a Connection Model, in the sense that the Physical Mind (PM) is connected to the Inter Mind (IM) which is connected to the Conscious Mind (CM). These Connections might be conceptual where all three Minds are actually in the Neurons. But these Connections might have more reality to them where the PM, the IM, and the CM are separate things. I will Speculate that the situation is more like the latter than the former. In that case the PM, which is in Physical Space (PSp), uses the IM to create a Connection to the CM, which is in Conscious Space (CSp). The important perspective change here is that the PM is Connected to the CM, rather than assuming that the PM contains the CM as part of the PM. This allows the CM to be a thing in itself existing in it’s own CSp.

The inability of Science to solve the problem of Consciousness is the main driver for looking at other perspectives. Insisting that Consciousness is in the Neurons and is just some artifact of Neural Activity is getting us nowhere. Not only is Science unable to Explain Consciousness as Neural Activity, it is also unable to provide the first clue as to what something like the Experience of Redness actually is. Things like Redness, the Standard A Tone, and the Salty Taste, are Conscious Experiences. These kinds of Conscious Experiences are some sort of Phenomena that exist in the Reality of the Manifest Universe, but they are in a Category of Phenomena that Science cannot explain. It is therefore Sensible and Logical to Speculate a place for them to exist. This of Course is CSp.

At the developmental level we now will have the PM developing in PSp and a separate CM developing in CSp. There is also an IM which is developing the Connections between the PM and the CM. The CM is no longer trapped in the PM which is in PSp. The CM now has a separate development and existence in CSp.

We can make some statements about things that are in the CM and things that are in the PM. For example, the CM is where the Experiences of Redness, the Standard A Tone, and the Salty Taste are located. The CM is also where the Conscious Self is located. Examples of things that are located in the PM are Memory, Pattern Recognition, Eye Convergence/Tracking, and Balance.

This separation provides a new perspective for thinking about the effect of Anesthesia. With the old perspective the reasoning was like this: The Neural Activity was halted and Consciousness seemed to also be halted so therefore Consciousness must be in the Neurons. With the new perspective the reasoning would be: The Neural Activity was halted and Consciousness seemed to be halted so therefore the Connection must have been interrupted. With this new perspective Consciousness itself was not halted but rather the Connection from the PM to the CM was interrupted. We don’t know what the CM does during an interruption, but since Anesthesia can halt Memory operations the CM will not have any access to Memories of the Interruption after the Connection is reestablished.

It is time for Science to think more outside the Box with regard to Consciousness, and hopefully this Connection Perspective will inspire Research in new directions that might someday solve the Problem of Consciousness.

It is not helpful to come up with new totally hypothetical constructs that will make discussions and attempted explanations of consciousness. These will just lead to more go-nowhere useless unsubstantiated conjectures.

Here’s the thing. Consciousness is the various types of our thinking behaviors that include us being aware of our environment. Our consciousness behaviors are time limited occurrences as are any behaviors. But our unique abilities for complex verbal behavior, dramatically increases our functionality with our thinking behaviors, in general, in various ways.

Anyway, consciousness exists in passing. Consider this. If you did some dance moves, those dance behaviors would exist at those moments. Then they were gone. Were the dance moves cut off from some central dance area of the brain? No. You are just not doing the moves currently.

Now if you were imagining doing the dance moves, then the neurological correlates for imagining the dance moves, would flash in patterns of neurons firing. This would occur til you stopped imagining doing the dance moves.

In re: to your comments about the experience of “redness”. We typically learn to name colors as toddlers. A caregiver socially reinforces the child’s learning to say “red” at the presentation of something red. At the point that the child reliably names red, it can be assumed that he has “experienced redness”. (at least his own particular experience of redness. who can say if my experience of red is the same as yours? but whatever our individual subjective experience of red is, we agree that it is red.)

 

 

New Totally Hypothetical Constructs are needed because progress with understanding Consciousness has been stalled for a hundred years. Science has made tremendous progress with understanding the Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience (the Easy Problem), but Science has Zero understanding of Conscious Experience (the Hard Problem) itself.

I’m not sure what you are getting at with the Dance Moves analogy. Are you trying to say that the Conscious Experience of something like Redness is somehow not real because we are not always seeing Redness?

It is irrelevant what the Color Experience differences between people are. What is relevant is the question: How do you or anyone else See whatever it is that you See? I talk about Redness because Redness has always been a sort of ground zero for thinking about Color Experience in general.

I just laid out a hypothetical construct of consciousness that is parsimonious, and fits with what we know.

Consciousness happens when we do a consciousness behavior (any mental behavior, including perception, thinking, remembering, dreaming, visualizing, imagining, etc., etc., etc.

The dance moves analogy is, in part, to help you overcome your mis-understanding that consciousness is a kind of homunculus. Dance moves are a behavior. Behavior happens when you do something. It does not exist if you are not doing anything. (So it is with consciousness.) If I see something red, and am aware of it, then I am doing the consciousness behaviors of perceiving and thinking about what I am percieving. (Whether the red thing I am aware of is “real” or not, is another question altogether.) When I am not doing any consciousness behaviors, then I am not conscious for that period of time.

 

I don’t understand how you can say that Redness is a Behavior. Redness is a Conscious Experience that happens in the Mind. You are mixing Apples and Oranges with your analogies. You say Homunculus as a derogatory term. There is no little man inside the Brain. You need to think more Deeply about your own Conscious Experiences. Think about the Redness itself. The Redness itself cannot yet be explained by Science. Do you reject the Hard Problem of Consciousness?

I do not know what you mean by “the Hard Problem of Consciousness”.

I did not say that “Redness” is a behavior. I could have said “perceiving something red” is a behavior. Picturing something red is a behavior. Thinking about “redness” is a behavior. Remembering the color of a cardinal is a behavior. etc.

Your very use of the term “mind” is a homonculus. You say that “Redness is a Conscious Experience that happens in the Mind”. So your explanation requires the term “mind” which is something (what a homunculus?) inside of us. It further requires that we accept that inside of that homunculus is a “Conscious Experience” that is, so far, beyond our understanding.

But it’s not beyond our understanding. It’s just behavior. (It is different from overt behaviors, in that it is not directly visible to an outside observer. )

 

TimB said,

But it’s not beyond our understanding. It’s just behavior. (It is different from overt behaviors, in that it is not directly visible to an outside observer.


This may start the exploration;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xx0SsffdMBw

 

You need to think more Deeply about your own Conscious Experiences.
And you claim there is a "hard problem of consciousness". So if I can't tell what consciousness is, how can I think more "deeply" to know what that is? I'm not just playing semantics here, I'm trying to get you to define your terms.

19 yr old Jake is color blind. He had never seen some of the primary colors, only shades of brown and grey. His friends got him some special glasses and he saw the bright colors (including red) for the 1st time.

He already had a concept of “redness” because as a child, he would use Crayolas, but always when reading the color name of the Crayola.

But knowing that there were colors he did not see, cannot compare with actually seeing them. He subsequently had a 1st hand concept of redness. Because he was able, at last, to engage in the behavior of “seeing something that is red”.

 

TimB said: I do not know what you mean by “the Hard Problem of Consciousness”.

Are you kidding me? I have to think you are just being sarcastic. The Hard Problem is the fundamental issue in the study of Consciousness today.

 

Lausten said:
You need to think more Deeply about your own Conscious Experiences.
And you claim there is a “hard problem of consciousness”. So if I can’t tell what consciousness is, how can I think more “deeply” to know what that is? I’m not just playing semantics here, I’m trying to get you to define your terms.

What is there to define? These are basic Philosophical ideas. I thought this was a Philosophy forum. You can try to beat to death the definitions of things but it only serves to distract from the issues. Do you reject the Hard Problem of Consciousness?

The “Hard Problem” is crap. Ask Daniel Dennett if you don’t believe me.

But even if it weren’t crap, it relies on the assumption that “experience” cannot be explained by scientific methodologies. And that is not true, since our mental “experiences” (in the paradigm I am suggesting) are ALSO each a covert behavior.

Steven, You started out saying “… Science has no Theory, Hypothesis, or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons…”. You seemed to desperately want a better understanding of “Consciousness”. I gave you a parsimonious hypothesis that fits all that we do know, and includes a straightforward explanation of Consciousness. YET, I got no thanks for the fantastic insights I have offered you.

 

TimB: The “Hard Problem” is crap. Ask Daniel Dennett if you don’t believe me.

If you think the Hard Problem is crap then you are revealing that you don’t understand the Hard Problem. You can’t just say it’s crap and expect that explains why you reject it. Dennett likes to say that Consciousness is just an Illusion. I have tried to make sense out of his arguments but am always left with the question: But what actually is that Redness that you are just Ignoring away by using the magic Illusion word? It is the Redness itself that you must think more Deeply about. Don’t ignore it. It really doesn’t get Explained or go away it is always there staring you in the face when you see something Red.

 

 

TimB: Steven, You started out saying “… Science has no Theory, Hypothesis, or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons…”. You seemed to desperately want a better understanding of “Consciousness”. I gave you a parsimonious hypothesis that fits all that we do know, and includes a straightforward explanation of Consciousness. YET, I got no thanks for the fantastic insights I have offered you.

Here’s your fantastic insight:

Here’s the thing. Consciousness is the various types of our thinking behaviors that include us being aware of our environment. Our consciousness behaviors are time limited occurrences as are any behaviors. But our unique abilities for complex verbal behavior, dramatically increases our functionality with our thinking behaviors, in general, in various ways.

Anyway, consciousness exists in passing. Consider this. If you did some dance moves, those dance behaviors would exist at those moments. Then they were gone. Were the dance moves cut off from some central dance area of the brain? No. You are just not doing the moves currently.

Now if you were imagining doing the dance moves, then the neurological correlates for imagining the dance moves, would flash in patterns of neurons firing. This would occur til you stopped imagining doing the dance moves

 

I am unable to apply this to the Experience of Redness. Please show me how this Explains the Experience of Redness.

What is there to define? These are basic Philosophical ideas. I thought this was a Philosophy forum. You can try to beat to death the definitions of things but it only serves to distract from the issues. Do you reject the Hard Problem of Consciousness?
It is a Philosophy forum, although there aren't credentialed philosophers here AFAIK. I don't reject anything, but if you are going to discuss something this complex, something without scientific consensus, then you need to be aware that some people do reject it. You can find that out with the simplest of searches. In a Philosophy forum, I expect language that doesn't sound like I'm talking about whether or not Rodgers is the GOAT.

“The hard problem isn’t a hard problem at all. The really hard problems are the problems the scientists are dealing with. […] The philosophical problem, like all philosophical problems, is a confusion in the conceptual scheme.” - Peter Hacker

TimB, thanks for you fantastic insight

Thanks. Since I fished for that complement, I will release it back into the wild, so that it might grow and reproduce.

Lausten: It is a Philosophy forum, although there aren’t credentialed philosophers here AFAIK. I don’t reject anything, but if you are going to discuss something this complex, something without scientific consensus, then you need to be aware that some people do reject it. You can find that out with the simplest of searches. In a Philosophy forum, I expect language that doesn’t sound like I’m talking about whether or not Rodgers is the GOAT.

“The hard problem isn’t a hard problem at all. The really hard problems are the problems the scientists are dealing with. […] The philosophical problem, like all philosophical problems, is a confusion in the conceptual scheme.” – Peter Hacker

If someone rejects the Hard Problem they must know something about Consciousness that the rest of the World does not know. Don’t know what that quote is supposed to prove. He just says he rejects the Hard Problem with no Explanation.

To TimB and Lausten: I get that you both reject the Hard Problem. But do you both reject the actual Existence of something like the Conscious Experience of Redness?