There's no contradiction. If there was, then pretty much anybody could figure how to to show a simple contradiction with a simple syllogism (there'd be no need for a regress argument).Come up with what it would take to be in control of the want and I'll supply the syllogism.
No sufficient cause for the want is needed, and the want is in the agent's control by definition.Bold by me. Come up with a definition that fits here Bryan. I know it isn't true because I know there is no reasonable definition that fits.
There's no contradiction. If there was, then pretty much anybody could figure how to to show a simple contradiction with a simple syllogism (there'd be no need for a regress argument).Come up with what it would take to be in control of the want and I'll supply the syllogism. Dude, I've already explained this. Control is a standard term in the free will debate. You can do the proof without waiting on me. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#2.2 What we have here is you again ignoring the opportunity to deal with an issue clearly by insisting on using ambiguous terms "the want" when I've offered more specific terms for you to use to make your intent clear (want-a, want-p). Your behavior will tend to automatically result in syllogism (assuming you ever write one) that will include one or more fallacies of ambiguity. Stephen went on:
That works as long as you're permitted to assume that indeterminism is impossible. You haven't yet convinced me that I should allow you to fallaciously beg the question.No sufficient cause for the want is needed, and the want is in the agent’s control by definition.Bold by me. Come up with a definition that fits here Bryan. I know it isn’t true because I know there is no reasonable definition that fits.
There's no contradiction. If there was, then pretty much anybody could figure how to to show a simple contradiction with a simple syllogism (there'd be no need for a regress argument).Come up with what it would take to be in control of the want and I'll supply the syllogism. Dude, I've already explained this. No you have not. What does it mean for a want to be in our control? Plainly by blocking any regress you also block any sensible meaning of control.
There's no contradiction. If there was, then pretty much anybody could figure how to to show a simple contradiction with a simple syllogism (there'd be no need for a regress argument).Come up with what it would take to be in control of the want and I'll supply the syllogism. Dude, I've already explained this. No you have not. Plainly you've been watching Monty Python's "I'm looking for an argument" sketch.
What does it mean for a want to be in our control?Control is exhibited by the correlation between desire and activity. In the case of want-a (the one correlating with an action in the LFW model) the desire and activity are the same thing, so control is proved by the principle of identity (A=A). I've been the one emphasizing the difference between the simplicity of libertarian freedom in the exercise of want-a, and pointing to the different question we address by looking at want-p. I've asked why control is needed for want-p. From you we get crickets, unless we count the stubborn reliance on ambiguous communications.
Plainly by blocking any regress you also block any sensible meaning of control.So plainly that all you can do is assert it repeatedly. It's so simple that it defies explanation.
That works as long as you're permitted to assume that indeterminism is impossible. You haven't yet convinced me that I should allow you to fallaciously beg the question. Not at all, I'm assuming indeterminism for these purposes. Still you have option A) regress or option B) no regress. You're going for option B) which means there is no way the want can be in the agent's control. This you can try to counter by defining control in a way which would fit with the want being in the agents control. But the result would be laughable. And so this really is the simple subject I say it is and it's just your stubborn refusal to face facts which is the problem.No sufficient cause for the want is needed, and the want is in the agent’s control by definition.Bold by me. Come up with a definition that fits here Bryan. I know it isn’t true because I know there is no reasonable definition that fits.
Control is exhibited by the correlation between desire and activity. In the case of want-a (the one correlating with an action in the LFW model) the desire and activity are the same thing, so control is proved by the principle of identity (A=A).This is just crackers. It's an unjustifiable move and that's all there is to it. There really is nothing to say beyond that.
That works as long as you're permitted to assume that indeterminism is impossible. You haven't yet convinced me that I should allow you to fallaciously beg the question. Not at all, I'm assuming indeterminism for these purposes. Still you have option A) regress or option B) no regress. Why would we need any regress at all if there is no prior sufficient cause (second time I've lobbed that question to you, sir)?No sufficient cause for the want is needed, and the want is in the agent’s control by definition.Bold by me. Come up with a definition that fits here Bryan. I know it isn’t true because I know there is no reasonable definition that fits.
You're going for option B) which means there is no way the want can be in the agent's control.Why not? Because you say so?
This you can try to counter by defining control in a way which would fit with the want being in the agents control. But the result would be laughable.Yet you can't explain why you're laughing, ironically. You want a Xeno's paradox for the active will. It will only work if you assume causal determinism.
And so this really is the simple subject I say it is and it's just your stubborn refusal to face facts which is the problem.Like I said, this will come down to your own certitude and not a real argument. You've got a definition of control at the URL I provided. Get to work on the syllogism you promised.
Control is exhibited by the correlation between desire and activity. In the case of want-a (the one correlating with an action in the LFW model) the desire and activity are the same thing, so control is proved by the principle of identity (A=A).This is just crackers. It's an unjustifiable move and that's all there is to it. There really is nothing to say beyond that. So, what you're saying is you can't explain why it's an unjustifiable move? Why am I not surprised? Will you at least explain why you dodge the questions I ask you?
Here’s how you defined control earlier, Stephen:
“By definition actions are in our control when they are caused by our want.”
That’s a serviceable definition, though it’s more ambiguous (surprise!) than the one I linked.
The trick you’re trying to use is to say that the want itself is an action and needs to be caused in turn by a separate want (which I’ve called “want-p” and you’ve avoided like the plague). It’s akin to Xeno’s paradox.
So, what you're saying is you can't explain why it's an unjustifiable move? Why am I not surprised? Will you at least explain why you dodge the questions I ask you?It's nonsense Bryan, why does something make no sense, simply because it makes no sense. Once you resort to nonsense what else is to be said about it. It seems to make sense to talk about an action being in our control if we do it because we want to. But you can't play around and try and talk about the want being in our control simply by virtue of the fact we have the want. It's completely different, there is no rational connection, it is nonsense, how else can I put it. It's like this: the room temperature is in the control of the thermostat if it depends up what the thermostat is set to. You can't get from there to what the thermostat is set to is in the thermostat's control because it is what it is set to. It's simply and obviously a move you can't sensibly make.
So, what you're saying is you can't explain why it's an unjustifiable move? Why am I not surprised? Will you at least explain why you dodge the questions I ask you?It's nonsense Bryan, why does something make no sense, simply because it makes no sense. Bollocks, Stephen. When something makes no sense it's easy to prove it via argumentation. Does a square circle make sense? No, because it's contradictory. And demonstrable in a syllogism. Yet you always end up excusing yourself from the proof because it's supposedly too simple.
Once you resort to nonsense what else is to be said about it.Syllogism. Prove the nonsense and support your charge. Otherwise you make it look like I'm way better than Nostradamus based on predicting what you will do.
It seems to make sense to talk about an action being in our control if we do it because we want to.Yes, it does. Compatibilists noticed this, too.
But you can't play around and try and talk about the want being in our control simply by virtue of the fact we have the want.I can, because it's not as simple as you portray it. I know the next steps in the argument if you'd ever get started, and you have a big clue in front of you when I distinguish between want-p and want-a ("Run away! Run away!").
It's completely different, there is no rational connection, it is nonsense, how else can I put it.Don't ask me. I figure if you try to use a syllogism it'll just fail. So it makes sense from your perspective to just insist you're right and I'm posting nonsense. Stephen, the predictability of your responses is the best argument for determinism I've ever seen. ;-)
It's like this: the room temperature is in the control of the thermostat if it depends up what the thermostat is set to.Great. Apply that to either want-a or want-p and see how far you get. Or go back to the mantra that you're right and I'm wrong.
You can't get from there to what the thermostat is set to is in the thermostat's control.Sure we can, if we can avoid assuming determinism and add the premise that the thermostat has wants (your last line is perfect evidence of a rigged analogy). I know that's tough for you to do.
It's simply and obviously a move you can't sensibly make.Again, so simple and obvious that you can't explain it via a simple syllogism. One that you promised after you received a definition of control. Remember? Poop or dismount the water closet.
Glad you said it Stephen, because that’s what I was thinking. Bryan just ignores what he wants to. He is alluding to having some next step in his logic, but I’m not interested in playing games. If he had something he should have said it by now. Wants don’t just come from nowhere. I don’t have a desire for salt and sugar because of my astrological sign, there is some basic chemistry involved.
Glad you said it Stephen, because that's what I was thinking. Bryan just ignores what he wants to. He is alluding to having some next step in his logic, but I'm not interested in playing games. If he had something he should have said it by now. Wants don't just come from nowhere. I don't have a desire for salt and sugar because of my astrological sign, there is some basic chemistry involved.Lausten, if you plan to comment on my philosophy, please do so on the "repost" thread. I am no longer subscribing to this thread. Thank you!
Glad you said it Stephen, because that's what I was thinking. Bryan just ignores what he wants to.One example? Just one? Please?
He is alluding to having some next step in his logic, but I'm not interested in playing games.Aren't you playing a game right now? What stopped you from using the private message feature to contact Stephen with this important information?
If he had something he should have said it by now.I suppose you can ignore the fact that I linked a paper from a philosopher with very close parallels to the positions I'm taking. As well as Stephen's chronic avoidance of logic arguments (such as syllogisms).
Wants don't just come from nowhere.They don't? Why not? Because indeterminism is impossible? If so, then take a bow. It's hard to fallaciously beg the question more perfectly. At least Stephen typically makes a nod toward narrowing his concern to the issue of finding control in a want that comes from nowhere.
I don't have a desire for salt and sugar because of my astrological sign, there is some basic chemistry involved.Just to test whether you're paying attention at all ... is the desire for salt an action?
They don't? Why not? Because indeterminism is impossible? If so, then take a bow. It's hard to fallaciously beg the question more perfectly. At least Stephen typically makes a nod toward narrowing his concern to the issue of finding control in a want that comes from nowhere.It's not begging the question, it's pointing out the obvious. You know darn well I could provide an answer involving chemistry and physics to just about any want-p you could come up with. If I couldn't, some physicist or chemist could. The philosophical problem is that not every action can have it's cause explained with 100% accuracy. The question of whether or not all actions/wants will ever be explained is not answerable at this time, i.e. non-falsifiable, i.e. non-scientific. You're welcome to have an opinion on the subject, and even claim that authorities agree with you. You are not welcome to be a douche bag about it.
They don't? Why not? Because indeterminism is impossible? If so, then take a bow. It's hard to fallaciously beg the question more perfectly. At least Stephen typically makes a nod toward narrowing his concern to the issue of finding control in a want that comes from nowhere.It's not begging the question, it's pointing out the obvious. I'll explain clearly why you're wrong.
You know darn well I could provide an answer involving chemistry and physics to just about any want-p you could come up with.Right. And I could provide an answer involving indeterminism or magic for any want-p you could come up with. As a matter of a basic understanding of the scientific method, you ought to realize that some propositions are unfalsifiable. Agreed? Great. Let's proceed and correct the rest of your mistakes.
If I couldn't, some physicist or chemist could.And it's irrelevant who gives the answers because indeterminism and/or magic are unfalsifiable propositions. You know that and I know that.
The philosophical problem is that not every action can have it's cause explained with 100% accuracy.That's the practical scientific problem. The philosophical problem is that indeterminacy and magic are unfalsifiable, so as a matter of philosophy we cannot exclude them from consideration unless they are shown incoherent/self-contradictory. And we can't do that by simply assuming contradictions. Nor can we do it by assuming indeterminism doesn't exist (like you did), because that fallaciously begs the question. In philosophy we try to avoid fallacies.
The question of whether or not all actions/wants will ever be explained is not answerable at this time, i.e. non-falsifiable, i.e. non-scientific.Right, as is the proposition of whether some or many wants come from nothing, contrary to what you stated earlier. Nice hypocrisy.
You're welcome to have an opinion on the subject, and even claim that authorities agree with you. You are not welcome to be a douche bag about it.As a matter of fact, I can tell you that you're wrong and back it up. You can think I'm a douchebag or not. I don't give a flip. At the same time, you risk running afoul of the moderators with name-calling (though there's some possibility the moderators are more forgiving when they're sympathetic to one side). So maybe you're not welcome to react as you do to my explaining you're wrong. The most realistic recourse for the modern scientist in hiding from true randomness (which strongly implies a universe that is not causally determined) is the infinite worlds theory. Infinite worlds theory isn't exactly a marvel in terms of parsimony so far as multiplying entities. In my opinion, even if the infinite worlds theory is true, the end result gives every appearance of true randomness in the universe we perceive. And in philosophical terms we'll have to decide if it means that a bunch of traditional contradictory states of affairs may be true at the same time and in the same sense (can you eat nougat ice cream and not eat nougat ice cream at the same time and in the same sense? Maybe so, under the infinite worlds interpretation). Hey! Wouldn't it be great if either you or Stephen could prove with a clever and non-fallacious deductive syllogism that I'm spouting baloney? Even a basic argument by stringing sentences together could do, if we were able to identify a conclusion that follows from its premises. Maybe next time? Great.
The philosophical problem is that indeterminacy and magic are unfalsifiable, so as a matter of philosophy we cannot exclude them from consideration unless they are shown incoherent/self-contradictory.!?
The philosophical problem is that indeterminacy and magic are unfalsifiable, so as a matter of philosophy we cannot exclude them from consideration unless they are shown incoherent/self-contradictory.!? In other words it's fair game to consider the existence of anything in philosophy except things that aren't things (by virtue of incoherence). And one may even consider those for purposes of showing they are incoherent. In short, you were fallaciously begging the question, despite your protestation to the contrary.
I see no “joy" in reaching for goals, but there can be joy in achieving them.Not sure what I can do explain that one. I’ve had some tremendous failures in my life, but I’ve been honest about what I was doing, fair in how I dealt with others and celebrated along the way. The joy came from that, not the final result.
Where do I mention “balance" in a way that would be inconsistent with living in the present?You don’t specifically. I would have to tally up how much you focus on “living in the present" vs making trade-offs and working toward long term goals. I could be misreading your overal intentions. You make general statements about “the trade-off between present and future" p. 12, but I think you make more specific statements when considering avoiding a long term goal, like politics or children.
Lausten - 17 January 2014 10:38 AM The overemphasis can be seen in how you apply that. You handled grief and being offended, but I can be insulted by something that is an affront to my sense of what is right. I am offended by a degradation of the environment that will affect life.I’m not sure that I do disagree. You say natural selection partially explains moral variability. Natural selection would promote a clean environment because a non-clean one would select out its inhabitants. Even attempts to send your non-cleanness downstream are likely to come back and bite you. I can feel this at a morally intutitive level and provide a reasoned explanation for it. I guess it’s how you look at where reasoning arises. I see motivation as coming from somewhere less defined, from thoughts that I have little control over, then my so-called higher functioning brain kicks in and chooses what to empower and what to discard.Then you clearly disagree with moral skepticism (see page 3 of the document). So, where do my arguments for moral skepticism go wrong?