The Munchaussen trilemma and the personal identity problem

Unlike the physical sciences where we can construct a bridge and walk across it to test if our engineering "truths" are valid, in this type of philosophy we can't do that.
It is not quite clear to me what you mean with 'this type of philosophy'. Are there types of philosophy that can be tested? If not, does that mean philosophising is worthless?
As for the book, the connection is that as the name suggests, the theoretical reflections are just part of a game. Hesse was poking fun at professional philosophers who treated it like a game where the beads that got manipulated were ideas.
I think you are misled a little by the word 'game' in the title. Hesse is quite clear that the glass bead game is a formal structure that is common to mathematics, music, logic, aesthetic etc, i.e. it is a universal language of all science and culture. A 'sentence' in a glass bead game can be translated into a theme of Bach or e.g. in a mathematical statement. Taking such a sentence as departing point, one can develop new 'bead game sentences' according to the formal rules of the glass bead game, that, on its turn translated into music or mathematics, reveal new musical themes or statements. Joseph Knecht never doubts the intrinsic value of the glass bead game. But even as a student he recognises that the glass bead game cannot be the one and all value: he notices that students leave the academic world of Kastalien, and in the beginning he does not understand why. Slowly, even mastering the glass bead game better than anyone before him, he realises that without a connection with real life, the glass bead game is sterile. So, as said on one of the German blurbs of the book, 'The Glass Bead Game' is a call for integrating 'vita contemplativa' with the 'vita activa'. Don't forget, Joseph Knecht wants to become a teacher after he left his position as 'Magister Ludi'. Teacher of what do you think? Interesting however that Knecht's leap into the real world ends with his death...
If you've ever read through a dictionary of philosophy it becomes very apparent much of philosophy was just that: Mr X states A, B, and C. Mr Y was a student of Mr X but after careful examination concluded A, B, and not C. His student added D, but negated A. And so on.
Well, of course I did, I studied philosophy. It is true that much of the study of philosophy is in fact the study of the history of philosophy (maybe even more here in Europe as in the US). I am not specially favouring this, but I think it is a method to avoid repeating the same arguments over and over again, so you can at least recognise when you think you are developing a new idea. And where it is true that some philosophical problems are very resistant against a final answer, knowing what other philosophers have said helps to get insight into the matter. Many philosophical questions arise again and again in daily culture ('vita activa'?) and having a reservoir of historical memory of how people reflected on these questions in the past ('vita contemplativa'?) proof to be helpful. On the other side, when I was studying my subsidiary discipline (physics), I missed the historical consciousness of the history of physics in the daily curriculum. No wonder that I also chose a semester course 'history of physics'...
kkwan, I agree with Lausten that in commenting on your citation you interpret 'an evolutionary artifact' as 'just an evolutionary artifact'. That gives you the possibility to criticise it (with a rather lousy rhetorical question ('If the self does not exist, what is the I we are referring to when we say I and how can we prove something which does not exist to be either true or false?'.))
That you have misquoted me is a fact, which you deny. My comment was: If the self does not exist, what is the I we are referring to when we say I and how can we prove something which does not exist to be either true or false? It does not mean an interpretation of "just an evolutionary effect" which both you and Lausten wrongly ascribed to me.
My comment wanted to show that that is not a correct interpretation. 'Not existing independently', or 'existing unchanging' do not mean 'not existing'.
What is existence? From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence
According to the direct-reference view, an early version of which was originally proposed by Bertrand Russell, and perhaps earlier by Gottlob Frege, a proper name strictly has no meaning when there is no object to which it refers. This view relies on the argument that the semantic function of a proper name is to tell us which object bears the name, and thus to identify some object. But no object can be identified if none exists. Thus, a proper name must have a bearer if it is to be meaningful.
Thus, if I (as a distinct object) does not exist, then there is nothing to refer to when we say I and therefore it is meaningless, as such.
This is an error many people here make (see the free will discussions; I even assume that your thread here is derived from the idea that the capability of reasoning is evolutionary advantageous): that explaining a higher order phenomenon with lower order processes means that it is explained away, and that the higher order phenomenon therefore does not exist. It does exist: only not independently.
This thread does not assume what you assume. It poses the fundamental questions of what we can prove and of personal identity if the sense of self is deflated.
kkwan, I agree with Lausten that in commenting on your citation you interpret 'an evolutionary artifact' as 'just an evolutionary artifact'. That gives you the possibility to criticise it (with a rather lousy rhetorical question ('If the self does not exist, what is the I we are referring to when we say I and how can we prove something which does not exist to be either true or false?'.))
That you have misquoted me is a fact, which you deny. You may criticise me that I made it not clear that I did not cite you, but cited something you cited. But my reaction was clearly pointed at the fact that you gave the citation the most unfavourable interpretation, and probably not what was meant, and so made it an easier target for your poorly formulated criticism: a rhetorical question.
What is existence?
According to the direct-reference view, an early version of which was originally proposed by Bertrand Russell, and perhaps earlier by Gottlob Frege, a proper name strictly has no meaning when there is no object to which it refers. This view relies on the argument that the semantic function of a proper name is to tell us which object bears the name, and thus to identify some object. But no object can be identified if none exists. Thus, a proper name must have a bearer if it is to be meaningful.
Thus, if I (as a distinct object) does not exist, then there is nothing to refer to when we say I and therefore it is meaningless, as such.
So processes do not exist? Laws of nature describing these processes do not exist? Relations do not exist? Social institutions do not exist? 'I' do not exist? I think you do not agree with the view you are citing, so it is not much use in supporting your own view.
This is an error many people here make (see the free will discussions; that explaining a higher order phenomenon with lower order processes means that it is explained away, and that the higher order phenomenon therefore does not exist. It does exist: only not independently.
This thread does not assume what you assume.
I left out the assumption. Now you can try to discuss my view substantially.
You may criticise me that I made it not clear that I did not cite you, but cited something you cited. But my reaction was clearly pointed at the fact that you gave the citation the most unfavourable interpretation, and probably not what was meant, and so made it an easier target for your poorly formulated criticism: a rhetorical question.
That my quotation from the wiki on personal idendity implies if the "self"does not exist, then it is problematic wrt what we are we talking about when we say I. This problem was posed by my question. What, if any, is a favorable interpretation?
So processes do not exist? Laws of nature describing these processes do not exist? Relations do not exist? Social institutions do not exist? 'I' do not exist?
Not quite so. From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process_philosophy
In opposition to the classical model of change as accidental (as by Aristotle) or illusory, process philosophy regards change as the cornerstone of reality—the cornerstone of the Being thought as Becoming. Modern philosophers who appeal to process rather than substance include Nietzsche, Heidegger, Charles Peirce, Alfred North Whitehead, Alan Watts, Robert M. Pirsig, Charles Hartshorne, Arran Gare and Nicholas Rescher. In physics Ilya Prigogine distinguishes between the "physics of being" and the "physics of becoming". Process philosophy covers not just scientific intuitions and experiences, but can be used as a conceptual bridge to facilitate discussions among religion, philosophy, and science
So, if change is the cornerstone of reality, then existence is becoming rather than being. Hence, processes exist and processes are never deterministic. The universe is a process and we are all processes in the universe. As such, when we say I, we are talking about a process, I and not an object, I.
I left out the assumption. Now you can try to discuss my view substantially.
What is your view?