I don’t have the time to react on all of you, so I try to make one or two central points to each of you.
@Vyazma
Punishing is treating a person as a responsible subject, who has done wrong. In court a defendant can give his arguments why he is not guilty, a judge must give his arguments for his judgement. Treating as an object is not listening to the ‘criminal’ at all and correct his behaviour by neurosurgical or chemical ways. Arguments do not count.
Evolution produced future anticipating animals. So yes, punishment and rewards are evolutional products too. But they work because we assign free will and responsibility to each other. The fact that we are determined is no ground to change that practice: the fact that we do it is determined, of course, but therefore does not support the idea that because of that we should change our moral way of thinking.
@Lois
Several people on the forum noticed that you don’t get it, like Bryan and Doug. Many other participants agreed with my viewpoints on free will. And of course you’ve read Honderich, Harris, Swartz, Dennett (‘Freedom evolves’, ‘Elbow room’), Kane, Menzinger], Bieri ]etc on free will? And you know of course that the majority of those who study free will are compatibilists? Right or wrong, compatibilism is a serious viewpoint.
And I very well have arguments, but I notice you have no arguments against them, mostly based on the fact that you do not even understand them (O why, adjectives…). It is no use to go on endlessly, and I stop with the conclusion that you are not a serious discussion partner on this topic.
@Bugrip
Which of the points 1 to 4 are no are not part of the definition of free will?
And about point 5: if a robber points a gun at you and forces you to give your money, did you do this out of free will? When not, why would that not be a part of the definition of free will?
Yes, Harris uses this concept, but he should know it is an empty concept. There exists no metaphysics in which the idea of libertarian free will can be applied consistently. Why should we stick to a concept of which we know it is wrong, just because the majority thinks that libertarian free will means something?
And compatibilist free will is so close to our normal use of the concept, that it is better to heal people from their wrong conception that our will is uncaused, then yelling that we have no free will. That is a gigantic difference with defining God as ‘the universe’: such a God does not interfere with the universe, does not hear prayers, did not have prophets or messiahs, has no intentions, is not a basis for morality or defining good and evil, gives no meaning to life etc etc. For short it has next to nothing to do with the God people believe in. And also: compatibilism can explain why people feel as if they have an uncaused free will.
If determiism is true, it wouldn't make any difference whether they believe in free will. Dennet, of all people, should know that people can't decide to believe or not believe in anything, even if free will exists.Yes, Dennett thinks we are determined. Very good, Lois, at least you understand one point of compatibilism. Do you?
If determiism is true, it wouldn't make any difference whether they believe in free will. Dennet, of all people, should know that people can't decide to believe or not believe in anything, even if free will exists.I think you're confusing determinism with fatalism. Even if the universe is deterministic (possibly with some quantum randomness thrown in), believing in Free Will or not could still make a difference in someone's behavior. Causes still have effects in a deterministic universe. Even if everything is totally predetermined, it's still important to try our best to make the world a better place. I'm somewhat with you on people's ability to consciously decide what they believe. But Dennett, concerned with the effect on people's moral behavior if they don't believe in Free Will, is trying to convince them that Free Will is compatible with a universe that is a combination of deterministic and random--neither of which is compatible with Free Will as nearly everyone thinks of it. His and other compatibilists' tactics remind me of 16th Century theologians like John Calvin who attempted to reconcile God's omniprescience with the assertion that He gave us free will. How could we be said to have Free Will if God already knows everything we will ever do? How could God Himself have Free Will for that matter? Those theologians' desperate attempts to reconcile this paradox was a fool's errand then and it's a fool's errand now...IMHO.
If determiism is true, it wouldn't make any difference whether they believe in free will. Dennet, of all people, should know that people can't decide to believe or not believe in anything, even if free will exists.Even if the universe is deterministic (possibly with some quantum randomness thrown in), believing in Free Will or not could still make a difference in someone's behavior. Causes still have effects in a deterministic universe. Even if everything is totally predetermined, it's still important to try our best to make the world a better place. That is a good point. Those majority of people who think we have libertarian free will might confuse determinism with fatalism: as if we don't have moral responsibility anymore when our wishes and beliefs, and actions, are caused, and our thinking makes no difference. That's why they are prepared to believe in the empty concept of libertarian free will.
I'm somewhat with you on people's ability to consciously decide what they believe. But Dennett, concerned with the effect on people's moral behavior if they don't believe in Free Will, is trying to convince them that Free Will is compatible with a universe that is a combination of deterministic and random--neither of which is compatible with Free Will as nearly everyone thinks of it.Dennett only needs determinism. Without determinism free will would be impossible, all our actions would become mere randomness. Randomness doesn't add to free will: it disturbs at most.
His and other compatibilists' tactics remind me of 16th Century theologians like John Calvin who attempted to reconcile God's omniprescience with the assertion that He gave us free will. How could we be said to have Free Will if God already knows everything we will ever do? How could God Himself have Free Will for that matter? Those theologians' desperate attempts to reconcile this paradox was a fool's errand then and it's a fool's errand now...IMHO.It is one of the reasons why we have this funny concept of libertarian free will. I am not sure, but I have heard there are cultures who don't know such a concept.
I'm somewhat with you on people's ability to consciously decide what they believe. But Dennett, concerned with the effect on people's moral behavior if they don't believe in Free Will, is trying to convince them that Free Will is compatible with a universe that is a combination of deterministic and random--neither of which is compatible with Free Will as nearly everyone thinks of it.Dennett only needs determinism. Without determinism free will would be impossible, all our actions would become mere randomness. Randomness doesn't add to free will: it disturbs at most. This is an interesting and counterintuitive point (which, of course, doesn't make it wrong). I do understand Dennett's argument that determinism doesn't undermine Free Will, that it is, in fact, essential to it (because the alternative is randomness, which is even worse for the idea of Free Will). I just don't agree with it. Whether they realize it or not, most people intuitively believe that there is a bizarre third option to determinism and randomness, and that is Free Will. Since most people are dualist (including, interestingly enough, a lot of atheists), this third option must come from the mystical realm where the soul resides. This idea may be incoherent, as both Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett demonstrate, but it is nonetheless how the vast majority of people define Free Will. I don't know how it could be any more clear that Dennett is simply redefining the term in order to make it fit into his framework. That is usually a big no-no in philosophy. I guess the compatibilists think they should get an exemption from this rule. To make a point I already made: If Dennett thought that not believing in God would lead people to act less morally (which is what he believes about Free Will), wouldn't it bother you if he redefined the word "God" to simply be synonymous with the term "The Universe" in an attempt to make non-believers more moral? If so, why doesn't his redefinition of "Free Will" bother you? To me, it just absolutely smacks of philosophical sophistry.
Would you posit a compatibilist god? A compatibilist angel? Compatibilist space aliens?Exactly. Using compatibilist logic, why not simply redefine "God" as "The Universe" in order to rescue the concept of God (basically pantheism)? See my previous post.
If determiism is true, it wouldn't make any difference whether they believe in free will. Dennet, of all people, should know that people can't decide to believe or not believe in anything, even if free will exists.Yes, Dennett thinks we are determined. Very good, Lois, at least you understand one point of compatibilism. Do you? He's also a compatibilist, like you, which means he believes in free will and wants to have his cake and eat it, too.
GdB wrote:
Several people on the forum noticed that you don’t get it, like Bryan and Doug.
–Several people on the forum have said you don’t get it. Is that the new criteria for deciding who’s right?
GdB: Many other participants agreed with my viewpoints on free will.
–and many agreed with mine,
GdB:
And of course you’ve read Honderich, Harris, Swartz, Dennett (‘Freedom evolves’, ‘Elbow room’), Kane, Menzinger, Bieri etc on free will? And you know of course that the majority of those who study free will are compatibilists? Right or wrong, compatibilism is a serious viewpoint.
–in your compatibilist opinion! in fact compatiblism is a compromise by people who can’t or won’t accept that there isn’t a scintilla of evidence that free will exists. They’ve decided on a aybto have their cake and eat it too. All we have are people making bare assertions that free will exists–no different than those who make bare assertions about god.
–I have read enough of people who are compatibilists who have shown they also want to eat their cake and have it, too. I don’t need to read any more poor philosophizing.
GdB: And I very well have arguments, but I notice you have no arguments against them, mostly based on the fact that you do not even understand them (O why, adjectives…). It is no use to go on endlessly, and I stop with the conclusion that you are not a serious discussion partner on this topic.
–What a coincidence. I see you the same way! You don’t understand the flaws in your arguments. You won’t even accept that you have any. And you have never produced a rational argument or shown any evidence that we have free will, so you break the rules of scientific evidence. Obviously, it’s YOU who doesn’t understand the arguments so you attack me instead of my arguments–an unequivocal sign of a poor debater.
Lois
Whether they realize it or not, most people intuitively believe that there is a bizarre third option to determinism and randomness, and that is Free Will. Since most people are dualist (including, interestingly enough, a lot of atheists), this third option must come from the mystical realm where the soul resides. This idea may be incoherent, as both Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett demonstrate, but it is nonetheless how the vast majority of people define Free Will.Now tell me why philosophy would take a bizarre option as a definition. We give it a new name, 'Libertarian Free Will', notice that it is incoherent, and lay it ad acta. We also notice, exactly as you do, that LFW is strongly connected to dualism, and I also do agree that even that most atheists say they are not dualists, but in fact argue still from a dualist background. LFW clearly has no meaning in a monist world view. So instead of taking over the bizarre definition of the majority of the people, we should make clear that it is an empty concept.
I don't know how it could be any more clear that Dennett is simply redefining the term in order to make it fit into his framework. That is usually a big no-no in philosophy. I guess the compatibilists think they should get an exemption from this rule.I am not aware of such a rule. If conceptual analysis shows that everyday concepts are useless for understanding intelligibility problems, then one should use new concepts with a more technical meaning. Same holds for science: should we say that atoms do not exist, because 'atom' means 'indivisible', or because most people think of atoms as small planetary systems with electrons circling the nucleus? Of course not: we tell the people that atoms are not like what we once thought of, and tell them what they really are, even if it is not that easy to understand. Same with free will. First we make a technical distinction: we distinguish LFW and CFW, and show that LFW is humbug. Then we show that CFW fullfills nearly all conditions for calling it free will (remember the points 1-5 here]). Only one condition has to go: the idea that my decisions are uncaused. That might be difficult to understand (but do you understand the quantum theory for electron orbitals in atoms?), but that is no reason to drop the idea of free will. But it has shifted meaning, from LFW to CFW, but on very good grounds: it solves the intelligibility problem of free will. And it was an intelligibility problem because, amongst others, the concepts used to pose the problem were incoherent from the beginning. BTW, I noticed you did not bother to evaluate the points 1 to 4 at all, and also did not react on my counter argument against your argument against my point 5. You stick to remarking 'he is shifting meaning, that is not allowed!'. It is allowed, and it is everyday practice in science and philosophy.
To me, it just absolutely smacks of philosophical sophistry.If it was, then Dennett would not be taken seriously. And as a personal impression (I read a lot of Dennett (and other philosophers)): I never read a philosopher that is so good in showing the weak points in other's thinking. A sweeping statement like 'he is shifting meaning, that is not allowed' is just not enough to refute him. You should take my word for it, or otherwise start reading... A few youtubes is definitely not enough.
I have 2 questions for you all. Let’s leave out the idea of free will for a moment. As background for the questions: it is interesting that in recent times it is especially neurologists that put themselves in the picture with the ‘no free will’ statement.
- Do these neurologists say we have no free will based on their specialist knowledge of the brain? Why (not)? Is that justified?
- On the assumption that we factually are determined: is this a ground to change our ways of thinking and acting in our daily practice concerning blaming, praising, punishing, and responsibility? Why (not)?
If some (one?) of you think that I am creating a pitfall, then just think again. If you cannot avoid the pitfall, then your position is in trouble. If you can avoid a pitfall with your answers, then please do! I am burning of curiosity! And if you avoid the pitfall by not answering them, I know enough.
And if you do not see a pitfall, then please just answer them.
PS It is also interesting that many physicists, chemists, and biologists stick to the idea that free will is based on some randomizer. But that only as aside.
I don't know how it could be any more clear that Dennett is simply redefining the term in order to make it fit into his framework. That is usually a big no-no in philosophy. I guess the compatibilists think they should get an exemption from this rule.I am not aware of such a rule. Perhaps you're right that there is no specific rule against changing a definition in and of itself, but when one does so in order to make their argument work (where it otherwise would not), I think that's philosophically problematic--and it's very similar to an equivocation fallacy.
If conceptual analysis shows that everyday concepts are useless for understanding intelligibility problems, then one should use new concepts with a more technical meaning. Same holds for science: should we say that atoms do not exist, because 'atom' means 'indivisible', or because most people think of atoms as small planetary systems with electrons circling the nucleus? Of course not: we tell the people that atoms are not like what we once thought of, and tell them what they really are, even if it is not that easy to understand.Again, I think you're confusing redefining something with correcting a factual error. The fact that "most people think of atoms as small planetary systems..." simply means they're factually wrong. When scientists themselves realized that they were incorrect in envisioning atoms that way, they didn't redefine the word "atom", they improved their description of atoms to be more in line with objective, physical reality. Nonetheless, they were still talking about the same thing--atoms. The compatibilists are literally not talking about the same thing as Free Will. They are, more or less, talking about freedom--freedom from coercion, freedom from brain disease or disorder, freedom from being misled, but not freedom from the laws of physics--which is what Free Will has traditionally entailed and continues to for the vast majority of the population. It's not that the vast majority of the population is wrong the way they are about the physical properties of an atom. Atoms are physical objects. Their properties are a matter of fact, not a matter of definition. Free Will is a concept that is given its definition entirely by a consensus of how people define it. What Dennett and his compatibilist compatriots are doing would be the (almost) equivalent of saying; "If people don't believe that atoms behave like planetary systems, they will behave less morally. Therefore, I shall simply redefine 'atom' to literally mean 'planetary system'. Those pesky physicists will just have to find a new word for their so-called 'atoms'."
Same with free will. First we make a technical distinction: we distinguish LFW and CFW, and show that LFW is humbug. Then we show that CFW fullfills nearly all conditions for calling it free will (remember the points 1-5 here]). Only one condition has to go: the idea that my decisions are uncaused.But that one condition is precisely what distinguishes "Free Will" from "freedom" in general! All the compatibilists are really saying is that since most of the time we are more or less free to do as we please (within the confines of the laws of physics), we therefore really do have Free Will. Dennett and company haven't added anything new to the philosophy of Free Will. There's no difference in substance between the compatibilists and the "incompatibilists". Except intellectual honesty.
That might be difficult to understand (but do you understand the quantum theory for electron orbitals in atoms?), but that is no reason to drop the idea of free will. But it has shifted meaning, from LFW to CFW, but on very good grounds: it solves the intelligibility problem of free will. And it was an intelligibility problem because, amongst others, the concepts used to pose the problem were incoherent from the beginning.Again, definitions of abstract concepts (Free Will) vs. descriptions of physical objects (atoms). They are not analogous.
BTW, I noticed you did not bother to evaluate the points 1 to 4 at all, and also did not react on my counter argument against your argument against my point 5. You stick to remarking 'he is shifting meaning, that is not allowed!'. It is allowed, and it is everyday practice in science and philosophy.Revising descriptions of physical objects is allowed when new data comes in showing the previous description to be wrong, of course. Changing the definition of an abstract concept (like God) in order to rescue it from the dustbin of history is not generally condoned in either science or philosophy. I don't really see how it's any more valid a practice than slipping in an equivocation fallacy.
To me, it just absolutely smacks of philosophical sophistry.If it was, then Dennett would not be taken seriously. The Ontological Argument for the existence of God was taken seriously for hundreds of years, and still isn't exactly laughed out of the room among philosophers (as it should be). I rest my case. ;-)
And as a personal impression (I read a lot of Dennett (and other philosophers)): I never read a philosopher that is so good in showing the weak points in other's thinking. A sweeping statement like 'he is shifting meaning, that is not allowed' is just not enough to refute him. You should take my word for it, or otherwise start reading... A few youtubes is definitely not enough.I've read a couple of books by Dennett; Breaking the Spell and Consciousness Explained. I wasn't that impressed with Breaking the Spell as it was basically a layperson doing evolutionary psychology. And, frankly, I'd thought of most of his theories about the evolutionary origin of religion in my spare time. Seriously. As for Consciousness Explained; I found the first couple hundred pages absolutely riveting. It then devolved into Dennett saying the same thing over and over and over and over and over and over again in a bunch of different ways using different analogies and examples--basically that there is no physical (dimensionless) point in the brain where "it" all comes together for the viewing pleasure of the Cartesian homonculi. Which A) is obvious, and B) doesn't explain consciousness. I was already not that impressed with Dennett, but then I read his scathing criticism of Sam Harris's book/pamphlet Free Will, and was disappointed with his use of shockingly poor analogies and thinly-veiled ad hominems. But even more so, I was disappointed with his tone, which came across as both arrogant and hypersensitive to criticism of himself (that is, of compatibilism). At that point, I was done with Dennett. That being said, I admit I've not read any books on compatibilism. But, since compatibilists themselves admit that there is no substantive difference between them and the "incompatibilists" except for how to define "Free Will", I don't really see the point. Thanks for the interesting and civil discussion so far. And apologies for the long post. I'll try to keep them more focused in the future. :)
Hi BugRib,
Only a few short remarks, I am running out of time here.
You do as if intelligibility problems are not real problems. They are: some concepts do not fit together, ‘being determined’ and ‘having LFW’ in this case. I do not see why one should not introduce another concept of free will that at one side completely supports our daily practice of assigning responsibility and moral thinking, is coherent, and in sync with science, and on the other side is not based on a mere feeling of LFW. If people honestly investigate themselves, they discover that there is no empirical basis for knowing that ‘we could have done otherwise under the exact same circumstances, i.e. including the brain’.
Replacing this feeling, or at most this ‘regulative idea’, with the modal meaning of ‘could have done otherwise’ (‘I could have taken the bus’, or ‘the chess computer could have taken his knight’) looses nothing of how we use the concept of free will in daily life. It only gets rid of the illusion of LFW, and one should be prepared to defend such an idea against concepts that in this respect are just plainly wrong.
I understand Dennett’s irritation about Harris. There is an extended body of literature, of pro and contra arguments about the topics of free will and determinism, in which much deep insight has been won. And then comes an amateur in the field and just spouts some opinions that were already resolved for many years, and which in fact just mirror compatibilism without wanting to name it as such. ‘Free will does not exist’ sounds just much cooler. But denying on empirical grounds that something does not exist that on logical grounds is already known to be rubbish is really beating a dead horse. Maybe you can answer my 2 questions in my previous posting?
I will be away for a few days, I don’t know if I have the chance to react the coming days. So please stay with me, if you want.
@Vyazma Punishing is treating a person as a responsible subject, who has done wrong. In court a defendant can give his arguments why he is not guilty, a judge must give his arguments for his judgement. Treating as an object is not listening to the 'criminal' at all and correct his behaviour by neurosurgical or chemical ways. Arguments do not count. Evolution produced future anticipating animals. So yes, punishment and rewards are evolutional products too. But they work because we assign free will and responsibility to each other. The fact that we are determined is no ground to change that practice: the fact that we do it is determined, of course, but therefore does not support the idea that because of that we should change our moral way of thinking.You got nothing here GdB. Except the fact that this thread is entitled "Freedom and Ethics(principles....)" You have that...you're on topic as far as the thread is concerned. Otherwise, it appears you just want to split hairs on definitions, terminology, etc...without addressing any of the points I made. What's new?
VYAZMA,
I reacted on two points of you:
- Is there any difference between punishing and treating something as a dysfunctional object?
- We have already discussed the evolutionary basis for punishment and rewards a dozen times on this forum.
If you are not interested in my reactions then just let be, OK?
Sorry for quoting myself:
I mean here we are again and all I can understand in your post above is how you need to label certain steps in a causal chain as having more significance than others.(hmnnn…I wonder why? Especially when these are the steps that nexus at the mind and regard a human perception of past, present and future!)Here's an example of determinst/causal steps and the "nexus at the human mind(or animal mind). It involves "a person", that person's sensory inputs and their brain/nervous system and endocrine system as well. It also involves other actors both inside and outside of the "persons" range of perception and senses. The list below is a rough time line going forward from the past(say 24 hours past to the present. The present will be examined at the Nexus of the mind of the "a person". This is in chronological order: 1. an employee lays out some patio furniture for display on a sales floor. 2. "a person" sits on a milk crate in his backyard patio. 3. the "a person's" wife complains about the lack of furnishings on their patio. 4. the "a person" peruses some patio furniture in some catalogs. 5. The "a person" goes to the store and sees the patio furniture that the employee laid out yesterday. 6. PRESENT MOMENT. The "a person" purchases the patio furniture that the employee displayed yesterday. To examine the " a person's" actions of the present moment based upon his "wishes and beliefs" is disingenuous to the causal chain. That is placing extra significance on that particular Nexus in the person's mind. Because that is the angle we are looking at! It is taking one small part in a hyper-complex determined chain of events or timeline and focusing on it. The reasons for focusing on it are quite obvious. It can be related to by our own experiences. We can empathize with it. We have the duality and the "theater" to recognize the "wishes and beliefs" in the present moment(in this case.) Plus in any discussion, we constantly examine "the one nexus point in a person's mind" for purposes of the discussion. So what happens? We discuss the person's decision to buy the patio furniture. We discuss why he chose that furniture. We discuss why he needed patio furniture. We discuss everything associated with that point in the timeline and that particular event. We leave out the infinite other steps that led to that nexus. Both within and without the "a person's" range of perception, and physiological, neurological, endocrinological etc... So we focus on that event and we call it wishes and beliefs. What about the step from the day before? The employee that set out the furniture for display? Yes that's oversimplified, but why are we placing significance on the one step? It's obvious why we are. It's ok to focus on that "nexus" for purposes of discussion, but it is disingenuous when trying to relate it to any type of discussion based on causal events or determinism. The minute that that event is focused on, any relative discussion on determinism is lost. Relative is bolded. Let's take all the meanings of "relative" there please.
VYAZMA, I reacted on two points of you: - Is there any difference between punishing and treating something as a dysfunctional object?100% NO. There is no difference. Obviously. If there was no dysfunction then punishment would not come into play. The fact that a dysfunctional object can argue has absolutely no bearing on this. Plus you're discussing Courts of Law and arguing. Punishment is another phase. The point is punishment. That is your query. Punishment follows dysfunction...you disagree? Your rebuttal: more wordplay and diversionary adventures in terminology.
GdB: “Maybe you can answer my 2 questions in my previous posting?”
Me: Okay…
But first let me say that, since Dennett and Harris are pretty much in complete agreement about the nature of reality and the workings of consciousness and decision making, there really is no disagreement between them at all–except whether to rescue the term “Free Will” from the dustbin of history by redefining it. It’s a purely semantic argument.
1. Do these neurologists say we have no free will based on their specialist knowledge of the brain? Why (not)? Is that justified?I don't know about neuroscientists (I think that's what you meant) in general, but that is definitely not Harris' main argument. In fact, it's really beside the point--although he does mention some interesting experiments in neuroscience that appear to show that "we" (i.e. our brains) make decisions a second or two before we become conscious of having made them. Amazingly, Dennett says that even if all of my decisions are made below the level of consciousness, I (in the philosophical/psychological sense of the "I" or the "self") am my brain (even the autonomic parts!), therefore I make those decisions (that I have no conscious control over!). All Harris is saying is that this does not fit anybody's conception of Free Will, so when compatibilists proclaim that this still fits the definition of Free Will, it is nothing more than a confusion. Dennett is therefore not just redefining "Free Will", he is (unwittingly?) redefining the "I"/"self" to include non-conscious functions of the brain. I don't know of anyone who overtly define's the "I"/"self" as including non-conscious functions of the brain/body. All that being said, these findings of neuroscience are just the icing on the cake of "incompatibilism". Even without them, the case that we don't have Free Will--as the vast majority of the population defines it--is rock solid. And Dennett doesn't even disagree with that! He just disagrees with the way Free Will is defined by the vast majority of the population!
2. On the assumption that we factually are determined: is this a ground to change our ways of thinking and acting in our daily practice concerning blaming, praising, punishing, and responsibility? Why (not)?As Sam Harris says, this is actually a reason to be more compassionate towards "evildoers", since they are ultimately not responsible for their actions. Also, it does nothing to diminish the utility of love and compassion for all, since sentient beings can still suffer and feel pleasure whether they have Free Will or not. In practical terms, we can still assign personal blame and responsibility to people, even though in a deep philosophical sense, they may not really carry any blame or responsibility. In other words, the only difference it makes is that it means there is no logical reason to punish "evildoers" for punishment's sake. "Punishment" should serve a utilitarian purpose--primarily deterrence and protection of society by separating those likely to cause harm from the rest of us. Did that help?
I understand Dennett's irritation about Harris. There is an extended body of literature, of pro and contra arguments about the topics of free will and determinism, in which much deep insight has been won. And then comes an amateur in the field and just spouts some opinions that were already resolved for many years, and which in fact just mirror compatibilism without wanting to name it as such.Ad hominem. Dennett should not be irritated because Harris is an "amateur in the field". It's his arguments that should matter. And frankly, it doesn't take any philosophical training whatsoever to have an informed opinion about whether a word should be redefined. That being said, Harris does have B.A. degree in philosophy, and any of his books would have been top-notch M.A. or Ph.D. thesis papers had he chosen to enroll in those programs. And he's been writing acclaimed works of philosophy for over ten years. Not that that really matters anyway. Most of my favorite philosophers are not technically philosophers.
'Free will does not exist' sounds just much cooler.It also conforms to the actual definition of "Free Will" as opposed to the compatibilists definition held by about .000001% of the population
But denying on empirical grounds that something does not exist that on logical grounds is already known to be rubbish is really beating a dead horse.So you admit that Free Will "on logical grounds is already known to be rubbish"? ;-)
It also conforms to the actual definition of "Free Will" as opposed to the compatibilists definition held by about .000001% of the populationI think you are right in a way about that because if asked the question "do we have free will?", libertarian free will will usually be what springs to mind. And it's so confusing for a compatibilist to then answer "yes". It's a bit like being asked "do you believe in real magic?" and answering yes because you believe in conjuring tricks, you just know the question doesn't refer to conjuring tricks. But just like real magic and conjuring tricks people do have at least two concepts which they call free will. So they believe in libertarian free will but they also believe in the distinction between two people getting married of their own free will and a forced marriage (the subject of compatibilist free will). Compatibilists are right about free will ,just like people who believe in conjuring tricks are right, but compatibilism can obscure the problem which is that people believe in libertarian free will as well. The trouble with libertarian free will is people believe that someone who failed to do what they should have done, could have done so without any difference in circumstances beyond their control, they don't accept that in the final analysis the person was just unlucky that circumstances beyond their control were not different. Stephen
It also conforms to the actual definition of "Free Will" as opposed to the compatibilists definition held by about .000001% of the populationI think you are right in a way about that because if asked the question "do we have free will?", libertarian free will will usually be what springs to mind. And it's so confusing for a compatibilist to then answer "yes". It's a bit like being asked "do you believe in real magic?" and answering yes because you believe in conjuring tricks, you just know the question doesn't refer to conjuring tricks. But just like real magic and conjuring tricks people do have at least two concepts which they call free will. So they believe in libertarian free will but they also believe in the distinction between two people getting married of their own free will and a forced marriage (the subject of compatibilist free will). Compatibilists are right about free will ,just like people who believe in conjuring tricks are right, but compatibilism can obscure the problem which is that people believe in libertarian free will as well. The trouble with libertarian free will is people believe that someone who failed to do what they should have done, could have done so without any difference in circumstances beyond their control, they don't accept that in the final analysis the person was just unlucky that circumstances beyond their control were not different. Stephen How is that "trouble"?