Freedom and ethics (principles of universal morality)

Philosophy
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They are different somewhat but the difference is not essential. I see both of them as belonging to the same class of results, namely "obeying the laws, repeatable, predictable".
I think it is a huge difference if future events are exactly predictable in principle, or not. That laws of nature cannot give exact predictions anymore was a shock for the physics community. Measurements are not exactly repeatable anymore. Under exact the same circumstances, different outcome can occur, and in the right context the difference in the outcomes can be huge (e.g. a living or a dead cat).
Anyway, because philosophy transcends mathematics, we should not try to apply mathematics here. Let me rephrase my definition more clearly. If the result obeys any laws, then the result is determined by those laws. Any regularities whatsoever make future predictable (even if not completely). Only the result which is "new", which has not "existed before" can be called non deterministic. I hope it is clearer now.
No, it isn't. Can you give an example of a 'new result'?
May be a new term instead of "determinism" (like "unfreedom"?) would be better, but I do not think so. Determinism has different meanings (and had throughout the history) and I think there is a need to redefine it more properly.
Why? Why should your definition be more properly?
Coercive force not necessarily has to be caused by somebody else's will. The forces of nature are a good example.
It is pure anthropomorphism to use the word 'coercion' in this context. Is a stone forced to fall by gravity, or does the stone want to move in the direction of the earth?
It is an interesting question. I may certainly feel the forces of determinism when my brain / body does not want to do what my moral duty requires. My body is lazy and my brain sometimes tries to rationalise, to find excuses and reasons to avoid what is the right thing to do. The pleasure I feel is caused by my biology, and my wishes often comes from my body. Usually, but not always, I am aware of the situations when my nature goes against my ethics. Many people do not know what is right, what is moral and why they live. Thus, they probably think that what they want is the right thing to do. In that case, I agree, it is difficult to feel the forces of our nature. In short, in order to feel the force you have to have a wish to go against it.
You just describe the fact that we are not an undivided unity: we have contradicting wishes, struggles between what our feeling urge us to do, and what we think is most reasonable to do.
Take a look at the abundance of natural laws. The laws of chemistry, solid state physics or fluid dynamics have probably emerged when the corresponding entities/substances emerged, and the laws of survival have probably emerged together with life. To say that all the laws have been existing since the "beginning of time" is to declare that the future of the universe is/was predestined. While I certainly can't prove it, it looks highly unlikely to me.
That is highly speculative, and it is based on the idea that laws of nature force processes to run as they do. But that is not the case: they are valid descriptions of how nature develops (see the article referred to at the end of this posting). Nothing is forced, everything just takes its course.
The essence of your definition is "freedom is the absence of obstacles". Therefore, freedom may be defined (in your terms) as "the capability to act according against somebody’s own wishes and beliefs", because wishes and beliefs are certainly obstacles - they imposed on us by nature and society.
Obstacles? For what and who? What would I do when these obstacles were not there? My own will is an obstacle for my own will? Why would the fact that my wishes and beliefs are determined make it impossible to act according my will?
I am aware of the unsolvable troubles which modern philosophy has with free will.
I am not. Compatibilism solves the problem very well. See e.g here].
22
I am aware of the unsolvable troubles which modern philosophy has with free will.
I am not. Compatibilism solves the problem very well. See e.g here]. I'm not a fan of Compatibilism. It seems to only work if one redefines Free Will (note the caps) in a way that is contrary to the views of the vast majority of the population. Most people are dualists and believe that the source of Free Will is the soul or spirit, and that it is not subject to the laws of physics--that is, our actions are not deterministic because our souls or spirit transcend the clockwork nature (at macro scales) of the universe. For this and other reasons I have given up on Daniel Dennett. I think Sam Harris, in his book Free Will, makes a pretty airtight case that Free Will--as the vast majority of the population thinks of it--is an illusion. In fact, I think he shows that it is not even a coherent concept. But that's just my humble opinion.
23
It seems to only work if one redefines Free Will (note the caps) in a way that is contrary to the views of the vast majority of the population. Most people are dualists...
Yes, of course. But we know they are wrong, isn't it? So to be logically consistent, we must redefine free will. If you define 'earth' as the flat surface in the middle of the universe, we do not live on the same earth as did most people from ancient times. Should we therefore not redefine earth as the 3 planet revolving around the sun? If we are honest, we do not have the experience that we are not caused. We just do not feel the complete causal chain that led us to our decisions. I don't know why I like pizza and hate brussels sprouts. But I can anticipate the future, and when I can choose, avoid a horrible experience by choosing the pizza, and not the brussels sprouts.
I think Sam Harris, in his book Free Will, makes a pretty airtight case that Free Will--as the vast majority of the population thinks of it--is an illusion. In fact, I think he shows that it is not even a coherent concept.
Sam Harris' pamphlet 'Free Will' is inconsistent. If you look how he still defends morality and ethics, it becomes clear that he is just a compatibilist as Dennett is: he only refuses to call 'Free Will' 'free will'. But that's just my humble opinion. ;-)
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No, it isn't. Can you give an example of a 'new result'?
I gave but you called them "natural course of development".
Why? Why should your definition be more properly?
Because the current definitions are not able to explain anything. Or, rather, they are able to explain everything only to those people who refuse to notice the obvious contradictions in them.
Coercive force not necessarily has to be caused by somebody else's will. The forces of nature are a good example.
It is pure anthropomorphism to use the word 'coercion' in this context. Is a stone forced to fall by gravity, or does the stone want to move in the direction of the earth? Definition of COERCION: the act, process, or power of coercing Full Definition of COERCE 1: to restrain or dominate by force 2: to compel to an act or choice 3: to achieve by force or threat (Merriam-Webster)
In short, in order to feel the force you have to have a wish to go against it.
You just describe the fact that we are not an undivided unity: we have contradicting wishes, struggles between what our feeling urge us to do, and what we think is most reasonable to do. So now you admit that you feel it?
Take a look at the abundance of natural laws. The laws of chemistry, solid state physics or fluid dynamics have probably emerged when the corresponding entities/substances emerged, and the laws of survival have probably emerged together with life. To say that all the laws have been existing since the "beginning of time" is to declare that the future of the universe is/was predestined. While I certainly can't prove it, it looks highly unlikely to me.
That is highly speculative, and it is based on the idea that laws of nature force processes to run as they do. But that is not the case: they are valid descriptions of how nature develops (see the article referred to at the end of this posting). Nothing is forced, everything just takes its course. Thanks, I think I'll stop right here.
25
I gave but you called them "natural course of development".
Sorry, that is not the kind of example I thought of. To clarify what you mean you should give 'real life' examples: like the opening of a flower, an earthquake, measuring a quantum particle, a human action or a feeling. Such kind of things. The concreter the better.
Why? Why should your definition be more properly?
Because the current definitions are not able to explain anything. Or, rather, they are able to explain everything only to those people who refuse to notice the obvious contradictions in them. Without telling why the current definitions are not able to explain anything, and what the contradictions are, this doesn't help.
Definition of COERCION: the act, process, or power of coercing Full Definition of COERCE 1: to restrain or dominate by force 2: to compel to an act or choice 3: to achieve by force or threat
(Bold by me) Don't you see that all the meanings relate to (human) actions? So yes, to use this concept for natural forces is an anthropomorphism.
So now you admit that you feel it?
Feel what? That I am determined? Or that I have conflicting desires? Did you see my example about pizza in my posting above]? I notice that you do not react on the most important question: why are my wishes and beliefs obstacles? And obstacles for whom?
- Nevertheless, science has shown that freedom is a fiction because everything in the world obeys the laws. Feeling of a free will is simply a tricky illusion. In reality, there is no will at all and any action has its direct cause. Is this true? Of course not. Free will is real just like the existence of self is real. One without the other is not possible. As for laws, science is limited by determinism because everything else could not be studied. And the "everything else" is exactly what "freedom" actually is, and all that comes along, such as ethics.
If there are events that are not caused in a lawful way they would appear to science as randomness. That means that for the outside observer the freedom of another person would be indistinguishable from randomness. A person having and giving reasons for his actions does not look like a random generator to me.
Thanks, I think I'll stop right here.
That's your free choice. I think you have good reasons for it, and that it is not a random choice.
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I've never got a handle on the determinism debate. If anyone asked, I'd say I am a compatibilist since that's what I experience, and it's what our laws and culture currently agree with. But I couldn't debate it or define it much better than that.
In short, it means that everything we do has precedents and driving influences that are out of our control and that we don't have free will, even if it seems as if we do and we would like to think we do. The culture doesn't "agree" with anything and most peopl e's opinions and supposed understanding have been shown to be wrong more often than right. That is also an argument from popularity--a fallacious argument. If you think we have free will, the burden of proof is on you to show evidence of it. What the culture "thinks" has no influence on the truth. The "culture" thought that the sun revolved around the earth and "the culture" at one time had no understanding of biology or bacteriology--to it's detriment. What you think you experience also has no bearing on the how the universe or its creatures function. Ancient peoples "experienced" the sun revolving around the earth and religions killed people for denying it. Did that make it so? It's not a popularity fallacy when it is something that philosophers and legal experts have worked on for centuries and tested and experimented with a variety of legal and moral systems. Currently, pretty much everyone agrees that at least some of our actions are affected by our environment, our genetics, our childhood, etc. The disagreements are a matter of degree as to just what our brains do. You say they are just reacting to all the input that came before, others say there is some processing going on there. I think we could be better at recognizing the "nurture" aspects of our lives and in criminal justice for instance, focus more on rehabilitation than punishment. But it's something I'll have to wait for experts in those fields to do anything about. No matter how long experts have worked on and experimented with a variety of legal and moral systems, no objective evidence has over been presented that we have free will. There is plenty of evidence that our actions are determined. So why bring in a theory of free will that has never been shown to exist. You might as well be talking about god--another idea that has no objective evidence.
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I gave but you called them "natural course of development".
Sorry, that is not the kind of example I thought of. To clarify what you mean you should give 'real life' examples: like the opening of a flower, an earthquake, measuring a quantum particle, a human action or a feeling. Such kind of things. The concreter the better.
Why? Why should your definition be more properly?
Because the current definitions are not able to explain anything. Or, rather, they are able to explain everything only to those people who refuse to notice the obvious contradictions in them. Without telling why the current definitions are not able to explain anything, and what the contradictions are, this doesn't help.
Definition of COERCION: the act, process, or power of coercing Full Definition of COERCE 1: to restrain or dominate by force 2: to compel to an act or choice 3: to achieve by force or threat
(Bold by me) Don't you see that all the meanings relate to (human) actions? So yes, to use this concept for natural forces is an anthropomorphism.
So now you admit that you feel it?
Feel what? That I am determined? Or that I have conflicting desires? Did you see my example about pizza in my posting above]? I notice that you do not react on the most important question: why are my wishes and beliefs obstacles? And obstacles for whom?
- Nevertheless, science has shown that freedom is a fiction because everything in the world obeys the laws. Feeling of a free will is simply a tricky illusion. In reality, there is no will at all and any action has its direct cause. Is this true? Of course not. Free will is real just like the existence of self is real. One without the other is not possible. As for laws, science is limited by determinism because everything else could not be studied. And the "everything else" is exactly what "freedom" actually is, and all that comes along, such as ethics.
If there are events that are not caused in a lawful way they would appear to science as randomness. That means that for the outside observer the freedom of another person would be indistinguishable from randomness. A person having and giving reasons for his actions does not look like a random generator to me.
Thanks, I think I'll stop right here.
That's your free choice. I think you have good reasons for it, and that it is not a random choice. Randomness is not an argument for free will. It's another determining factor we have no control over.
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Like I said, I can't grasp all the details of the argument, but there is a debate. Rather than go to Hume or Harris or Dennett or brain scans, the easiest example of where we are as a species is the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the US. These express a world where individuals have freedom as well as responsibility, a world where we are interdependent and affected by our past, and have the ability to affect the future. That's cultural discussion I was referring to. I'm not even sure where the burden of proof is on this one. To claim pure determinism, it seems you need to show the specific cause of every action that has ever happened. To claim free will, you would have to show that every choice ever made could have been made differently for no reason. Both of those are kinda silly.
No you don't. All anyone has to show is that there has never been any objective evidence for free will. So determinism, for which there is plenty of evidence, is the default until someone can present objective evidence that something else interferes with the deterministic process, be it free will or something else.
29
They are different somewhat but the difference is not essential. I see both of them as belonging to the same class of results, namely "obeying the laws, repeatable, predictable".
I think it is a huge difference if future events are exactly predictable in principle, or not. That laws of nature cannot give exact predictions anymore was a shock for the physics community. Measurements are not exactly repeatable anymore. Under exact the same circumstances, different outcome can occur, and in the right context the difference in the outcomes can be huge (e.g. a living or a dead cat).
Anyway, because philosophy transcends mathematics, we should not try to apply mathematics here. Let me rephrase my definition more clearly. If the result obeys any laws, then the result is determined by those laws. Any regularities whatsoever make future predictable (even if not completely). Only the result which is "new", which has not "existed before" can be called non deterministic. I hope it is clearer now.
No, it isn't. Can you give an example of a 'new result'?
May be a new term instead of "determinism" (like "unfreedom"?) would be better, but I do not think so. Determinism has different meanings (and had throughout the history) and I think there is a need to redefine it more properly.
Why? Why should your definition be more properly?
Coercive force not necessarily has to be caused by somebody else's will. The forces of nature are a good example.
It is pure anthropomorphism to use the word 'coercion' in this context. Is a stone forced to fall by gravity, or does the stone want to move in the direction of the earth?
It is an interesting question. I may certainly feel the forces of determinism when my brain / body does not want to do what my moral duty requires. My body is lazy and my brain sometimes tries to rationalise, to find excuses and reasons to avoid what is the right thing to do. The pleasure I feel is caused by my biology, and my wishes often comes from my body. Usually, but not always, I am aware of the situations when my nature goes against my ethics. Many people do not know what is right, what is moral and why they live. Thus, they probably think that what they want is the right thing to do. In that case, I agree, it is difficult to feel the forces of our nature. In short, in order to feel the force you have to have a wish to go against it.
You just describe the fact that we are not an undivided unity: we have contradicting wishes, struggles between what our feeling urge us to do, and what we think is most reasonable to do.
Take a look at the abundance of natural laws. The laws of chemistry, solid state physics or fluid dynamics have probably emerged when the corresponding entities/substances emerged, and the laws of survival have probably emerged together with life. To say that all the laws have been existing since the "beginning of time" is to declare that the future of the universe is/was predestined. While I certainly can't prove it, it looks highly unlikely to me.
That is highly speculative, and it is based on the idea that laws of nature force processes to run as they do. But that is not the case: they are valid descriptions of how nature develops (see the article referred to at the end of this posting). Nothing is forced, everything just takes its course.
The essence of your definition is "freedom is the absence of obstacles". Therefore, freedom may be defined (in your terms) as "the capability to act according against somebody’s own wishes and beliefs", because wishes and beliefs are certainly obstacles - they imposed on us by nature and society.
Obstacles? For what and who? What would I do when these obstacles were not there? My own will is an obstacle for my own will? Why would the fact that my wishes and beliefs are determined make it impossible to act according my will?
I am aware of the unsolvable troubles which modern philosophy has with free will.
I am not. Compatibilism solves the problem very well. See e.g here]. No, it doesn't. Compatibilism says that free will and determinism can coexist, but there is still no evidence that free will exists. Compatibilism is a theory designed by people who can't accept that free will does not exist so they have tried to reach some kind of compromise by assuming compatibilism. But such a compromise is false because compatibilissts are still using a concept that has never been shown to exist. An analogy would be an atheist and a theist compromising on the existence of god by saying that god exists sometimes but not others. The compromise still contains an unfounded premise--that a god exists at all. I don't know what rational person could accept compatibilism. It contains the concept of free will. So it contains an unfounded premise.
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Lois,
For somebody who has shown not even to understand what it is all about, you have pretty strong opinions.
You do not even understand what compatibilists are saying, so you have never given any relevant argument against combatibilism. You keep saying that determinism and free will do not go together, without ever touching the concept of compatibilist free will.

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I am aware of the unsolvable troubles which modern philosophy has with free will.
I am not. Compatibilism solves the problem very well. See e.g here]. I'm not a fan of Compatibilism. It seems to only work if one redefines Free Will (note the caps) in a way that is contrary to the views of the vast majority of the population. Most people are dualists and believe that the source of Free Will is the soul or spirit, and that it is not subject to the laws of physics--that is, our actions are not deterministic because our souls or spirit transcend the clockwork nature (at macro scales) of the universe. For this and other reasons I have given up on Daniel Dennett. I think Sam Harris, in his book Free Will, makes a pretty airtight case that Free Will--as the vast majority of the population thinks of it--is an illusion. In fact, I think he shows that it is not even a coherent concept. But that's just my humble opinion. It's a perfectly rational one, Bug.
32
Lois, For somebody who has shown not even to understand what it is all about, you have pretty strong opinions. You do not even understand what compatibilists are saying, so you have never given any relevant argument against combatibilism. You keep saying that determinism and free will do not go together, without ever touching the concept of compatibilist free will.
What do you think compatibilists are saying? There can be no such thing as compatibilist free will because free will has never been shown to exist. You can put any adjective in front of free will that you can think up. Free will is still an unfounded concept. Would you posit a compatibilist god? A compatibilist angel? Compatibilist space aliens?
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What do you think compatibilists are saying?
See here ]and here]. Oh, and here: http://philosophyfortheeveryday.blogspot.ch/search/label/Free Will (Copy/paste the link into your browser). Your argument 'we are determined so we have no free will' does not work for this conception of free will. If you can show that this compatibilist version of free will does not suffice for our practice of assigning responsibility and our idea of 'could have done otherwise' then show me. But you should argue against what I wrote there, and not just repeat that 'free will has never been shown to exist'.
You can put any adjective in front of free will that you can think up.
If you define the earth as the flat surface in the middle of the universe, then the earth does not exists. If you give a definition that fits to the findings of science, then of course the earth exists. Same with compatibilism: there exists a useful concept of free will (that differs from what people like you think free will should be) that is perfectly in sync with 'scientific determinism', and that is a basis for our daily practice of praising and blaming other people for their actions. Start understanding what it is about Lois. Then we can discuss. Until now you have just been venting ungrounded opinions, and not been arguing against the position of compatibilism.
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It seems to only work if one redefines Free Will (note the caps) in a way that is contrary to the views of the vast majority of the population. Most people are dualists...
Yes, of course. But we know they are wrong, isn't it? So to be logically consistent, we must redefine free will. If you define 'earth' as the flat surface in the middle of the universe, we do not live on the same earth as did most people from ancient times. Should we therefore not redefine earth as the 3 planet revolving around the sun? I think that's a poor analogy. The earth is what it is no matter how you "define" it. I could "define" my brother as a green triangular alien from the moon, but that would be objectively, factually wrong. (I put "define" in scare quotes because such delusions as a flat earth or my brother as an alien are not so much wrong definitions of concepts as wrong descriptions of physical objects.) "Free Will" on the other hand is an abstract concept (rather than a physical object) that gets it definition from, well, how the people define it--kind of like the word "square". If the vast majority of people--including philosophers and theologians, historically--define something a certain way, and then a subset (compatibilists) of a very tiny subset (philosophers) of society comes along and says "no, the unwashed masses don't know what they mean when they use a word that has always meant what they foolishly think it means because we have a better idea of what this word should mean that is rather different that what it has always meant to nearly everyone", then in my opinion those philosophers are engaging in pure redefinitional* sophistry born out of desperation to save a concept they hold dear. *not actually a word. Apologies.
I think Sam Harris, in his book Free Will, makes a pretty airtight case that Free Will--as the vast majority of the population thinks of it--is an illusion. In fact, I think he shows that it is not even a coherent concept.
Sam Harris' pamphlet 'Free Will' is inconsistent. If you look how he still defends morality and ethics, it becomes clear that he is just a compatibilist as Dennett is: he only refuses to call 'Free Will' 'free will'. I don't know what you mean. What does defending morality and ethics have to do with being a compatibilist?
But that's just my humble opinion. ;-)
I appreciate your humility. ;-)
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I think that's a poor analogy. The earth is what it is no matter how you define it. I could define my brother as a green triangular alien from the moon, but that would be objectively, factually wrong. (I put define in scare quotes because such delusions as a flat earth or my brother as an alien are not so much wrong definitions of concepts as wrong descriptions of physical objects.)
The difference between your green brother and the earth as the flat surface in the centre of the earth is that people believed in it for ages. But of course, such comparisons might not work to the end.
Free Will on the other hand is an abstract concept (rather than a physical object) that gets it definition from, well, how the people define it kind of like the word square.
Yeah, right, that's true. But if we discover that a concept used by the majority of the people cannot stand a critical logical analysis, then it is just wrong. Libertarian free will is such a concept: it has no coherent meaning at all. Define free actions as movements that are not caused by previous events: then they are random. If 'we' are doing it, i.e. 'we' can change the course of nature with our will, then we are causes. But that means actions are caused. By what? The soul? Besides that science has done away with the idea of a soul, what would motivate a soul to its intentions, uncaused? No, libertarian free will is a conceptually empty concept.
If the vast majority of people including philosophers and theologians, historically define something a certain way, and then a subset (compatibilists) of a very tiny subset (philosophers) of society comes along and says no, the unwashed masses don't know what they mean when they use a word that has always meant what they foolishly think it means because we have a better idea of what this word should mean that is rather different that what it has always meant to nearly everyone, then in my opinion those philosophers are engaging in pure redefinitional* sophistry born out of desperation to save a concept they hold dear.
No. Compatbilist Free Will (CFW) contains everything we normally connect to the idea of free will, except that it is uncaused. 1. CFW describes free will as being able to do what you want (or a little bit more technical that wishes and beliefs are causes of actions). I think everybody will subscribe to this. 2. CFW shows how the modal meaning of 'could have done otherwise' fully covers the meaning we attach to it also in the context of free will. It is a conceptual misunderstanding of 'could have done otherwise' to take it as 'could have done otherwise' in exactly the same circumstances, including the brain being in exactly the same state. 3. Higher animals, especially human animals, are able to anticipate the consequences of their actions. They can picture themselves and their environment in the future, dependent on which action they will take. There is no reason to think that such an evaluating entity cannot be implemented in a determined system, like the brain. A chess computer is also a 'possibility evaluating system', for every move it has different possibilities. But it is a determined system. 4. Societies can, by connecting consequences to actions (praising, rewarding, blaming, punishing, etc), take influence on people, and so form a basis for ethics and our judicial system. People can discuss this rationally by evaluating arguments, because they are 'evaluting machines'. 5. Having free will does not mean being uncaused, but that I am not following the wishes and beliefs that are my own, i.e. that I am coerced to my action, that I am intentionally falsely informed etc. Therefore such actions can be excluding grounds for guilt in court cases. The illusion of libertarian free will can arise because we have no access to our hardware layer, the neurons. We do not observe how we are determined. Thoughts and feelings seem to pop up from nowhere, and in the meantime we still feel that our feelings, thoughts and actions are ours, that we are the independent author of these. That gives the feeling of not being caused. The illusion of libertarian free will is the companion of feeling as an entity seperate from our environment, even from our bodies. Give up this idea, and CFW logically pops up as the only meaningful sense of what free will is.
I don't know what you mean. What does defending morality and ethics have to do with being a compatibilist?
If you are a hard determininist, then you deny the existence of free will alltogether. Then you have no basis anymore to praise or blame people for their actions: one should not punish criminals, but treat them as disfunctional objects. Because Harris doesn't do this, and still makes a distinction between actions that are morally culpable and those that aren't, he shows that he is a closet compatibilist.
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1. CFW describes free will as being able to do what you want (or a little bit more technical that wishes and beliefs are causes of actions). I think everybody will subscribe to this.
That's not technical enough. That's not even "a little bit more technical". Today science can get more technical than that.
If you are a hard determininist, then you deny the existence of free will alltogether. Then you have no basis anymore to praise or blame people for their actions: one should not punish criminals, but treat them as disfunctional objects.
From what point of view are you saying we have "no basis"? How can you say we have no basis? You see, this is interesting because it sheds light on your own personal conception of how people should think. Then you take this "basis" and clothe it in your own definition called-compatibilism. We do have a basis. Hard determinists do praise and judge. And we know why we do. Is there any difference between punishing and treating something as a dysfunctional object? Of course not! That's the very basis of punishment. Let's not get carried away with your term "object" either. Object is a person or animal in this case. You used the term "object" to color your impassioned plea for compatibilism. We have already discussed the evolutionary basis for punishment and rewards a dozen times on this forum. That's one basis. Another is that a determinist recognizes the illusion of free-will or the "moral" cause of punishment and reward. We recognize the "theater" that is going on in our minds regarding these "apparent" choices or wishes or desires. That theater is one thing that is not fully recognized or understood by science...yet. Aside from all of this GdB, it's quite obvious that you need to package this all up in your own defined version and terminology. That's ok. If that's what works for you. I've argued that this "compatibilist" step is a useless step. It's just a term that some need to use as a last tether between free-will and determinism. To a determinist it makes no sense and seems redundant. I mean here we are again and all I can understand in your post above is how you need to label certain steps in a causal chain as having more significance than others.(hmnnn...I wonder why? Especially when these are the steps that nexus at the mind and regard a human perception of past, present and future!) GdB, you personally need to box up these concepts in a package that makes sense for you. You like categorizing and labeling. That's fine.
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What do you think compatibilists are saying?
See here ]and here]. Oh, and here: http://philosophyfortheeveryday.blogspot.ch/search/label/Free Will (Copy/paste the link into your browser). Your argument 'we are determined so we have no free will' does not work for this conception of free will. If you can show that this compatibilist version of free will does not suffice for our practice of assigning responsibility and our idea of 'could have done otherwise' then show me. But you should argue against what I wrote there, and not just repeat that 'free will has never been shown to exist'.
You can put any adjective in front of free will that you can think up.
If you define the earth as the flat surface in the middle of the universe, then the earth does not exists. If you give a definition that fits to the findings of science, then of course the earth exists. Same with compatibilism: there exists a useful concept of free will (that differs from what people like you think free will should be) that is perfectly in sync with 'scientific determinism', and that is a basis for our daily practice of praising and blaming other people for their actions. Start understanding what it is about Lois. Then we can discuss. Until now you have just been venting ungrounded opinions, and not been arguing against the position of compatibilism. We will never be able to discus it because in my opinion you don't know what you're talking about when it comes to free will. You have proven it overwhelmingly with every post on the subject. You seem to think that attacking my understanding makes points for you. It doesn't. It just makes you look like a fool. I will not argue free will with you again because you don't understand that it has never been shown to exist, but you will continue to beat the same broken drum and to make ad hominem attacks--the perfect indication that you have no valid argument.
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1. CFW describes free will as being able to do what you want (or a little bit more technical that wishes and beliefs are causes of actions). I think everybody will subscribe to this.
That's not technical enough. That's not even "a little bit more technical". Today science can get more technical than that.
If you are a hard determininist, then you deny the existence of free will alltogether. Then you have no basis anymore to praise or blame people for their actions: one should not punish criminals, but treat them as disfunctional objects.
From what point of view are you saying we have "no basis"? How can you say we have no basis? You see, this is interesting because it sheds light on your own personal conception of how people should think. Then you take this "basis" and clothe it in your own definition called-compatibilism. We do have a basis. Hard determinists do praise and judge. And we know why we do. Is there any difference between punishing and treating something as a dysfunctional object? Of course not! That's the very basis of punishment. Let's not get carried away with your term "object" either. Object is a person or animal in this case. You used the term "object" to color your impassioned plea for compatibilism. We have already discussed the evolutionary basis for punishment and rewards a dozen times on this forum. That's one basis. Another is that a determinist recognizes the illusion of free-will or the "moral" cause of punishment and reward. We recognize the "theater" that is going on in our minds regarding these "apparent" choices or wishes or desires. That theater is one thing that is not fully recognized or understood by science...yet. Aside from all of this GdB, it's quite obvious that you need to package this all up in your own defined version and terminology. That's ok. If that's what works for you. I've argued that this "compatibilist" step is a useless step. It's just a term that some need to use as a last tether between free-will and determinism. To a determinist it makes no sense and seems redundant. I mean here we are again and all I can understand in your post above is how you need to label certain steps in a causal chain as having more significance than others.(hmnnn...I wonder why? Especially when these are the steps that nexus at the mind and regard a human perception of past, present and future!) GdB, you personally need to box up these concepts in a package that makes sense for you. You like categorizing and labeling. That's fine. Hooray! Sense at last.
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Yeah, right, that's true. But if we discover that a concept used by the majority of the people cannot stand a critical logical analysis, then it is just wrong. Libertarian free will is such a concept: it has no coherent meaning at all. Define free actions as movements that are not caused by previous events: then they are random. If 'we' are doing it, i.e. 'we' can change the course of nature with our will, then we are causes. But that means actions are caused. By what? The soul? Besides that science has done away with the idea of a soul, what would motivate a soul to its intentions, uncaused? No, libertarian free will is a conceptually empty concept.
The problem with this is that I don't think you would support Dennett and the compatibilists if they used the exact same rationale to argue that "God does indeed exist. It's just that all these theists have wrongly defined God as the omnipotent/scient/benevolent being that created the universe, when in fact God simply is the Universe."
1. CFW describes free will as being able to do what you want (or a little bit more technical that wishes and beliefs are causes of actions). I think everybody will subscribe to this. 2. CFW shows how the modal meaning of 'could have done otherwise' fully covers the meaning we attach to it also in the context of free will. It is a conceptual misunderstanding of 'could have done otherwise' to take it as 'could have done otherwise' in exactly the same circumstances, including the brain being in exactly the same state. 3. Higher animals, especially human animals, are able to anticipate the consequences of their actions. They can picture themselves and their environment in the future, dependent on which action they will take. There is no reason to think that such an evaluating entity cannot be implemented in a determined system, like the brain. A chess computer is also a 'possibility evaluating system', for every move it has different possibilities. But it is a determined system. 4. Societies can, by connecting consequences to actions (praising, rewarding, blaming, punishing, etc), take influence on people, and so form a basis for ethics and our judicial system. People can discuss this rationally by evaluating arguments, because they are 'evaluting machines'. 5. Having free will does not mean being uncaused, but that I am not following the wishes and beliefs that are my own, i.e. that I am coerced to my action, that I am intentionally falsely informed etc. Therefore such actions can be excluding grounds for guilt in court cases. The illusion of libertarian free will can arise because we have no access to our hardware layer, the neurons. We do not observe how we are determined. Thoughts and feelings seem to pop up from nowhere, and in the meantime we still feel that our feelings, thoughts and actions are ours, that we are the independent author of these. That gives the feeling of not being caused. The illusion of libertarian free will is the companion of feeling as an entity seperate from our environment, even from our bodies. Give up this idea, and CFW logically pops up as the only meaningful sense of what free will is.
So in other words, CFW is just a new definition of "Free Will" that is different than how the vast majority of the population and most philosophers historically have defined it. Also, number 5 in your list is an equivocation. That is not Free Will in the philosophical sense. That is simply "freedom", a very different concept than Free Will. The phrase "of my own free will" is an anomalous use of the term.
If you are a hard determininist, then you deny the existence of free will alltogether. Then you have no basis anymore to praise or blame people for their actions: one should not punish criminals, but treat them as disfunctional objects. Because Harris doesn't do this, and still makes a distinction between actions that are morally culpable and those that aren't, he shows that he is a closet compatibilist.
Actually, I think you have that backwards. Unlike Dennett and all the other compatibilists, Harris is not changing the definition of Free Will to suit his purposes. In fact, the only difference between Dennett and Harris is how they define "Free Will". It's purely an argument over semantics. There is absolutely no substantive difference between what Dennett and Harris believe about determinism or how the "mind" works. So there is no reason why Harris's view of Free Will should lead one to any different conclusions about morality than Dennett's view. IMHO, Dennett and the compatibilists are simply being intellectually dishonest in order to protect a cherished illusion called "Free Will" for the masses. Watch Dennett give a talk about compatibilism and you might notice he spends half his presentation talking about how if people don't believe in Free Will, they will act less morally. He even cites studies that he thinks show this to be true (they show no such thing, and I think Dennett know that--not that it matters). It seems obvious to me what his real motives are for redefining Free Will.
40
Yeah, right, that's true. But if we discover that a concept used by the majority of the people cannot stand a critical logical analysis, then it is just wrong. Libertarian free will is such a concept: it has no coherent meaning at all. Define free actions as movements that are not caused by previous events: then they are random. If 'we' are doing it, i.e. 'we' can change the course of nature with our will, then we are causes. But that means actions are caused. By what? The soul? Besides that science has done away with the idea of a soul, what would motivate a soul to its intentions, uncaused? No, libertarian free will is a conceptually empty concept.
The problem with this is that I don't think you would support Dennett and the compatibilists if they used the exact same rationale to argue that "God does indeed exist. It's just that all these theists have wrongly defined God as the omnipotent/scient/benevolent being that created the universe, when in fact God simply is the Universe."
1. CFW describes free will as being able to do what you want (or a little bit more technical that wishes and beliefs are causes of actions). I think everybody will subscribe to this. 2. CFW shows how the modal meaning of 'could have done otherwise' fully covers the meaning we attach to it also in the context of free will. It is a conceptual misunderstanding of 'could have done otherwise' to take it as 'could have done otherwise' in exactly the same circumstances, including the brain being in exactly the same state. 3. Higher animals, especially human animals, are able to anticipate the consequences of their actions. They can picture themselves and their environment in the future, dependent on which action they will take. There is no reason to think that such an evaluating entity cannot be implemented in a determined system, like the brain. A chess computer is also a 'possibility evaluating system', for every move it has different possibilities. But it is a determined system. 4. Societies can, by connecting consequences to actions (praising, rewarding, blaming, punishing, etc), take influence on people, and so form a basis for ethics and our judicial system. People can discuss this rationally by evaluating arguments, because they are 'evaluting machines'. 5. Having free will does not mean being uncaused, but that I am not following the wishes and beliefs that are my own, i.e. that I am coerced to my action, that I am intentionally falsely informed etc. Therefore such actions can be excluding grounds for guilt in court cases. The illusion of libertarian free will can arise because we have no access to our hardware layer, the neurons. We do not observe how we are determined. Thoughts and feelings seem to pop up from nowhere, and in the meantime we still feel that our feelings, thoughts and actions are ours, that we are the independent author of these. That gives the feeling of not being caused. The illusion of libertarian free will is the companion of feeling as an entity seperate from our environment, even from our bodies. Give up this idea, and CFW logically pops up as the only meaningful sense of what free will is.
So in other words, CFW is just a new definition of "Free Will" that is different than how the vast majority of the population and most philosophers historically have defined it. Also, number 5 in your list is an equivocation. That is not Free Will in the philosophical sense. That is simply "freedom", a very different concept than Free Will. The phrase "of my own free will" is an anomalous use of the term.
If you are a hard determininist, then you deny the existence of free will alltogether. Then you have no basis anymore to praise or blame people for their actions: one should not punish criminals, but treat them as disfunctional objects. Because Harris doesn't do this, and still makes a distinction between actions that are morally culpable and those that aren't, he shows that he is a closet compatibilist.
Actually, I think you have that backwards. Unlike Dennett and all the other compatibilists, Harris is not changing the definition of Free Will to suit his purposes. In fact, the only difference between Dennett and Harris is how they define "Free Will". It's purely an argument over semantics. There is absolutely no substantive difference between what Dennett and Harris believe about determinism or how the "mind" works. So there is no reason why Harris's view of Free Will should lead one to any different conclusions about morality than Dennett's view. IMHO, Dennett and the compatibilists are simply being intellectually dishonest in order to protect a cherished illusion called "Free Will" for the masses. Watch Dennett give a talk about compatibilism and you might notice he spends half his presentation talking about how if people don't believe in Free Will, they will act less morally. He even cites studies that he thinks show this to be true (they show no such thing, and I think Dennett know that--not that it matters). It seems obvious to me what his real motives are for redefining Free Will. If determiism is true, it wouldn't make any difference whether they believe in free will. Dennet, of all people, should know that people can't decide to believe or not believe in anything, even if free will exists.