Show me why my 'Swartz in a nutshell' (He just says that laws of nature are true descriptions of the world, and therefore also true descriptions of us. But true descriptions follow reality, not the other way round) is a wrong interpretation of hist text.It's not wrong Gdb, you're just missing out why he thinks this "dissolves" the free will problem. What he thinks is this get's us ultimate responsibility by breaking the necessary link with the distant past.
But they aren't according to the deterministic view. Our actions are necessitated by factors operating at the moment. The distant past would be a very weak factor if it is a factor at all. I wish everyone on this list could understand what determinism actually is even if they don't embrace it. It seems to be a concept that only a few people can get their heads around. Sad.This time I am with Stephen. What you describe is at most causation. Determinism and causation concepts are very closely related in a naturalistic view, but they are not the same. You should do your homework, instead of saying that others don't understand determinism.
It's not wrong Gdb, you're just missing out why he thinks this "dissolves" the free will problem. What he thinks is this get's us ultimate responsibility by breaking the necessary link with the distant past.First of all I notice you did not react on my first question, so I suppose you did not find any relevant text passages. And I did not miss anything, but just gave the relevant outline of Swartz' thought against your silly idea that he defends that we control physical laws. And nowhere Swart mentions even the word 'responsibility' in the referenced text, so surely not 'ultimate responsibility'. Your own thinking stands you in the way of understanding others. Just think about it: first you must understand a viewpoint; only then you can start criticising it.
And nowhere Swart mentions even the word 'responsibility' in the referenced text, so surely not 'ultimate responsibility'. Your own thinking stands you in the way of understanding others. Just think about it: first you must understand a viewpoint; only then you can start criticising it.GdB, The free will problem he is talking about is the problem of how can we be ultimately responsible. http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/freewill1.htm#intro
There is an illuminating and particularly disconcerting consequence of Darrow's views. If Leopold and Loeb were not morally responsible for their behavior, it was because of what others had done to them. But these others, in turn, were not morally responsible for what they had done, since they were the product of what had earlier been done to them. And so on, and so on. The argument works like a line of dominos, it is – in effect – the domino theory of moral nonresponsibility. If someone is to be regarded as not morally responsible for what he does because he is the product of someone else's actions, then, ultimately, no one is responsible for anything he/she does.bold by me. On physical laws yes he thinks certain physical laws depend upon our choices (another way of saying controlled by). He is clear about that.
6.6 "The laws of nature are not of our choosing" Recall the example (in Section 6.3) of John buying Claudia a bouquet of flowers. In discussing that example, I wrote: There seems – in this account of the way the universe 'works' – to be no opportunity for the exercise of free choice. ... The Natural Laws are 'given' (i.e. not of our choosing); and the antecedent conditions, equally, are 'given' (i.e. not of our choosing). Our behavior is completely 'causally determined' by the laws of nature and antecedent conditions. There is no 'room', in this account ..., it would appear, for free choice. I chose my words carefully. In the first sentence, I wrote "seems"; and in the last, "it would appear". For, on that earlier occasion, I wanted merely to present the argument; I did not want to endorse it, or to say that I thought the argument correct. Indeed, I think that that earlier argument is mistaken. And we now have sufficient philosophical and logical tools to address the problem. I want to suggest that the claim in that argument – the claim that the Laws of Nature are not of our choosing – is a relic of the earlier view that Laws of Nature are God's inviolable prescriptions to the Universe. If we fully abandon the view that the Laws of Nature are prescriptions, then the way is open for us to rescue the theory that Free Will exists.So no, it's not my own thinking that stands in the way of understanding others, you've got this the wrong way around. I take him at face value, you re-interpret to fit with your view. Really you might be right, it's not impossible, but the evidence strongly points against it and you just assert that it doesn't as is what happens when we get to certain sticking points.
Sigh…
First: you do not refer to the text we were talking about.
Now of course you can take other texts of the same author as help to interpret a text, assuming that he is consistent in his views. (Sometimes one must be careful with that, because it happens that people change their minds. But I think Swartz is consistent in his texts, so we can go on.)
Now you take this quote:
If someone is to be regarded as not morally responsible for what he does because he is the product of someone else’s actions, then, ultimately, no one is responsible for anything he/she does.as proof for your statement that Swartz defends a form of ultimate responsibility. But the logical opposite of 'ultimately, no one is responsible' is not 'we are ultimately responsible' but 'at least one person is somewhat responsible'. If I say something is not white, that does not mean it is black, as 'absolute opposite of white'. It could be red, or even light-grey. So any, however weak kind of responsibility would already do. So it does not follow in any way that Swartz defends that we are ultimately responsible. This becomes clear when we read a little further:
What are the philosophical arguments that we are never free to choose? What are the opposing arguments that we are – at least sometimes – free to choose?Now 'the laws of nature are not of our choosing': what he is arguing for is that laws of nature do not force our action, but that laws of nature are true descriptions of what we in fact do, so also true descriptions of what we choose. In Laws of Nature] he clearly states:
It’s true that you cannot “violate" a law of nature, but that’s not because the laws of nature ‘force’ you to behave in some certain way. It is rather that whatever you do, there is a true description of what you have done. You certainly don’t get to choose the laws that describe the charge on an electron or the properties of hydrogen and oxygen that explain their combining to form water. But you do get to choose a great many other laws. How do you do that? Simply by doing whatever you do in fact do.and:
it’s not that you reflect on choosing the laws. You don’t wake up in the morning and ask yourself “Which laws of nature will I create today?" No, it’s rather that you ask yourself, “What will I do today?", and in choosing to do some things rather than others, your actions – that is, your choices – make certain propositions (including some universal statements containing no proper names) true and other propositions false.This clearly contradicts your statement that Swartz says we are in control of physical laws. Really, except for possibly a few New Age fanatics, no reasonable person would defend that we are in control of laws of physics. To think that a serious philosopher would defend such a view is simply ridiculous. And that Swartz would use this in defence for the position that we are ultimately responsible even more.
Sigh returned GdB
The problem with the necessary link with the past is that we can’t be morally responsible in the ultimate sense that is commonly believed in.
It is really quite clear that is what Swartz is trying to rescue, otherwise there is no point in the exercise.
There is no reasonable way for you to argue in the opposite direction. To say I might be mistaken or something is fair enough but to say the odds tilt in your favour is perverse.
I’ll leave it there, the evidence is in Swartz’s writings.
But they aren't according to the deterministic view. Our actions are necessitated by factors operating at the moment. The distant past would be a very weak factor if it is a factor at all. I wish everyone on this list could understand what determinism actually is even if they don't embrace it. It seems to be a concept that only a few people can get their heads around. Sad. LoisLois, why is it you think you understand determinism and others don't? A standard definition of determinism is here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
1.3 Determinism A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.[4] Within this essay, we shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that are sufficient for each of her actions.
Our actions are necessitated by factors operating at the moment.Which in turn are necessitated by the distant past. You wrote:Lois, why is it you think you understand determinism and others don't? My answer: I am determined to think that way. ;) But seriously, many people I have communicated with cannot seem to accept the premise of determinism. Most would say they do not understand how we cannot have free will. Some take it as a personal affront. As far as the distant past goes, it is a factor but it is likely that most of it has been superseded by more recent factors--in my opinion. When I said most people don't understand determinism I wasn't referring to you. Just because we disagree on some point regarding determinism doesn't mean I think you don't understand it. I was referring to people who have no understanding of it or won't even consider its most basic principles, and they are legion. Lois
But they aren't according to the deterministic view. Our actions are necessitated by factors operating at the moment. The distant past would be a very weak factor if it is a factor at all. I wish everyone on this list could understand what determinism actually is even if they don't embrace it. It seems to be a concept that only a few people can get their heads around. Sad. LoisLois, why is it you think you understand determinism and others don't? A standard definition of determinism is here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
1.3 Determinism A standard characterization of determinism states that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events.[4] Within this essay, we shall define determinism as the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. According to this characterization, if determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that are sufficient for each of her actions.
Our actions are necessitated by factors operating at the moment.Which in turn are necessitated by the distant past. You wrote:Lois, why is it you think you understand determinism and others don't? My answer: I am determined to think that way. ;) But seriously, many people I have communicated with cannot seem to accept the premise of determinism. Most would say they do not understand how we cannot have free will. Some take it as a personal affront. As far as the distant past goes, it is a factor but it is likely that most of it has been superseded by more recent factors--in my opinion. When I said most people don't understand determinism I wasn't referring to you. Just because we disagree on some point regarding determinism doesn't mean I think you don't understand it. I was referring to people who have no understanding of it or won't even consider its most basic principles, and they are legion. Lois Well Lois, one physically possible future given the distant past is such an important definition. Because we need to be clear that we are merely lucky or unlucky that the distant past was as it was. Otherwise people invent some kinda supposed compatibilism which relies on freedom from the distant past. Watch the debate in various places, you'll see this going on all the time.
The problem with the necessary link with the past is that we can't be morally responsible in the ultimate sense that is commonly believed in. It is really quite clear that is what Swartz is trying to rescue, otherwise there is no point in the exercise.You do realise that you retract, from Swartz' texts, to the general problem of determinism and 'ultimate responsibility' as you see it, don't you? And you can only imagine that Swartz makes sense in that context, and therefore it must mean what you think? You have given no single reason why my interpretation of Swartz' text would be wrong. You have given no reference to a text passage that positively says that Swartz argues for ultimate responsibility, only the negative position that it might not be true that we are ultimately not responsible for our actions. And that is not enough: not-white does not mean black. And in my citations Swartz explicitly says that we do not choose laws of nature, but that the laws of nature are descriptions of what we do, and so the laws of nature are, as true descriptions, according our choosing, i.e. in sync with the process of choosing.
I'll leave it there, the evidence is in Swartz's writings.Then you should be able to show the evidence against what I said in my postings above. Why is what I said wrong? And don't forget: it is about text interpretation now, not yet the truth of the matter.
Otherwise people invent some kinda supposed compatibilism which relies on freedom from the distant past.You have not understood compatibilism. Compatibilism is freedom of coercion, not of the past, however distant.
But they aren't according to the deterministic view. Our actions are necessitated by factors operating at the moment. The distant past would be a very weak factor if it is a factor at all. I wish everyone on this list could understand what determinism actually is even if they don't embrace it. It seems to be a concept that only a few people can get their heads around. Sad.This time I am with Stephen. What you describe is at most causation. Determinism and causation concepts are very closely related in a naturalistic view, but they are not the same. You should do your homework, instead of saying that others don't understand determinism. Ok, i'll bite. What's the difference between determinism and causation? Lois
Ok, i'll bite. What's the difference between determinism and causation?Causation is a relationship between events. Often this is interpreted as immediate cause, which means a cause immediately is followed by an effect, but it is also used in a slightly looser meaning as 'when this cause would not have happened, then that effect would not have happened either'. Interpreted in this sense there can be a considerable time between a cause and its effect. If this time is too long however, a lot of other events might also have contributed to its occurrence, which then also would be causes of the event. So the idea that a cause a long time ago is a cause of an event is so to speak 'diluted' by many other causes. I think this is what you wanted to say above]. Determinism on the other hand is the view that all future events are already fixed. In the modern naturalistic view determinism mostly takes the form of causal determinism, which means that if every event is caused by a previous event, then all events are causally connected, which in its turn means that given a certain past (a collection of events a while, or a billion years ago), exactly only one future can happen. But determinism can also exist in theological contexts (God made his plans and so everything will happen according his plans (then determinism sometime comes under the flag of 'pre-determination', God made his plans ages before the events really occur)), or more exotic versions of causation, like the law of karma in Hinduism. So a deterministic world view does not necessarily entail causation. On the other hand, if causality would be rigidly true in the universe, then the universe must be determined. Therefore my remark that causation and determinism are closely related in a naturalistic world view (in which there is no God or law of karma).
Ok, i'll bite. What's the difference between determinism and causation?Causation is a relationship between events. Often this is interpreted as immediate cause, which means a cause immediately is followed by an effect, but it is also used in a slightly looser meaning as 'when this cause would not have happened, then that effect would not have happened either'. Interpreted in this sense there can be a considerable time between a cause and its effect. If this time is too long however, a lot of other events might also have contributed to its occurrence, which then also would be causes of the event. So the idea that a cause a long time ago is a cause of an event is so to speak 'diluted' by many other causes. I think this is what you wanted to say above]. Determinism on the other hand is the view that all future events are already fixed. In the modern naturalistic view determinism mostly takes the form of causal determinism, which means that if every event is caused by a previous event, then all events are causally connected, which in its turn means that given a certain past (a collection of events a while, or a billion years ago), exactly only one future can happen. But determinism can also exist in theological contexts (God made his plans and so everything will happen according his plans (then determinism sometime comes under the flag of 'pre-determination', God made his plans ages before the events really occur)), or more exotic versions of causation, like the law of karma in Hinduism. So a deterministic world view does not necessarily entail causation. On the other hand, if causality would be rigidly true in the universe, then the universe must be determined. Therefore my remark that causation and determinism are closely related in a naturalistic world view (in which there is no God or law of karma). That's not the determinism as I define it, use it and have written about. What you refer to here is predestination. That is a completely different concept. There are many definitions of the word "determinism." In the definition I use all events are caused by many factors unknown to the participants and the participants have no control (otherwise called free will) over those events. The factors are not fixed but change every moment depending on conditions in the universe and in the person over which no one has control. Nothing is fixed beforehand. You are talking about predeterminism and theological determinism. I have never suggested that anything is predetermined and nothing I have written has anything to do with the concept of predetermination or a god. "The standard argument against free will, according to philosopher J. J. C. Smart focuses on the implications of determinism for 'free will'. However, he suggests free will is denied whether determinism is true or not. On one hand, if determinism is true, all our actions are predicted and we are assumed not to be free; on the other hand, if determinism is false, our actions are presumed to be random and as such we do not seem free because we had no part in controlling what happened."http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism "Everything in nature is worthy of respect-including all persons. We define respect as representing that attitude (thought and feeling) resulting from understanding the concept of total determinism. Applied to humanity, this implies, 'There but for the differences in our determinants go I.' "All persons are totally selfish. This makes sense when we define selfishness neutrally, to mean responding to one’s own motivations (determinants). The question of whether one’s actions are selfish or unselfish thus becomes irrelevant. The real issue is whether one's actions are intelligently, healthily, and socially selfish, or stupidly, neurotically, and anti-socially selfish. "There are no bad people, only persons who have a greater or lesser degree of mental health. "Healthy behavior is social, equitable, tolerant, cooperative, and respecting to all. "Morality represents man's traditional attempt to formulate practical rules for living one's life. "To the extent that they are neurotic, the powerful tend to mislead, deceive, or lie to the weak. "Parents tend to corrupt. Power brings out corruption (neurotic behavior)-with apologies to Lord Acton. "Consistent with the Psychosomatic Principle, there is no life of the personality (mind, soul, spirit, psyche) after the death of the body. Death only results in the recycling of our constituent chemicals. "All concepts of heaven, hell, purgatory, limbo, and the like, are false. "There is no anthropomorphic god with a knowledge of, concern and plan for, individual organisms." Determinism.com When I speak of determinism, these are the definitions I refer to, which constitutes an argument against free will. The problem is that there are many definitions, concepts and uses of the term "determinism" that have nothing to so with the kind of determinism that I am speaking of. I wish there were another term for it that is more specific to the definition and concept i use, but there isn't one that I know of so I am often stuck having to elaborate the definition I am using, especially to people who confuse it with predestination.
I gave a the traditional meaning of determinism as it is used in philosophy and physics. It exists on its own, also without any reference persons and to free will. E.g. Quantum physics shows that determinism is not true for all kinds of quantum processes. This can be discussed without reference to persons.
Determinism is a philosophical position stating that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given those conditions, nothing else could happen.Determinism often is taken to mean simply causal determinism, which in physics is the idea known as cause-and-effect. It is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states.
From wikipedia].
It also has nothing to do with the fact if we know the factors that determine us, it is about the plain fact that we are determined, independent of our knowledge of which factors determine us.
See also here]:
Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.It seems to me that you are more oriented in the direction of the social sciences for the meaning of 'determinism'. In the philosophical sense I would say that it is an open question if knowledge of the factors that determine you are a necessary condition of free will.
Reaction on Bryan’s post in this thread].
Rather, he simply insists that my critique has failed while not offering a coherent support for his claim.You should point your arguments at the description Philosofer123 gives in his document. Nowhere he is claiming that he is discussing Strawson and Kane. It is clear that he borrowed his arguments from them, but his standpoint can be discussed on its own merit. I also am not interested in who represents who's ideas wrong. At most I am interested in the topic of free will. But given my past experiences discussing the topic with you I might bailout very soon. Paraphrasing you: Meaning no offense, Bryan, but my experience with you is that your rhetorical slyness nearly always ends up serving as a wall blocking effective communications. So just one remark about Kane: his concept of self-forming actions is rather ridiculous. It is just meant as an ad hoc quick fix of an infinite regress:
Kane holds that a free decision or other free action is one for which the agent is “ultimately responsible". Ultimate responsibility for an action requires either that the action not be causally determined or, if the action is causally determined, that any determining cause of it either be or result (at least in part) from some action by that agent that was not causally determined (and for which the agent was ultimately responsible).SEP] But being uncaused means being random: physics has nothing else on offer. Random actions however can hardly make somebody responsible.
Reaction on Bryan's post in this thread].On the contrary, he specifically mentions Kane and Strawson and it is clear to anyone familiar with their arguments that the infinite regress in Phil's document is Strawson's response to Kane's argument. So, when I point out flaws in Strawson's argument I'm showing a failure in the argument in Phil's statement.Rather, he simply insists that my critique has failed while not offering a coherent support for his claim.You should point your arguments at the description Philosofer123 gives in his document. Nowhere he is claiming that he is discussing Strawson and Kane.
It is clear that he borrowed his arguments from them, but his standpoint can be discussed on its own merit.I've done that. Phil uses Strawson's argument as his rationale for negating the influence of negative emotions in his life. I pointed out that his reasoning isn't rational, given the failure of Strawson's argument.
I also am not interested in who represents who's ideas wrong.Why not? Do you think there's nothing wrong with arguing straw men and basing one's conclusions on such arguments?
At most I am interested in the topic of free will. But given my past experiences discussing the topic with you I might bailout very soon. Paraphrasing you: Meaning no offense, Bryan, but my experience with you is that your rhetorical slyness nearly always ends up serving as a wall blocking effective communications.You resemble that remark, with your current suggestion that I am hijacking Phil's newest version of this thread serving as merely the latest example. Where's your example of my slyness serving as a wall blocking effective communications?
So just one remark about Kane: his concept of self-forming actions is rather ridiculous. It is just meant as an ad hoc quick fix of an infinite regress:Randomness isn't a cause of anything. It is a statistical description of an outcome, and it would fit statistically even for outcomes reflecting deep personal responsibility (thus it's a non-sequitur or a straw man to say it can't make somebody responsible). I've explained this to you before (slyly?). I'd love to see you address the point someday. But if you won't, then it at least gives you another opportunity to put up a wall.Kane holds that a free decision or other free action is one for which the agent is “ultimately responsible". Ultimate responsibility for an action requires either that the action not be causally determined or, if the action is causally determined, that any determining cause of it either be or result (at least in part) from some action by that agent that was not causally determined (and for which the agent was ultimately responsible).SEP] But being uncaused means being random: physics has nothing else on offer. Random actions however can hardly make somebody responsible.
Randomness isn't a cause of anything.Where did I write that randomness causes something?
It is a statistical description of an outcome, and it would fit statistically even for outcomes reflecting deep personal responsibility (thus it's a non-sequitur or a straw man to say it can't make somebody responsible).No idea what you are saying here.
Randomness isn't a cause of anything.Where did I write that randomness causes something? Why do you ask? Did somebody accuse you of writing it?
It is a statistical description of an outcome, and it would fit statistically even for outcomes reflecting deep personal responsibility (thus it's a non-sequitur or a straw man to say it can't make somebody responsible).No idea what you are saying here. Right, or else you wouldn't suggest that randomness isn't consistent with deep moral responsibility and LFW. Randomness is a feature of LFW, not a bug.
However: for general well-being in society and for your peace of mind, I think it is also wholesome to take as much responsibility as you can (but not more, because then you would fall back into regret, shame, remorse, as you say). You mention these as 'attempt to rectify the situation, and vow to act differently in the future'. Point for me is that the sheer possibility of being able to do so means you have some form of free will. Not the form that goes along with 'ultimate responsibility', but the one that fits to our ability to act according our wishes and beliefs, and to act for reasons: combatibilist free will.I think we are in agreement. I agree that we have compatibilist free will, and you agree that we do not have ultimate responsibility. Yes! What matters and why this is of enormous practical importance is the difference between the two, since we do know most people believe in ultimate responsibility. Stephen Believing in ultimate responsibility and actually having it are two different things. People feel exactly the amount of responsibility they are determined to have, not a jot more or less. We don't "decide" how much responsibility we will feel any more than we "decide" what our next thought or action will be. Responsibility is a human mental construct as are other thoughts and actions--no more and no less. It doesn't exist outside of our individual minds any more than god does.
I gave a the traditional meaning of determinism as it is used in philosophy and physics. It exists on its own, also without any reference persons and to free will. E.g. Quantum physics shows that determinism is not true for all kinds of quantum processes. This can be discussed without reference to persons.Of course, they can't be. No human being can know all or even most , maybe not even any, of the factors that drive thoughts and actions. It would be like trying to pick out the individual ingredients in a stew, though millions of times more complicated. We don't even know what those "ingredients" might be.Determinism is a philosophical position stating that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given those conditions, nothing else could happen.Determinism often is taken to mean simply causal determinism, which in physics is the idea known as cause-and-effect. It is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states.
From wikipedia].
It also has nothing to do with the fact if we know the factors that determine us, it is about the plain fact that we are determined, independent of our knowledge of which factors determine us.
See also here]:Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.It seems to me that you are more oriented in the direction of the social sciences for the meaning of 'determinism'. In the philosophical sense I would say that it is an open question if knowledge of the factors that determine you are a necessary condition of free will.