It is not about attempting to create a greater amount of total happiness.I think BugRib was saying it is about that, so we'll see. And you've said the goal is "human comfort" which certainly could be interpreted that way and if not how?
It is not about attempting to create a greater amount of total happiness.I think BugRib was saying it is about that, so we'll see. And you've said the goal is "human comfort" which certainly could be interpreted that way and if not how? I also said a key factor of the goal theory is to refine the goal. This is just a discussion about is/ought, if I were discussing morality I add on "for all" or "not at the expense of other", and probably a lot more. I don't see a big leap from simply existing to being comfortable. We exist, that just is. If you want to claim we ought not to exist, it's up to you to reason that. Continued existence is no more in need of an explanation either, unless you know something about the future that I don't. To continue to exist, we need rest, we need food, we need shelter, all the oughts stem there.
BugRib and Lausten, I think these articles of John Shook of CFI are 'must reads': A Confutation of both Sam Harris and Richard Carrier on Science and Morality] Sam Harris vs. The Philosophers on Morality] PS Shook uses the better word for the 'is/ought problem': not 'border' but the 'is/ought gap'. There is no way you can get to an 'ought' with an 'is', without at least putting one 'ought' already in it somewhere.I read the links, and once again, I think people have simply misread Harris. He never claims he's bridged the is/ought gap. If anyone can show where he's made this claim, I'd really like to see it. Until someone can do that, I contend that the arguments you linked to are committing the Straw Man fallacy. His argument is basically that "the worst possible misery for everyone" is as close to being objectively bad as anything can be. If you don't think TWPMFE is bad, he doesn't know what you're talking about, and he doesn't think you know what you're talking about either. If TWPMFE isn't bad, then the word "bad" is meaningless. He thinks we should use the scientific method (in the broadest sense) to figure out how to move us as far away from TWPMFE as possible. That's it. That's his argument. He's basically arguing for some form of consequentialism, an ethical position I think most philosophers subscribe to. That is, he's basically making the exact same argument about right and wrong that Peter Singer makes in Practical Ethics. How many philosophers have derided Singer's book for being poor philosophy or accused him of claiming to have bridged the is/ought gap? Not many (none?). I wonder why Harris is treated so differently. Because he's not part of "the club"? "Sam Harris vs. The Philosophers on Morality"?
So lets take a simple case. 1) A world in which 70% of people are very happy and 30 % of people are extremely miserable 2) A world in which everyone is slightly miserable. How are you going to come up with a fact of the matter about which is better??Good point. There are certainly facts about certain situations being better than others in terms of moving away from TWPMFE. That being said, there are other situations (like your example) where it is difficult to say that one is factually better than the other. But that doesn't change the fact that there are indeed factual answers about how to move us further away from the WPMFE. And that's a factual fact!
A Confutation of both Sam Harris and Richard Carrier on Science and Morality]Okay GdB. Here's a quote from the above article where it seems like he's misread Harris: That it can be proven that truths ‘exist’ does not necessarily, by itself, either constitute a method for specifically learning those truths, or supplying the grounds for deducing those truths so that they can be known. Hence, this argument only creates the mirage that there are real answers, but there won’t really be any actual answers. First of all, Harris repeatedly acknowledges that we may not, in practice, be able to uncover all of these truths. In other words, Harris has readily conceded the point that John Schook is using as an argument against his position. If they were face to face, the argument might sound something like this: Harris: "We may not, in practice be able to uncover all of these truths." Shook: "Yeah, but who's to say there's a method that can actually uncover all of these truths? Burn!" Harris' argument is not that we will, in practice, be able to uncover all of these truths. It's that the scientific method (in the broadest sense) is the best chance we have of uncovering them. I wonder what method Shook suggests we use to solve moral dilemmas if not the "scientific" one? Guessing? Consulting a psychic? Astrology?
There is no way you can get to an 'ought' with an 'is', without at least putting one 'ought' already in it somewhere.So why is "is/ought" a problem for morality, but not other systems of thought that not everyone agrees on such as health (what is the exact definition of "health"?), and science (what, precisely, constitutes the "scientific method"?)? In both "health" and "science", we humans have "arbitrarily" assigned objectives to these fields. We've bridged the is/ought gap (in a sense) by describing these fields in goal-directive terms and choosing what those goals are (i.e. we've defined these terms). Why can't we do the same for "morality"? Nobody has been able to answer this question.
His argument is basically that "the worst possible misery for everyone" is as close to being objectively bad as anything can be. If you don't think TWPMFE is bad, he doesn't know what you're talking about, and he doesn't think you know what you're talking about either. If TWPMFE isn't bad, then the word "bad" is meaningless.If that is all, then it is absolutely trivial. It is just utilitarianism. As I already said, utilitarianism is grosso modo ok, but there are many problems in the details, and these details are definitely not all questions of science.
I wonder why Harris is treated so differently.Because he does as if he did find out something great new stuff, and loves to present them in the spotlight?
First of all, Harris repeatedly acknowledges that we may not, in practice, be able to uncover all of these truths. In other words, Harris has readily conceded the point that John Schook is using as an argument against his position. ... Harris' argument is not that we will, in practice, be able to uncover all of these truths.May I ask what kind of truths we are talking about? That it is unhealthy to eat too much fat? Or that animals do not play a part in our moral considerations about 'the greatest good for the maximum of sentient beings'?
I wonder what method Shook suggests we use to solve moral dilemmas if not the "scientific" one? Guessing? Consulting a psychic? Astrology?I cannot answer that for Shook. But a permanent rational dialogue between moral subjects might do. Do you really think that moral dilemmas always can be 'solved', and that this solution is true, whatever people feel or think about it?
So why is "is/ought" a problem for morality, but not other systems of thought that not everyone agrees on such as health (what is the exact definition of "health"?), and science (what, precisely, constitutes the "scientific method"?)? In both "health" and "science", we humans have "arbitrarily" assigned objectives to these fields. We've bridged the is/ought gap (in a sense) by describing these fields in goal-directive terms and choosing what those goals are (i.e. we've defined these terms). Why can't we do the same for "morality"?The answer is simple: because everybody agrees on it. 'TWPMFE' just isn't precise enough, and never will. As said, it is great as a first start, but soon after the start it will waver out in all of different kinds of values. Animals anyone?
There are certainly facts about certain situations being better than others in terms of moving away from TWPMFE. That being said, there are other situations (like your example) where it is difficult to say that one is factually better than the other.But is it just difficult to say or is there no fact of the matter?
We seem to be hitting often on the problem of “perfect is the enemy of good”. Applied to morality: Science can’t answer all moral dilemmas, so science shouldn’t be applied to morality at all. Or: Not everyone will agree on all moral rules, so we shouldn’t try to get anyone to agree on any of them.
Harris makes much more lengthy and eloquent arguments against this fallacious thinking.
Gdb still thinks he has an argument against applying moral treatment to animals although I don’t remember him actually making on.
We seem to be hitting often on the problem of "perfect is the enemy of good". Applied to morality: Science can't answer all moral dilemmas, so science shouldn't be applied to morality at all. Or: Not everyone will agree on all moral rules, so we shouldn't try to get anyone to agree on any of them.I never said something like that. I just say that science cannot answer which values we should take: it can only answer what means we have to reach goals we already have defined. Harris is just a utilitarian, or he is wrong.
Gdb still thinks he has an argument against applying moral treatment to animals although I don't remember him actually making on.Right, I never gave an argument. I use it as example that ‘TWPMFE’ cannot answer the question if we should include animals in our considerations, not even with help of science. Including animals or not is a value question, not a scientific one.
We seem to be hitting often on the problem of "perfect is the enemy of good". Applied to morality: Science can't answer all moral dilemmas, so science shouldn't be applied to morality at all. Or: Not everyone will agree on all moral rules, so we shouldn't try to get anyone to agree on any of them.I never said something like that. I just say that science cannot answer which values we should take: it can only answer what means we have to reach goals we already have defined. Harris is just a utilitarian, or he is wrong. I think he says that. If Harris is a utilitarian, then everything we do is utilitarian and words have no meaning. This is essentially the argument against acting morally, nothing matters so do what feels good.
Gdb still thinks he has an argument against applying moral treatment to animals although I don't remember him actually making on.Right, I never gave an argument. I use it as example that ‘TWPMFE’ cannot answer the question if we should include animals in our considerations, not even with help of science. Including animals or not is a value question, not a scientific one. Value question sure, but you arbitrarily define a value question to be separate from science. Philosophy that is not informed by science is pseudo-philosophy. It's the type of thing philosophers did a thousand years ago. They had no concept of where humans came from or how their actions affected the environment on a global scale. We know it now, but people don't want to know that their iPhone is made in slave like factories, so we make up lies about Chinese culture and how it's okay. Same thing for how we treat chickens. Factory farming developed by doing it in secret. As more people find out where their food comes from, the laws are changing. We are constantly applying science to morals.
... There is no way you can get to an 'ought' with an 'is', without at least putting one 'ought' already in it somewhere.I have a sense that if I could understand this one sentence, I would have a clue as to what you guys are talking about.
... There is no way you can get to an 'ought' with an 'is', without at least putting one 'ought' already in it somewhere.I have a sense that if I could understand this one sentence, I would have a clue as to what you guys are talking about. :lol: And I was thinking I want some of what Bug has in that pipe. Interesting conversation though.
If Harris is a utilitarian, then everything we do is utilitarian and words have no meaning.So how does Harris differ from utilitarianism?
This is essentially the argument against acting morally, nothing matters so do what feels good.:question: Last time I looked utilitarianism is an ethical theory. It is about maximising the good for the maximum of people (personally I like to add 'on the long term' to it). That has nothing to do with 'nothing matters so do what feels good'.
Value question sure, but you arbitrarily define a value question to be separate from science. Philosophy that is not informed by science is pseudo-philosophy. It's the type of thing philosophers did a thousand years ago. They had no concept of where humans came from or how their actions affected the environment on a global scale. We know it now, but people don't want to know that their iPhone is made in slave like factories, so we make up lies about Chinese culture and how it's okay. Same thing for how we treat chickens. Factory farming developed by doing it in secret. As more people find out where their food comes from, the laws are changing. We are constantly applying science to morals.:question: You say that values can be discovered by science??? Science is necessary, in many cases, to know how to act in order to reach our goals. But it does not set the goals. Science can even help to discover what makes us happy. But the goal of 'being happy' is something we set, before science. Even the goal of science itself is not scientific. The values behind science are our goals to understand, and to improve technology. There are people that do not share these goals. Can you prove them wrong, scientifically? The rest of your pseudo-philosophy argument has nothing to do with what I am saying. You read something between my lines that isn't there. And again: does science tell us, if we should include animals in ‘TWPMFE’? Should we care about the suffering of animals?
... There is no way you can get to an 'ought' with an 'is', without at least putting one 'ought' already in it somewhere.I have a sense that if I could understand this one sentence, I would have a clue as to what you guys are talking about. It just means you cannot derive a value from facts only.
... There is no way you can get to an 'ought' with an 'is', without at least putting one 'ought' already in it somewhere.I have a sense that if I could understand this one sentence, I would have a clue as to what you guys are talking about. It just means you cannot derive a value from facts only. I'm just wondering if we can bridge the gap sometimes. So the first fact we have is there would be no right or wrong if we weren't sentient beings capable of happiness and suffering. So we can at least deductively get to the fact that morality is about avoiding suffering can't we? Might we also get to the fact that "everyone" should mean all sentient beings?
To Gdb:
I didn’t provide much detail, but I didn’t say that utilitarianism is an argument against morality. What I meant was your argument against the possibility of a scientific theory or morality and you are doing it by breaking down the definition of words too much.
First, what Harris says is not “just utilitarian", he does talk about the means we have to reach goals once we define them, it’s utilitarian-plus. He also defines those goals based on valid reasoning, that’s the key factor. That separates him from the way you are presenting the is/ought problem. It’s a problem if you are looking at the mere fact we exist and have moral thoughts and assuming that means we ought to. Science has shown us that those moral thoughts are related to survival. So now you need to argue against survival. Why would you want to do that? To survive, we need to cooperate, care for each other and lots of other good things, that’s what I mean by “moral".
I didn’t say values can be “discovered", I said they can be evaluated as helpful or not. Science setting goals is some kind of misdirection by you. I don’t know what the “goal of science" is, I thought it was just to learn things, without necessarily sorting out why. It’s not a goal, it’s a method. Improving technology is a political goal. And yes, I can scientifically prove that pursuing some technologies is wrong. Oil, nuclear bombs, eugenics, pick one.
I didn’t read between your lines, you are trying to make the is/ought a problem in a way that it is not.
I already answered about the animals, if you take the time to think about how we need them and how they fit into our goal of surviving. Once you do that, why would we want to treat them poorly? We also know that abusing a animals leads to psychological problems. What reasons do you have for not treating them well?
His argument is basically that "the worst possible misery for everyone" is as close to being objectively bad as anything can be. If you don't think TWPMFE is bad, he doesn't know what you're talking about, and he doesn't think you know what you're talking about either. If TWPMFE isn't bad, then the word "bad" is meaningless.If that is all, then it is absolutely trivial. It is just utilitarianism. As I already said, utilitarianism is grosso modo ok, but there are many problems in the details, and these details are definitely not all questions of science. I'm sorry you feel that Harris' books are trivial because they don't exactly break new ground. I assume you would say the same for Peter Singer's Practical Ethics, or Dennett's Breaking the Spell? Again, Harris' argument is simply that science (i.e. rational inquiry) is the best chance we have of finding moral answers in a consequentialist framework. Which ethical questions do you think would be better handled by something other than rational inquiry? What other useful forms of inquiry are there?
I wonder why Harris is treated so differently.Because he does as if he did find out something great new stuff, and loves to present them in the spotlight? You mean he publishes books and then talks about them? Like Dennett? Actually, I think Harris has added some useful (and novel) tools to discussions of ethics: -The idea that ethical outcomes can be graphed on a three-dimensional "landscapes", with multiple peaks and valleys for various moral questions. -The "worst possible misery for everyone" thought experiment. It sounds like such an obvious starting point for consequentialism, but I don't know where else it has been specifically used. -Using "health" as an analogy for "morality" in arguing for ethical objectivity. I have yet to hear a good argument against this analogy.
First of all, Harris repeatedly acknowledges that we may not, in practice, be able to uncover all of these truths. In other words, Harris has readily conceded the point that John Schook is using as an argument against his position. ... Harris' argument is not that we will, in practice, be able to uncover all of these truths.May I ask what kind of truths we are talking about? That it is unhealthy to eat too much fat? Or that animals do not play a part in our moral considerations about 'the greatest good for the maximum of sentient beings'? We're talking about the truth that there are ways that are factually better than others in moving us away from TWPMFE. The fact that there may be some meta-factual moral quandaries along the way doesn't make this any less important (there are meta-factual issues in the concept of health as well, but nobody denies that medicine is scientific).
I wonder what method Shook suggests we use to solve moral dilemmas if not the "scientific" one? Guessing? Consulting a psychic? Astrology?I cannot answer that for Shook. But a permanent rational dialogue between moral subjects might do. Do you really think that moral dilemmas always can be 'solved', and that this solution is true, whatever people feel or think about it? It's irrelevant whether they can always be solved. Just like it's irrelevant whether questions of health can always be "solved" (e.g. Is it "healthier" to live six more months as a paraplegic or only three more months but with barely functional legs?) to the question of whether medicine is a science or not (it is). In light of this, why can't there be a science of morality? And isn't "rational dialogue" one of the cornerstones of the scientific method?
So why is "is/ought" a problem for morality, but not other systems of thought that not everyone agrees on such as health (what is the exact definition of "health"?), and science (what, precisely, constitutes the "scientific method"?)? In both "health" and "science", we humans have "arbitrarily" assigned objectives to these fields. We've bridged the is/ought gap (in a sense) by describing these fields in goal-directive terms and choosing what those goals are (i.e. we've defined these terms). Why can't we do the same for "morality"?The answer is simple: because everybody agrees on it. 'TWPMFE' just isn't precise enough, and never will. As said, it is great as a first start, but soon after the start it will waver out in all of different kinds of values. Animals anyone? Everybody agrees on the precise meaning of "health" and what exactly the methods of science are? That's not even close to being true. As far as TWPMFE not being precise enough, it doesn't matter. As long as it is factually true that some actions are objectively better than others at moving us away from TWPMFE (such as beheading homosexuals vs. feeding the homeless), then rational inquiry is the best tool we have to find what those actions are. What's the alternative?
Which ethical questions do you think would be better handled by something other than rational inquiry? What other useful forms of inquiry are there?So you think rational inquiry is the same as scientific inquiry? Wow. I think every discourse in which people are looking for grounds for their positions is rational: if it is about facts, values, or beauty. You may think Harris has great points, but I will only start reading him on this subject if somebody can really show me there is something new. Until now I did not see anything.
We're talking about the truth that there are ways that are factually better than others in moving us away from TWPMFE.That is nothing new. That is just utilitarianism.
It's irrelevant whether they can always be solved. Just like it's irrelevant whether questions of health can always be "solved" (e.g. Is it "healthier" to live six more months as a paraplegic or only three more months but with barely functional legs?) to the question of whether medicine is a science or not (it is). In light of this, why can't there be a science of morality?There can be a science of morality, but it would be a branch of psychology, sociology or cultural anthropology. It would show what happens when people are making moral considerations, how their moral thinking works. What it would not show if the values we observe are 'really' morally good. It would describe what moral capable objects do; it does not show what we as moral subjects should do.
And isn't "rational dialogue" one of the cornerstones of the scientific method?Yes, it is. But not every rational dialogue is a scientific dialogue. See above.
Everybody agrees on the precise meaning of "health" and what exactly the methods of science are? That's not even close to being true.Well, then it is even worse. Don't you see that?
As far as TWPMFE not being precise enough, it doesn't matter. As long as it is factually true that some actions are objectively better than others at moving us away from TWPMFE (such as beheading homosexuals vs. feeding the homeless), then rational inquiry is the best tool we have to find what those actions are. What's the alternative?I fully agree that many moral situations are morally unproblematic, using TWPMFE. And I agree that we should approach the more difficult situations with rationality. But science is not the only area in which we can be rational (again, see above). PS Wikipedia]:
Rationality is the quality or state of being reasonable, based on facts or reason. Rationality implies the conformity of one's beliefs with one's reasons to believe, or of one's actions with one's reasons for action.
First, what Harris says is not “just utilitarian", he does talk about the means we have to reach goals once we define them, it’s utilitarian-plus.So it is utilitarianism in action. Nothing new again.
He also defines those goals based on valid reasoning, that’s the key factor.That is a key factor??? Any ethical theory claims to be based on valid reasoning. Sorry, I do not get it.
That separates him from the way you are presenting the is/ought problem.That show he starts his reasonable inquiry with some some values that seem reasonable to most people.
Science has shown us that those moral thoughts are related to survival. So now you need to argue against survival. Why would you want to do that? To survive, we need to cooperate, care for each other and lots of other good things, that’s what I mean by “moral".Where I agree with your moral stance, I do not agree that 'we ought to do everything to survive' is a fact. It is a value. This kind of argumentation is called the naturalistic fallacy. One can also use this argumentation model to defend eugenics.
I didn’t say values can be “discovered", I said they can be evaluated as helpful or not.Helpful for what? If they are helpful, i.e. means for something else, aren't they then mere reasonable actions to reach a goal? Or maybe 'sub-goals' for the greater goal? But again: we stated then with a value.
I already answered about the animals, if you take the time to think about how we need them and how they fit into our goal of surviving. Once you do that, why would we want to treat them poorly? We also know that abusing a animals leads to psychological problems. What reasons do you have for not treating them well?Yeah, you really read me wrong: I never stated anything about how we should treat animals. I only said that science cannot answer the question if we should take animals' survival and suffering into account in our moral considerations. Still we can give reasons why we should do it or not. Some of them might be scientific, some others not. A great example I found an argument given by Norwegian whale hunters: they said that the arguments of those who want to protect the whales are purely emotional, but for them it was their livelihood (their economic survival if you want). The whale protectors therefore are irrational. Are the whale hunters right?