Prof Hoffman Playing Basketball in Zero Gravity

I listened to the talk this morning - and I have watched a some others by him, though in honesty I’ve started more than I’ve finished.

I spent too much time on some other posts, so it’s a good excuse for me to start this, nice’n slow and 'n easy, like the song. ?

 

May I ask you, why (or how) do you think Tegmark would fit into the story line I’m trying to explicate?

 

 

May I ask you, why (or how) do you think Tegmark would fit into the story line I’m trying to explicate?
It seemed to me as fitting in with your analysis of current science. You cite Tononi as one of the cutting edge scientists working on the question of "integrated information theory" and what allows our brain to experience consciousness of the data being processed.
(4.06) Physical Origins of Mind: Dr. Siegel, Allen Institute Brain Science, Tononi, Koch.
As you will have noticed , Tegmark also mentions Tononi's work as supporting his own proposition of "inherently intelligent patterns".i.e. the patterns in which the data is being processed allows the brain to experience consciousness of the data being processed.

And Tegmark’s concept of the conscious patterns acquiring an independence from the physical substrate, seems to me as one of the possible consequences of your argument.

From my perspective this would fit nicely within the framework you have outlined… :wink:

Tru dat. They’ve done some amazing work NeuralCorrelates of Consciousness (NCC), but it doesn’t seems to help with getting closer to the foundations of consciousness, it’s more about the mechanical of neural networks.

Here's an update: www. nature. com/articles/nrn.2016.22

Published: 20 April 2016
Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems
Christof Koch, Marcello Massimini, Melanie Boly & Giulio Tononi

Key Points
The neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC) are the minimum neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one specific conscious experience. It is important to distinguish full NCC (the neural substrate supporting experience in general, irrespective of its specific content), content-specific NCC (the neural substrate supporting a particular content of experience — for example, faces, whether seen, dreamt or imagined) and background conditions (factors that enable consciousness, but do not contribute directly to the content of experience — for example, arousal systems that ensure adequate excitability of the NCC).

The no-report paradigm allows the NCC to be distinguished from events or processes — such as selective attention, memory and response preparation — that are associated with, precede or follow conscious experience. In such paradigms, trials with explicit reports are included along with trials without explicit reports, during which indirect physiological measures are used to infer what the participant is perceiving.
The best candidates for full and content-specific NCC are located in the posterior cerebral cortex, in a temporo-parietal-occipital hot zone. The content-specific NCC may be any particular subset of neurons within this hot zone that supports specific phenomenological distinctions, such as faces.

The two most widely used electrophysiological signatures of consciousness — gamma range oscillations and the P3b event-related potential — can be dissociated from conscious experiences and are more closely correlated with selective attention and novelty, respectively.
New electroencephalography- or functional MRI-based variables that measure the extent to which neuronal activity is both differentiated and integrated across the cortical sheet allow the NCC to be identified more precisely. Moreover, a combined transcranial magnetic stimulation–electroencephalography procedure can predict the presence or absence of consciousness in healthy people who are awake, deeply sleeping or under different types of anaesthesia, and in patients with disorders of consciousness, at the single-person level.

Extending the NCC derived from studies in people who can speak about the presence and quality of consciousness to patients with severe brain injuries, fetuses and newborn infants, non-mammalian species and intelligent machines is more challenging. For these purposes, it is essential to combine experimental studies to identify the NCC with a theoretical approach that characterizes in a principled manner what consciousness is and what is required of its physical substrate.


I admit most of that I only vaguely understand. The impression I’ve gotten, beyond the problems discussed above, is that NCC is more about mapping, accounting, understanding functionality. Important stuff that offers promise in specific applications.

But the initial excitement about unlocking secrets of consciousness have fading, because it’s increasingly appreciated that consciousness is actually more fundamental and deeper in the brainstem, and also diffused throughout the body, and even that we need to take into account the outside world creating the input on the consciousness. Plus of course, a deep appreciation for the evolutionary perspective that Mark Solms and Antonio Damasio have done a wonderful job of explicating.

 

 

As for Tegmark, another physicist/philosopher that ignores evolution and misses its significance to understanding consciousness.

For me, he’s an example of being too in love with his own genius and getting lost within his own mindscape.

For what it’s worth, I commented on some specifics over at that video.