Just about everyone has had some experience with rain. Among those who have, they do not require a meteorologist to tell them it is raining, if they can just look out the window. Similarly, someone who is familiar with the basics of Islam and its various incarnations of Muslim sects and their various doctrinal interpretations and propensities to follow or submit to those particular dogmas, should not need an "expert" to tell them there is a serious problem for mankind, posed by certain interpretations of Islam....Which is all Harris is saying. I swear he is the most misinterpreted intellectual of all time--at least by those who should otherwise be on his ideological side. Like Harris has said, if he was criticizing the doctrine of communism, would anyone call him a bigot? Why are religions considered special kinds of ideologies that shan't be criticized like any other? Has anyone called him a bigot for his criticisms of any other religions? All he's saying is that Islam poses a greater threat to civilization than any other religion today. He's never said that all Muslims are bad or that American Muslims should be discriminated against (although he does believe in racial profiling in certain situations, which I think I actually agree with, though reluctantly). And he absolutely never suggested that we should preemptively nuke the Middle East, or that people should be killed for their thoughts, or that torture is good (he simply pointed out that it's no worse than collateral damage) as he is routinely accused of by other liberals and atheists who really should work on their reading comprehension... Bug, I recognized you as a good thinker, early on. (Better than me, in this respect: You go out of your way to attend to what our current crop of "great minds" have to say on topics, then you critically analyze it. Whereas I, only do a critical analysis of what they say if I happen to come across it.) One other criticism that I have of Islam, whether, any "great minds" agree, or not, is that among today's predominant and powerful religions, Islamic theology is unique in it's amenability to be interpreted in ways that can promote followers to commit actual physical violence on others, but also, (and this is perhaps the greater threat), promote the abuse of various human rights. Muhammed was an extraordinarily effective military leader. For his time, he was also central to the construction of an extraordinarily successful new social order, a new form of government, with the Quran as its extraordinary manifesto. Unfortunately, in today's world, it is still an easy overlay wherever there is a breakdown of social order, or even the breakdown, for an individual, of trust in their particular society. (BTW, a little bit of thread drift is commonly accepted.)
.... The vast majority of people who hear about compatibilist philosophers' support for Free Will aren't going to read any of their books, they're simply going to think that many (most?) philosophers now support the dualist, logically incoherent type of Free Will that they believe in. And frankly, I think Dennett knows this, as evidenced by the fact that he has a huge ulterior motive--he thinks that if people don't believe in Free Will, they will act less morally. Watch any of his lectures about Free Will on Youtube and you might notice that he spends nearly half his time talking about the dangers of people not believing in Free Will...As you may have surmised, I am not particularly interested in the cat-fights of renowned "experts", (which I expect may be less motivated by intellectual integrity than by keeping themselves in the public light, thus increasing book sales and public speaking engagement profits). But the thought you referenced above, is intriguing to me. I wonder... If the masses suddenly became rational and recognized that dualistic interpretations of free will are nonsense, would society crumble? (I'm asking. I don't have a ready answer.)
BugRib,
I think I reacted already on these kind of points for months. Please look them up here].
Oh, btw, did you read the article that started this thread? I really would like to know what you think of it.
Hello GdB…
BugRib, I think I reacted already on these kind of points for months. Please look them up here]. Oh, btw, did you read the article that started this thread? I really would like to know what you think of it.I did read it and found it unimpressive for the same reason I find compatibilism unimpressive and intellectually dishonest (desperate?). I'll take on all of the points made in the article below: >>>¶4 ... central problem: these scientists are employing a flawed notion of free will.<<< Is he talking about the notion held by the vast majority of the population, and the vast majority of philosophers and theologians historically? In other words, THE definition? >>>¶5 When Haggard concludes that we do not have free will “in the sense we think," he reveals how this conclusion depends on a particular definition of free will. Scientists’ arguments that free will is an illusion typically begin by assuming that free will, by definition, requires an immaterial soul or non-physical mind, and they take neuroscience to provide evidence that our minds are physical. ...<<< By "particular definition", does he mean..? Well, see above... >>>¶6 We should be wary of defining things out of existence. Define Earth as the planet at the center of the universe and it turns out there is no Earth. ...<<< This is an astonishingly poor analogy. I'm not even sure it qualifies as an analogy at all. If the entire definition of the word "Earth" was "planet at the center of the universe", then it would indeed be an incoherent concept that should be abandoned. However, the word "Earth" primarily has always meant "the world where humans live". Whether it's flat or round, whether it circles the sun or the sun circles it, whether it's at the center of the universe or somewhere off to the left, these are all factual details about "the world where humans live" that can and should be revised whenever knew data comes in. Free Will, on the other hand, has pretty much meant one thing to pretty much all people, philosophers, and theologians throughout history: the special ability of humans--whether because of souls or some special property of the brain--to act in a way that is neither determinied nor random--an intuitively powerful but completely nebulous idea. So what the compatibilists are doing is not updating the concept to be consistent with new facts we've learned about it (like learning that the sun does not orbit the Earth), but simply redefining it so that they can claim that it actually exists. That's the very definition of either poor thinking or intellectual dishonesty. >>>¶7 The sciences of the mind do give us good reasons to think that our minds are made of matter. But to conclude that consciousness or free will is thereby an illusion is too quick. It is like inferring from discoveries in organic chemistry that life is an illusion just because living organisms are made up of non-living stuff. ...<<< Sheesh! Another example of an absurd analogy. First off, it is people like Dennett who claim that consciousness is an illusion, not neuroscientists like Harris. The analogy used is actually a good one for discrediting Dennett's claims about consciousness and the self being illusions (although I especially like yours about the magician and his imaginary audience). But it has absolutely nothing to do with Free Will because Free Will (as the vast majority of the population defines it) is simply logically incoherent; organic chemistry and it's ability to produce life, minds, and consciousness is not. >>>¶8 Our brains are the most complexly organized things in the known universe, just the sort of thing that could eventually make sense of why each of us is unique, why we are conscious creatures and why humans have abilities to comprehend, converse, and create that go well beyond the precursors of these abilities in other animals. ...<<< Irrelevant. >>>¶9 ... understand free will as a set of capacities for imagining future courses of action, deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them, planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation and controlling actions in the face of competing desires. ...<<< In other words, let's redefine Free Will as free will, as in "acted of her own free will"--a special use of the term that has a quite different meaning than the deep philosophical concept of Free Will. I think I'll start calling the compatibilists the redefiners. >>>¶10 These capacities for conscious deliberation, rational thinking and self-control are not magical abilities. They need not belong to immaterial souls outside the realm of scientific understanding ...<<< Irrelevant. >>>¶15 However, the existing evidence does not support the conclusion that free will is an illusion. First of all, it does not show that a decision has been made before people are aware of having made it. It simply finds discernible patterns of neural activity that precede decisions. If we assume that conscious decisions have neural correlates, then we should expect to find early signs of those correlates “ramping up" to the moment of consciousness. ...<<< Irrelevant. The findings of neuroscience are not main reason we should abandon the concept of Free Will. We should abandon it because it is logically incoherent. >>>¶16 This is what we should expect with simple decisions. Indeed, we are lucky that conscious thinking plays little or no role in quick or habitual decisions and actions. ...<<< "conscious thinking plays little or no role in quick or habitual decisions and actions." And this he calls Free Will?!!! Also, irrelevant. >>>¶17 ... We should not begin by assuming that free will requires a conscious self that exists beyond the brain (where?), and then conclude that any evidence that shows brain processes precede action thereby demonstrates that consciousness is bypassed. Rather, we should consider the role of consciousness in action on the assumption that our conscious deliberation and rational thinking are carried out by complex brain processes, and then ...<<< Irrelevant. >>>¶19 ... It would mean that whatever processes in the brain are involved in conscious deliberation and self-control — and the substantial energy these processes use — were as useless as our appendix, that they evolved only to observe what we do after the fact, rather than to improve our decision-making and behavior.<<< Irrelevant. >>>¶21 If we put aside the misleading idea that free will depends on supernatural souls rather than our quite miraculous brains, and if we put aside the mistaken idea that our conscious thinking matters most in the milliseconds before movement, then neuroscience does not kill free will. Rather, it can help to explain our capacities to control our actions in such a way that we are responsible for them. It can help us rediscover free will.<<< In other words, if we simply put aside the definition of Free Will that has always been and then just redefine it, that somehow means Free Will actually does exist. Hurray! I guess I could use the same argument to say unicorns exist: If we just put aside the notion that unicorns are magical horses with horns, and redefine them as simply being horses, hey, now unicorns do exist! Hurray for little girls everywhere! Thank goodness for unicorn compatibilists! (And that's actually an appropriate analogy, unlike those used by Eddy Nahmias.) Sadly, Dennett makes many of the same mistakes and uses similarly poor analogies in his criticism of Harris' Free Will. He also make several bewildering factual errors in his criticism of Harris, for instance calling him a hard determinist (a person with average reading comprehension skills who has read Free Will would know he is not since he talks at length about quantum indeterminacy), and he conflates Harris' soft determinism with fatalism, which is such a rookie mistake that I'm bewildered Dennett would make it. Like I said before, Dennett's criticism of Harris comes across like a fragile ego recklessly lashing out. Well, I have to end this post at some point, so how about right now?
Well, I have to end this post at some point, so how about right now?Not yet! You have not reacted on my points here]. But let me give just another simple example about redefining: People have thought that that what makes us human is the soul. Now we know we haven't one. Hurray, humans do not exist! Or should we redefine humans in a way that is as close to the original idea, but in correspondence with science?
Well, I have to end this post at some point, so how about right now?Not yet! You have not reacted on my points here]. But let me give just another simple example about redefining: People have thought that that what makes us human is the soul. Now we know we haven't one. Hurray, humans do not exist! Or should we redefine humans in a way that is as close to the original idea, but in correspondence with science? Again, a terrible analogy. The word "human" has never been simply defined as having a soul. A soul is something it is believed by many that humans have, but that is not the soul definition of "human". (Pun intended) So, arguing that human don't have souls is not arguing the concept of "human" out of existence. Just like arguing that the Earth is not the center of the universe is not arguing the concept of "the Earth" out of existence (Eddy Nahmias' similarly misguided "analogy"). Contrarily, the traditional definition of Free Will (and, again, the definition historically held by pretty much all philosophers and theologians, and still held today by the vast, vast, majority of the population) is simply not compatible with the relatively recent compatibilist redefinition. It's a straight up redefinition, not a revision based on new data. One of the problems that I have with the compatibilist definition of Free Will is that it is so very banal. We generally act in accordance with our will (i.e. our bodies do what our brains tell them to)? That's their deep philosophical definition of Free Will? That's it? That's what Dennett and others have written 500 page books about? Really? As for not responding to your previous points, I'll check them out. I'm kind of mood-swingy so I often lose the will to continue a discussion, while other times I'm typing a million words a minute. Mood disorders, aren't they wonderful?
Re the title of this thread: what has never existed cannot die. What might die is the belief that we have free will, but probably not. People will believe anything that makes them feel better, reality–or even probability–be damned. And consequences.
Lois
Again, a terrible analogy. The word "human" has never been simply defined as having a soul.Really? What is the difference between an animal and a human? How many people have answered this (or are still answering this) with "humans have a soul, animals don't".
Contrarily, the traditional definition of Free Will (and, again, the definition historically held by pretty much all philosophers and theologians, and still held today by the vast, vast, majority of the population) is simply not compatible with the relatively recent compatibilist redefinition. It's a straight up redefinition, not a revision based on new data.Well, the concept of libertarian free will is incoherent, and is more or less logically connected to the idea of a soul. Today we are convinced that the soul does not exist. We did not need neurologists for that. So doesn't that mean that it is time to give a coherent concept of free will, that on on side is in correspondence with science and on the other side with our daily praxis of praising, blaming, punishing and responsibility? Compatibilist free will is exactly that.
One of the problems that I have with the compatibilist definition of Free Will is that it is so very banal. We generally act in accordance with our will (i.e. our bodies do what our brains tell them to)? That's their deep philosophical definition of Free Will? That's it? That's what Dennett and others have written 500 page books about? Really?First: the compatibilist stance is not that 'our bodies do what our brains tell them to'. The compatibilist stance is that our actions correspond to our own wishes and believes, in contrast of being against my own wishes and believes but according to the wishes or beliefs of somebody else. And, second, the reason why such books are so thick is that there are so many prejudices against this position that it needs many pages to refute them all. And some illusions are so strong, that it takes many tough arguments to awaken from our 'sweet dreams'. Especially the illusion that I am not part of the causal network is very strong. To show that we are part of it, and can still be free takes a lot of work. Here is my 'slogan version' of the free will debate: Compatibilist free will means 'to be able to do what you want'. Libertarian free will means 'to be able to want what you want'. Which one is absurd: CFW or LFW?
As for not responding to your previous points, I'll check them out. I'm kind of mood-swingy so I often lose the will to continue a discussion, while other times I'm typing a million words a minute. Mood disorders, aren't they wonderful?That's ok. But I really hope you will find time for it, I think it is important for our discussion.
Again, a terrible analogy. The word "human" has never been simply defined as having a soul.Really? What is the difference between an animal and a human? How many people have answered this (or are still answering this) with "humans have a soul, animals don't". There are many, many, many differences between human and non-human animals. The fact that some people would say the difference is souls is interesting, but a definition is not the same thing as a differential description I think you're confusing descriptions and definitions. Having a soul has never been the whole definition of "human", nor is it integral to most definitions. In fact, the origin of the word human derives from the Latin "homo", which simply means "same" or "similar", as in "same as us". Look up the definition of the noun "human" in any dictionary, and the soul will probably not be mentioned, or, if it is, it will be mentioned as part of one of several definitions. Now, to see the contrast between one part of a description and an actual definition, look up "free will" in its noun form and you're likely to get two short one sentence definitions. From my Merriam Webster Dictionary: 1: voluntary choice or decision "I do this of my own free will." All of the workers at the homeless shelter are unpaid and are there of their own free will. 2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention He argues that all humans have free will. See the difference? "Has a soul" is not the or even a definition of "human", it's part of a description. Whereas, the sentences above are actual definitions of "free will". Also, notice that the first definition is basically akin to compatibilist free will (henceforth CFW), but the examples given are the special conversational cases of "I do this of my own free will" and "All of the workers at the homeless shelter are unpaid and there of their own free will" ("of___own free will" being the only grammatical situation in which "free will" is stripped of its deeper meaning), whereas the second is actually talking about the deep philosophical concept of Free Will as evidenced by its example sentence "He argues that all humans have free will". In other words, example 1 is the conversational (I would say banal) form and example 2 is the philosophical form. Granted, there are many dictionaries where the distinction is not so clear. For instance, my Microsoft Encarta College Dictionary merges ALL the definitions into one(!): the ability to act or make choices as a free and autonomous being and not solely as a result of compulsion or predestination Which is oddly clever, but not in line with actual mainstream usage (which is what a non-technical dictionary is supposed to reflect) since "she acted of her own free will" is a valid saying whether one believes in predestination or not. In any case, I'll take the Merriam Webster over the Microsoft Encarta or any online dictionary any day. Continued in my next post.
One of the substantialndifferences between humans and non human animals is, that as far as we know, non human animals can’t ptetend they have free will of any kind. This can be seen as an adventage.
The soul claim is irrational. There is no way to show evidence of a soul. You might as well drop that myth completely if you wish to be seen as rational.
Lois
Note: I was just unable to post a response. I was not trying to import any reference site - or anything. It was just a simple post. But try as I might it was rejected as possible spam.
I’ll try submitting just one point instead of two.
GdB, I submit that someone can not only want to want something other than what they currently want, but can even, take steps toward, and sometimes, successfully, come to want what they wanted to want. (I won’t get into examples, unless someone asks.)
However, since the 1st want is a product of factors that go well beyond the individual, having achieved wanting the 2nd want, would still not be a support of LFW, would it?
Look, I completely get what you're saying and what the compatibilists are saying. There's no lack of comprehension on my part. I just disagree for the reasons I have articulated before. Compatibilists, IMHO, are equivocating when they conflate free will with Free Will. Yes, of course they know the difference, but I think they also know that the vast majority of the population isn't going to realize what they've done. Heck, when I first heard about CFW, I thought they believed that somehow Free Will in the deep philosophical sense could somehow coexist with determinism (mixed with a bit of quantum randomness). I thought they would make some kind of esoteric argument of how this could be based on the 500 page tracts of people like Dennett. When I learned that they were just substituting Free Will with free will, it felt to me like a bit of a swindle. The problem is, the vast majority of people who intuitively believe in LFW aren't going to read any of the books about CFW and are simply going to assume that the compatiblists support their notions, determinism or not, souls or not. This is why I feel like CFW will is a dishonest, misguided project that only creates more confusion. I don't think there's a whole lot more to say about this. I respect your opinion, I just don't agree with it. Agree to disagree.Contrarily, the traditional definition of Free Will (and, again, the definition historically held by pretty much all philosophers and theologians, and still held today by the vast, vast, majority of the population) is simply not compatible with the relatively recent compatibilist redefinition. It's a straight up redefinition, not a revision based on new data.Well, the concept of libertarian free will is incoherent, and is more or less logically connected to the idea of a soul. Today we are convinced that the soul does not exist. We did not need neurologists for that. So doesn't that mean that it is time to give a coherent concept of free will, that on on side is in correspondence with science and on the other side with our daily praxis of praising, blaming, punishing and responsibility? Compatibilist free will is exactly that.
I'll try submitting just one point instead of two. GdB, I submit that someone can not only want to want something other than what they currently want, but can even, take steps toward, and sometimes, successfully, come to want what they wanted to want. (I won't get into examples, unless someone asks.) However, since the 1st want is a product of factors that go well beyond the individual, having achieved wanting the 2nd want, would still not be a support of LFW, would it?LFW would require that we can choose to choose to choose to want what we want what we want what we want, "turtles all the way down" to infinity. That's why it's logically incoherent I think. Neuroscience is just the icing on the cake. Sam Harris' book Free Will articulates this problem with LFW very well, and it has the added bonus of being concise, which is why GdB calls it a pamphlet. Personally, I think concision is a virtue. BTW, I was absolutely riveted with the first couple hundred pages of Dennett's Consciousness Explained, in which he concisely and clearly discussed various philosophical thought experiments and discoveries in neuroscience. It was the last two or three hundred pages that left me cold (and extremely bored) in which he made the same points over and over and over again in different ways and ultimately did not add anything new philosophically or scientifically to the discussion--and he certainly didn't explain consciousness, although he claimed that he had laid out a new, more productive path to studying it that no one else had ever thought of before (he didn't). His whole point was that consciousness does not all "come together" at a single, dimensionless point in the brain. Not much of a revelation there. Harris could have explained all that in twenty pages without neglecting one iota of essential information.
1: voluntary choice or decision "I do this of my own free will." All of the workers at the homeless shelter are unpaid and are there of their own free will. 2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention He argues that all humans have free will.Yeah, right. That's fine, I am fully aware of these meanings. But is it not interestingly, that the example for 2 is that of a philosophical discussion, and not of how the concept is used in daily life? So here we have a concept (2) about which neurologists, physicists, biologists and philosophers are quarrelling and rolling through the streets about who is right, in the meanwhile daily life is just going its way: children are punished for their stealing of a cookie, an artist is praised for the unexpected turn in his work, a criminal is convicted for robbery, and a totally confused schizophrenic is turned into a clinic. Then a neurologist stands up from the quarrelling and says 'Hey, you are all wrong, humans have no free will!' So you read his book, and discover that what he means is (2), but you see that in daily life we always using (1). And this is the basis for all our daily business. He even says so: he still wants to assign people responsibility, as you can read in his later chapters, just without the load of 'ultimate responsibility'. But stamping on the ground he keeps yelling in a shrieky voice: 'But we have no free will!'. Then an old man that looks like Santa Clause, stands up from the quarrelling, and says 'The people are right, we don't need this free will of yours, so we have to change nothing. It is all one big misunderstanding.' And then, with many 'uhs' and 'ahs', he describes in how many ways people, and especially philosophers and neurologists, have run astray on the concept of free will, and deconstructs all their fanciful and sometimes highly technical meanderings. Many people get bored. Others (mainly philosophers) still listen fascinated, and discover how deep some of the misconceptions are rooted in our thinking and feeling about life. The deeper understanding reveals that what some people called 'deep understanding of free will' was in fact a chimera. There was in fact all the time only a 'deepity'.
GdB, I submit that someone can not only want to want something other than what they currently want, but can even, take steps toward, and sometimes, successfully, come to want what they wanted to want. (I won't get into examples, unless someone asks.) However, since the 1st want is a product of factors that go well beyond the individual, having achieved wanting the 2nd want, would still not be a support of LFW, would it?Right. I would prefer to describe the situation a bit different. A person has several drives, and some might be inconsistent ('I want to stop smoking, but I want a cigarette now'). If somebody succeeds to stop, one motivation won over the other. But this motivation to stop is definitely just as determined as any other.
LFW would require that we can choose to choose to choose to want what we want what we want what we want, "turtles all the way down" to infinity. That's why it's logically incoherent I think. Neuroscience is just the icing on the cake.I see the problem that LFW just shifts free will to another metaphysical level (the soul) in which all the problems would just occur again: the soul must be somehow be influenced by what we observe, feel and think. On the other side, our bodies must be influenced by the soul, otherwise we would not be able to act out what we want. So LFW brings nothing.
Sam Harris' book Free Will articulates this problem with LFW very well, and it has the added bonus of being concise, which is why GdB calls it a pamphlet. Personally, I think concision is a virtue.Yes, if you formulate it in this way you are right. But his message is not that we have no LFW: he says we have no free will. Instead of just saying (as Dennett does): 'Hey, this idea of LFW is an illusion!', he claims that we have no free will at all. But at the same time he asserts that we have responsibility, just not ultimate responsibility. And that is exactly what compatibilists say. He is a compatibilist in disguise. But he just likes to yell 'We have no free will' for some ideological reasons. I think I understand your problems with 'Consciousness explained'. I see this book in the first place as a book written for fellow philosophers. He does at least two things: present his model of multiple drafts based on neurological, psychological and philosophical insights. Afterwards (the last two or three hundred pages?) he shows how his model dissolves all kinds of philosophical aporias that were brought against the position that a materialist, functionalist approach would not suffice.
His whole point was that consciousness does not all "come together" at a single, dimensionless point in the brain. Not much of a revelation there.Well, it is a bit more. The Cartesian theatre is not just a place, the actions also occur on definite times. So consciousness of something is also something spread in time, not just through the brain. The consequences of this are overseen by most people who think we have no free will because we are determined. They still think that some entity ('I', 'soul') is forced by the causal powers of the brain to think, feel and act as it does. However, without the illusion of the Cartesian theatre, one cannot even formulate the idea of having, or not having, LFW. There is nothing the concept of LFW can be applied on, not in the positive, but also not in the negative. To say we have no LFW is just as empty as we have LFW.
Sam Harris' book Free Will articulates this problem with LFW very well, and it has the added bonus of being concise, which is why GdB calls it a pamphlet. Personally, I think concision is a virtue.Yes, if you formulate it in this way you are right. But his message is not that we have no LFW: he says we have no free will. Instead of just saying (as Dennett does): 'Hey, this idea of LFW is an illusion!', he claims that we have no free will at all. But at the same time he asserts that we have responsibility, just not ultimate responsibility. And that is exactly what compatibilists say. He is a compatibilist in disguise. But he just likes to yell 'We have no free will' for some ideological reasons. That's just not true. He makes it very clear he's talking about LFW. But he argues that CFW is a misleading redefinition of what virtually every person without a philosophy degree calls "free will" (which it is), and so usually refers to LFW as just "free will". He denies that we have Free Will, but he doesn't deny that we can "act of our own free will"--two forms of the term which compatibilists are conflating, knowing that the general public won't realize they're doing it--a textbook equivocation fallacy IMHO. CFW could just as well stand for "conversational free will", while LFW could stand for "literally, free will". Yeah?
I think I understand your problems with 'Consciousness explained'. I see this book in the first place as a book written for fellow philosophers. He does at least two things: present his model of multiple drafts based on neurological, psychological and philosophical insights. Afterwards (the last two or three hundred pages?) he shows how his model dissolves all kinds of philosophical aporias that were brought against the position that a materialist, functionalist approach would not suffice.Admittedly, it could also be that I'm just not smart enough (or too ADD) to understand his point. However, I'm not aware of anyone in academia who has been impressed enough with his "new approach" to utilize it in the study of consciousness.
His whole point was that consciousness does not all "come together" at a single, dimensionless point in the brain. Not much of a revelation there.Well, it is a bit more. The Cartesian theatre is not just a place, the actions also occur on definite times. So consciousness of something is also something spread in time, not just through the brain. The consequences of this are overseen by most people who think we have no free will because we are determined. They still think that some entity ('I', 'soul') is forced by the causal powers of the brain to think, feel and act as it does. However, without the illusion of the Cartesian theatre, one cannot even formulate the idea of having, or not having, LFW. There is nothing the concept of LFW can be applied on, not in the positive, but also not in the negative. I got all of that from the book long before Dennett spent 200 pages repeating it over and over again. In fact, I think I got that from Harris' book by page twenty. And quite honestly, I think I understood that before I ever read any books about free will. I do think Dennett's coining of the term "Cartesian theatre" has been valuable in disabusing some otherwise brilliant scientists of their intuitions about consciousness. The Cartesian theatre is such a strong illusion that even atheists who don't believe in spirits or souls can get confused by it. I remember in one of my first college psychology classes, the professor was talking about how thoughts and moods change the state of the brain. I remember I raised my hand in amazement and asked, "You mean thoughts lead to actual physical changes in the brain?!!" What the hell else could I, a soulless atheist have thought? What other kinds of changes are there, ultimately, other than physical? Yet I was misled by the power of the Cartesian theatre delusion.
To say we have no LFW is just as empty as we have LFW.Kind of like wondering whether square circles exist or not. Except, they don't. Not in this universe, nor in any other. And neither does LFW (or what 99.9% of the population refers to as "free will"). But, yeah, saying something that is logically incoherent doesn't exist is kind of empty. Or at least redundant.
GdB, I wanted to mention that I just checked out your profile and noticed that one of your heroes is Susan Blackmore. I recently read her book Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction (an abridged version of her much longer textbook Consciousness: An Introduction) and found it a really fun, quick, clearly written read.
And I also wanted to mention that I actually do really like Daniel Dennett. He and I just mad at each other right now and aren’t talking. 
That's just not true. He makes it very clear he's talking about LFW. But he argues that CFW is a misleading redefinition of what virtually every person without a philosophy degree calls "free will" (which it is), and so usually refers to LFW as just "free will". He denies that we have Free Will, but he doesn't deny that we can "act of our own free will"--two forms of the term which compatibilists are conflating, knowing that the general public won't realize they're doing it--a textbook equivocation fallacy IMHO.Let's see what Harris says in his last chapter 'Moral Responsibility':
If we view people as neuronal weather patterns, how can we coherently speak about right and wrong or good and evil? These notions seem to depend upon people being able to freely choose how to think and act. And if we remain committed to seeing people as people, we must find some notion of personal responsibility that fits the facts. Happily, we can. (...) To say that I was responsible for my behavior is simply to say that what I did was sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to be considered an extension of them. (...) Judgments of responsibility depend upon the overall complexion of one’s mind, not on the metaphysics of mental cause and effect. (...) Why is the conscious decision to do another person harm particularly blameworthy? Because what we do subsequent to conscious planning tends to most fully reflect the global properties of our minds—our beliefs, desires, goals, prejudices, etc. If, after weeks of deliberation, library research, and debate with your friends, you still decide to kill the king—well, then killing the king reflects the sort of person you really are. The point is not that you are the ultimate and independent cause of your actions; the point is that, for whatever reason, you have the mind of a regicide.This fits exactly to the concept of CFW. Harris just refuses to call it so. The point to call it 'free will' is that it is just what Harris describes: it lies at the basis of our daily use of the concept of free will, which is the only meaning that makes sense. Maybe it helps to see at which exactly Harris' arrows are pointed: at those who believe in ultimate responsibility that is thought to be based on LFW. It is ultimate responsibility that leads to ultimate punishments, to harshness against people's fate etc. I share that worry. But you should not throw the baby with the bathwater away. CFW is what you call 'free will'.
CFW could just as well stand for "conversational free will", while LFW could stand for "literally, free will". Yeah?NO. How can you call an empty concept 'literally, free will'. It is also not 'deep Free Will'. It is a shallow, unreflected and empty concept. The work of CFW proposals is to show that this 'conversational free will' is all there is, and that it is enough to base our ideas about morality and responsibility on.
However, I'm not aware of anyone in academia who has been impressed enough with his "new approach" to utilize it in the study of consciousness.Then have a look at the philosophy department.
I got all of that from the book long before Dennett spent 200 pages repeating it over and over again. In fact, I think I got that from Harris' book by page twenty. And quite honestly, I think I understood that before I ever read any books about free will.Somehow, I do not believe you. I don't think you were able to give a correct interpretation of some of the extreme examples that Dennet is giving, like blindsight, the timing of a stimulus on a hand and directly in the brain, split brain patients etc.
I do think Dennett's coining of the term "Cartesian theatre" has been valuable in disabusing some otherwise brilliant scientists of their intuitions about consciousness. The Cartesian theatre is such a strong illusion that even atheists who don't believe in spirits or souls can get confused by it.Yep, exactly. Saying we have no free will is one of these illusions based on the Cartesian Theatre: if there is 'nobody there' in the brain where everything comes together and decisions are made how to react, how can this 'homunculus' be coerced by causal forces?
Kind of like wondering whether square circles exist or not. Except, they don't. Not in this universe, nor in any other. And neither does LFW (or what 99.9% of the population refers to as "free will"). But, yeah, saying something that is logically incoherent doesn't exist is kind of empty. Or at least redundant.Yep. So why not stick to the only meaningful concept of free will, and get people away from their illusions?
That's just not true. He makes it very clear he's talking about LFW. But he argues that CFW is a misleading redefinition of what virtually every person without a philosophy degree calls "free will" (which it is), and so usually refers to LFW as just "free will". He denies that we have Free Will, but he doesn't deny that we can "act of our own free will"--two forms of the term which compatibilists are conflating, knowing that the general public won't realize they're doing it--a textbook equivocation fallacy IMHO.Let's see what Harris says in his last chapter 'Moral Responsibility':
If we view people as neuronal weather patterns, how can we coherently speak about right and wrong or good and evil? These notions seem to depend upon people being able to freely choose how to think and act. And if we remain committed to seeing people as people, we must find some notion of personal responsibility that fits the facts. Happily, we can. (...) To say that I was responsible for my behavior is simply to say that what I did was sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to be considered an extension of them. (...) Judgments of responsibility depend upon the overall complexion of one’s mind, not on the metaphysics of mental cause and effect. (...) Why is the conscious decision to do another person harm particularly blameworthy? Because what we do subsequent to conscious planning tends to most fully reflect the global properties of our minds—our beliefs, desires, goals, prejudices, etc. If, after weeks of deliberation, library research, and debate with your friends, you still decide to kill the king—well, then killing the king reflects the sort of person you really are. The point is not that you are the ultimate and independent cause of your actions; the point is that, for whatever reason, you have the mind of a regicide.This fits exactly to the concept of CFW. Harris just refuses to call it so. The point to call it 'free will' is that it is just what Harris describes: it lies at the basis of our daily use of the concept of free will, which is the only meaning that makes sense. Maybe it helps to see at which exactly Harris' arrows are pointed: at those who believe in ultimate responsibility that is thought to be based on LFW. It is ultimate responsibility that leads to ultimate punishments, to harshness against people's fate etc. I share that worry. But you should not throw the baby with the bathwater away. CFW is what you call 'free will'. First of all, I don't see how anything you quoted is at odds with how I've characterized Harris' argument. I've tried to explain this many times, but let's try it another way: If you ask someone what it means to "act of their own free will", they will usually say that it means they acted without being coerced by some kind of threat. They might add that it also means the person was not insane--they knew what they were doing. Now, ask someone if they believe they have free will and what they mean by that, and you you will likely get an entirely different set of answers. They will say free will comes from God, or that they have souls and are not just acting in a clockwork manner. In other words, they'll describe LFW. When compatibilists say free will exists, it's misleading because all they're saying is that people can "act of their own free will", but they're framing it as if they're saying people have free will. They're taking a word that has a very different meaning in one context, and then equivocating by using it in another context. There's a huge difference between "acting of your own free will" and "having free will". Please tell me you can see how that's going to be misleading to the vast majority of people who told that most philosophers now believe in free will. That's why Harris is opposed to the compatibilist project. His opposition has little if anything to do with neuroscience (though it's a nice plus, and Harris does discuss it in his book), it has to do with misusing a word in a certain context in a way that misleads people. To act "of _____ own free will" is the only context where the word is used that way. Free Will (LFW) is what almost everyone means when they use the word in every other context. To act "of _____ own free will" is a unique special case in the use of that term. The whole compatibilist project is nothing but one big Equivocation Fallacy.
CFW could just as well stand for "conversational free will", while LFW could stand for "literally, free will". Yeah?NO. How can you call an empty concept 'literally, free will'. It is also not 'deep Free Will'. It is a shallow, unreflected and empty concept. The work of CFW proposals is to show that this 'conversational free will' is all there is, and that it is enough to base our ideas about morality and responsibility on. "NO. How can you call an empty concept 'literally, free will'." Because that's how the vast majority of the population defines it. Yes, it's an incoherent definition, but that doesn't make it not its definition. "The work of CFW proposals is to show that this 'conversational free will' is all there is, and that it is enough to base our ideas about morality and responsibility on." That's actually Sam Harris' proposal as well, because, you see, there's no substantive difference in their positions about LFW. But he's arguing that conflating the ability to act "of _____ own free will" with actually having free will (two very different concepts to the vast majority of the population) is confusing, misleading, and intellectually dishonest. It's a semantic argument, but what the compatibilists are doing is practically a textbook equivocation fallacy--substituting one meaning of a word for another in order to make an argument appear sound.
However, I'm not aware of anyone in academia who has been impressed enough with his "new approach" to utilize it in the study of consciousness.Then have a look at the philosophy department. Philosophers are researching consciousness? What is their method of study? If it's the scientific method, wouldn't scientist--say, neuroscientists--be better qualified to study it? Can you name any contributions to our body of empirical knowledge about how the brain produces consciousness that were made by philosophy departments? Can you name any philosophical contributions to the scientific study of consciousness at all? My point was that Dennett's book has had no impact on the scientific study of consciousness, and it would have if it had actually been novel and useful. I can't conceive of a purely philosophical "study" of consciousness. How would this "study" be conducted? People in a room talking about it? Dan Dennett thinking really hard about it?
I got all of that from the book long before Dennett spent 200 pages repeating it over and over again. In fact, I think I got that from Harris' book by page twenty. And quite honestly, I think I understood that before I ever read any books about free will.Somehow, I do not believe you. I don't think you were able to give a correct interpretation of some of the extreme examples that Dennet is giving, like blindsight, the timing of a stimulus on a hand and directly in the brain, split brain patients etc. I didn't say I got all that. I was responding to this from you: The Cartesian theatre is not just a place, the actions also occur on definite times. So consciousness of something is also something spread in time, not just through the brain. The consequences of this are overseen by most people who think we have no free will because we are determined. They still think that some entity (‘I’, ‘soul’) is forced by the causal powers of the brain to think, feel and act as it does. However, without the illusion of the Cartesian theatre, one cannot even formulate the idea of having, or not having, LFW. There is nothing the concept of LFW can be applied on, not in the positive, but also not in the negative. So, yes. Consciousness does not come together at a single, dimensionless point in the brain, there's no homonculus, and there's no soul that's running things. I think got all that, more or less, by page twenty of Free Will, but I'd have to reread it to be sure. Maybe it didn't come up until page 40. I don't know...
I do think Dennett's coining of the term "Cartesian theatre" has been valuable in disabusing some otherwise brilliant scientists of their intuitions about consciousness. The Cartesian theatre is such a strong illusion that even atheists who don't believe in spirits or souls can get confused by it.Yep, exactly. Saying we have no free will is one of these illusions based on the Cartesian Theatre: if there is 'nobody there' in the brain where everything comes together and decisions are made how to react, how can this 'homunculus' be coerced by causal forces? Well, if somehow there was a homonculus, it would still be bound by causal forces, and LFW still wouldn't make sense.
Kind of like wondering whether square circles exist or not. Except, they don't. Not in this universe, nor in any other. And neither does LFW (or what 99.9% of the population refers to as "free will"). But, yeah, saying something that is logically incoherent doesn't exist is kind of empty. Or at least redundant.Yep. So why not stick to the only meaningful concept of free will, and get people away from their illusions? Should we also redefine the term "square circle", or should we just admit that it's incoherent. Should we rescue the word "God" by redefining it as "The Universe" and then declare that philosophers now believe God exists. Why is "free will" different? That's what I'm trying to understand.
Compatibilists, IMHO, are equivocating when they conflate free will with Free Will. Yes, of course they know the difference, but I think they also know that the vast majority of the population isn't going to realize what they've done. Heck, when I first heard about CFW, I thought they believed that somehow Free Will in the deep philosophical sense could somehow coexist with determinism (mixed with a bit of quantum randomness). I thought they would make some kind of esoteric argument of how this could be based on the 500 page tracts of people like Dennett. When I learned that they were just substituting Free Will with free will, it felt to me like a bit of a swindle. The problem is, the vast majority of people who intuitively believe in LFW aren't going to read any of the books about CFW and are simply going to assume that the compatiblists support their notions, determinism or not, souls or not. This is why I feel like CFW will is a dishonest, misguided project that only creates more confusion. I don't think there's a whole lot more to say about this. I respect your opinion, I just don't agree with it. Agree to disagree.There is a lot of truth to this. We see time and time again that people are mislead by compatibilist free will. I accept compatibilist free will and even think we need the concept, so agree with compatibilists to that extent. But if someone asks "do we have free will" the correct answer is "no" or at the very least "it depends what you mean by free will". Clearly if you answer "yes" you're either answering "yes we have libertarian free will" or changing the question before answering which is obviously deceptive.