...In my personal view, this science shows that moral behaviors are motivated by biology and advocated by cultural moral norms that are adaptations for increasing the benefits of cooperation in groups by means of costly cooperation strategies (cooperation strategies that leave the actor open to exploitation). Again in my personal view, this science about what morality 'is' is consistent with something like "Moral behaviors are costly cooperation strategies that increase the benefits of cooperation in groups". The science of the matter shows that morality is a 'means' for increasing the benefits of cooperation, which sometimes may reduce reproductive fitness - for example by advocating fidelity in marriage...Mark, I am with you on seeking to have a scientific analysis of what morality is. In behavior analytic terms, morals are one example of discriminative stimuli that are active in controlling "rule-governed behavior". As such, they exert some control over the behavior of members who are a part of the culture that ascribes to the particular morals. They are similar to laws, in this respect. However, the consequences for following morals or not, tends to be different than for following laws or not. I think that an important matter to consider is the issue of "control". e.g., If morals exert control over our behavior, then we should be interested in how those morals came about and, perhaps more importantly, in whether the morals are effectively, as you say, increasing "the benefits of cooperation in groups" as opposed to being used as an exploitive mechanism for control that benefits some subgroup or individuals.
...In my personal view, this science shows that moral behaviors are motivated by biology and advocated by cultural moral norms that are adaptations for increasing the benefits of cooperation in groups by means of costly cooperation strategies (cooperation strategies that leave the actor open to exploitation). Again in my personal view, this science about what morality 'is' is consistent with something like "Moral behaviors are costly cooperation strategies that increase the benefits of cooperation in groups". The science of the matter shows that morality is a 'means' for increasing the benefits of cooperation, which sometimes may reduce reproductive fitness - for example by advocating fidelity in marriage...Mark, I am with you on seeking to have a scientific analysis of what morality is. In behavior analytic terms, morals are one example of discriminative stimuli that are active in controlling "rule-governed behavior". As such, they exert some control over the behavior of members who are a part of the culture that ascribes to the particular morals. They are similar to laws, in this respect. However, the consequences for following morals or not, tends to be different than for following laws or not. I think that an important matter to consider is the issue of "control". e.g., If morals exert control over our behavior, then we should be interested in how those morals came about and, perhaps more importantly, in whether the morals are effectively, as you say, increasing "the benefits of cooperation in groups" as opposed to being used as an exploitive mechanism for control that benefits some subgroup or individuals. I think we are on the same page. I plan to post new material from time to time on the website and plan to address some of your issues. I could post them here also if there is enough interest. Actually, I might prefer just posting links here to try to encourage more comment conversation on the website, but the forum monitors might object to that.
The first possible topic is "The morality of evolution", which is the source of a bizarro claim, based on bad science and worse moral philosophy, that the process of evolution itself somehow defines what is moral. From this illogical, terrible idea came justifications for eugenics and all other ideas related to any form of "whatever increases reproductive fitness is moral" or some such nonsense. I know of no one who advocates this moral garbage.Yes, let's excise the word evolution if you will. I think it fits in the category of the "science of morals anyways". So it is superfluous overlap. And let's keep it simple and try to stay on one track at a time. Not just you. Me and any other participants.
The second possible topic is "The science of morality" which is simply the scientific study of the origins and function of our 'moral' biology and cultural moral norms. This is the main topic of the new science of Morality section. There are no necessary implications about what moral codes 'ought' to be in this science. At best, it can just tell us what morality 'is'.Right. The "ought" comes back to the behavioral social "matrix" of a given time and space. In other words culture/government. That's the leader system I mentioned. Humans instinctively form hierarchies and look above, look up to get guidance on moral codes and to especially reinforce innate moral codes. When the morals get out of whack too much the leader system fails and is replaced. An example would be revolution due to disparity of wealth. Or too heavy a reliance on the people for military conscription. Or too much crime. Too much corruption. No Science will ever be able to say what "ought" to be moral. Humans instinctively know what is moral already. They want to see it reflected in their social structure. Obviously...if we were not social creatures there would be no morals. So again, it only takes this innate behavioral "reflection" or reinforcement of morals "advocated" through the social hierarchy.
In my personal view, this science shows that moral behaviors are motivated by biology and advocated by cultural moral norms that are adaptations for increasing the benefits of cooperation in groups by means of costly cooperation strategies (cooperation strategies that leave the actor open to exploitation). Again in my personal view, this science about what morality 'is' is consistent with something like "Moral behaviors are costly cooperation strategies that increase the benefits of cooperation in groups". The science of the matter shows that morality is a 'means' for increasing the benefits of cooperation, which sometimes may reduce reproductive fitness - for example by advocating fidelity in marriage.Ahhh...you used the word "Costly". And also: "leaves the actor open to exploitation". Are you thinking science can find a way to eliminate the cost? To eliminate the exploitation? Well, the costly aspect of morality is what makes moral behavior admirable and part of what often triggers feeling of well-being when we act morally with good results and escape being exploited. So we will not get rid of the costly aspect. Where I think science can help is in telling us which norms are mostly likely to increase the benefits of cooperation and thereby encourage moral behavior in society. For example, just knowing that the evolutionary function of morality is to increase the benefits of cooperation in groups may make acting morally more attractive for people who have thought of morality only as a burdensome obligation. In fact, morality is a set of strategies for improving your life (no surprise there, but now that is science). Also, while science cannot eliminate exploitation - some people are just SOBs - there is a lot of work in effective punishment strategies that should show how to reduce exploitation and the burden of punishing people for it.
Well, the costly aspect of morality is what makes moral behavior admirable and part of what often triggers feeling of well-being when we act morally with good results and escape being exploited. So we will not get rid of the costly aspect.I don't know about all of this. I think labeling moral behavior "admirable" is straying definitely from the scientific approach. Same with "good results" and even "exploited". In fact "moral behavior" is like saying "the behavior of the behavior."
Where I think science can help is in telling us which norms are mostly likely to increase the benefits of cooperation and thereby encourage moral behavior in society.Science, religion, philosophy has provided all of that 1000x enough already.
For example, just knowing that the evolutionary function of morality is to increase the benefits of cooperation in groups may make acting morally more attractive for people who have thought of morality only as a burdensome obligation. In fact, morality is a set of strategies for improving your life (no surprise there, but now that is science).Nahh....overthinking. This is just repackaging the same old thing in a new box. Like you said people have been working on this for thousands of years. Science is not going to be able to improve on this. Science is not going to find a way to get people to realize that acting more morally can improve life for everybody. In a nutshell, I would wager that humans have evolved to exert just enough morality. Because that has to balance with our "Dog eat Dog" behavior. Which you never addressed after I mentioned it. There probably is no such thing as "more morally".
Also, while science cannot eliminate exploitation - some people are just SOBs - there is a lot of work in effective punishment strategies that should show how to reduce exploitation and the burden of punishing people for it.I'd be interested in hearing more about this.
The ‘alert’ was not necessary, Mark. I asked for clarification, by means of VYAZMA’s example, and you gave that, that’s fine.
In the first place I regret you did not react on my more fundamental thought in my posting #32], in which I express my doubt that morality can be ‘grounded’ in the way you seem to think in your posting #27]. I hope you can elaborate on this.
Secondly I am wondering if your proposal would not be just a gathering of results of other sciences that contribute to our thoughts about morality:
- psychology, for researching how morality influences the individual;
- sociology, for researching the dynamics of morality in society;
- biology, for researching how morality arises from given behaviour in ‘lower’ animals, or how morality influences the thriving of groups having these morals,
- etc etc.
And thirdly, as you notice yourself, you seem to advocate just utilitarianism, which is an existing theory about how we may ‘ground’ morality.
So I am failing to see what is new in your approach, and I have severe doubts that morality can be ‘grounded’ in a similar way that science can be grounded, or even that such a project would be morally desirable.
just knowing that the evolutionary function of morality is to increase the benefits of cooperation in groups may make acting morally more attractive for people who have thought of morality only as a burdensome obligation.I am not sure what exactly you mean by "evolutionary function" here, but it sounds awfully close to group selection. As far as I know there is no evidence for this phenomenon. But, again, hard to tell what exactly you are referring to.
The 'alert' was not necessary, Mark. I asked for clarification, by means of VYAZMA's example, and you gave that, that's fine. In the first place I regret you did not react on my more fundamental thought in my posting #32], in which I express my doubt that morality can be 'grounded' in the way you seem to think in your posting #27]. I hope you can elaborate on this. Secondly I am wondering if your proposal would not be just a gathering of results of other sciences that contribute to our thoughts about morality: - psychology, for researching how morality influences the individual; - sociology, for researching the dynamics of morality in society; - biology, for researching how morality arises from given behaviour in 'lower' animals, or how morality influences the thriving of groups having these morals, - etc etc. And thirdly, as you notice yourself, you seem to advocate just utilitarianism, which is an existing theory about how we may 'ground' morality. So I am failing to see what is new in your approach, and I have severe doubts that morality can be 'grounded' in a similar way that science can be grounded, or even that such a project would be morally desirable.I did not mean the 'alert' banner to cause offense, but to attract notice in an entertaining way. My attempt at humor was apparently not entirely successful. My sense of urgency was prompted by the mention of forced eugenics and other despicable ideas that came out of claims that the process of evolution itself is somehow inherently moral. I expect no one on this forum supports such a bizarre idea. I seriously wanted to avoid, if possible, our descent into the heated and unproductive discussions such misunderstandings have produced elsewhere. Your questions about grounding, "What is different from Utilitarianism?", and "What is new?" are good ones. Regarding grounding, I understand Utilitarianism to be a definition of morality based on a proposed moral theory, not a primary source for moral grounding. For primary sources for moral grounding, we have to look at what grounds Utilitarianism. How can we argue Utilitarianism is even part of morality, much less that it defines the claimed ultimate goal of moral behavior, without something to test its assertions against, something by which to ground it in morality? At bottom, it seems to me that Utilitarianism is grounded in our considered, coherent moral intuitions (which require a lot of rational thought to identify) such as fairness and the equal worth of the well-being of all people. So what does my approach tell us that psychology, sociology, and biology do not already tell us? What is new? My approach reveals the underlying universal principle (in terms of their common underlying selection force) of our 'moral' biology and past and present cultural moral codes. Aspects of these are now chaotically cataloged in psychology, sociology, biology, (I'll add game theory), and so forth, with few, if any, organizing principles. My proposal brings order to disorder by identifying their common selection force as the benefits of costly cooperation in groups. How is my approach useful? Just for starters, 1) it tells us why people have genuinely believed that slavery and even genocide was moral - because these acts could increase the benefits of cooperation in sub-groups and 2) why contradictory and bizarre moral norms (for example about homosexuality and eating pigs) could be selected for as strategies, again, to increase the benefits of cooperation in in-groups. But I am most hopeful about is its potential as the Rule for a new Rule Utilitarianism. First, it defines the specific moral 'means' that I argue is most likely to achieve Utilitarian goals (this is the Rule criterion for a Rule Utilitarianism). Second, the requirement that the well-being benefits of cooperation be the sole means of achieving Utilitarian well-being goals appears to defeat common counter-examples to Utilitarianism. For example: That "it would be 'moral' to kill one innocent person to harvest his organs to save the life of five people" would, by my Rule-Utilitarianism, be immoral because the benefit is not produced by cooperation strategies. There are two primary reasons that my Rule is the one most likely to achieve Utilitarian goals. First it is defined by the section force that shaped our ancestors into the incredibly successful social animals we are. It fits people like a key in a well-oiled lock because this key (this Rule) is largely what shaped this lock, human social psychology and our emotional experience of durable well-being (arguably largely a psychological reward that motivates sustained costly cooperation in stable groups such as family and friends). This intrinsic harmony between a moral principle and our moral intuitions will encourage moral, pro-social behavior. Second, it can motivate moral behaviors for self-interested reasons, to increase the durable well-being benefits of cooperation in the long term. This should be more effective at motivating moral behaviors than Utilitarianism’s reasons, which can seem to be more about burdens and obligations to the group rather than long term benefits, on average, to the individual. There is a philosophical argument, which you may be thinking of, that all attempts at Rule Utilitarianism ultimately reduce to Utilitarianism. Getting into that technical argument here seems to me to likely to be an unproductive distraction.
just knowing that the evolutionary function of morality is to increase the benefits of cooperation in groups may make acting morally more attractive for people who have thought of morality only as a burdensome obligation.I am not sure what exactly you mean by "evolutionary function" here, but it sounds awfully close to group selection. As far as I know there is no evidence for this phenomenon. But, again, hard to tell what exactly you are referring to.Evolutionary function means the primary reason morality exists in all societies. Note that this is a descriptive claim about what the evolutionary function 'is'. I use three sources of evidence that "to increase the benefits of costly cooperation in groups" is the evolutionary function of morality: 1) a data base of past and present descriptively moral behavior, 2) an argument from first principles (about our physical universe) that all self-interested agents with cultures can be expected to advocate and enforce moral codes that "increase the benefits of costly cooperation in groups", and 3) evolutionary game theory that shows how blind evolutionary forces can, in fact, select for both our moral emotions that motivate costly cooperation strategies and for cultural moral codes that advocate costly cooperation strategies. The 'data base' of past and present descriptively moral behavior includes our moral emotions such as empathy, loyalty, shame guilt, and indignation, Jonathon Haidt's observed 6 universal moral 'foundations', and known past and present enforced moral codes. All can be argued to share the same function, to increase the benefits of costly cooperation in groups, even past and present moral codes, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and bizarre. Note that this ‘data base’ is only a mental construct, it does not exist as a real object. The three sources depend on “group selection" only in the form of the actual act of forming in-groups as a powerful cooperation strategy, which is well known, well recognized, and well accepted in game theory. The three sources are independent of the truth or falsity of “group selection" as a theory in the biological evolution of altruism, which I expect you are thinking of. The details of how the selection forces actually select for specific genes is irrelevant to my arguments.
Ok, I am not sure I understand what you’re after here. And as a side note, I see you referring to Pinker and Haidt and what psychology can teach us about morality, but what happened to the biology? I don’t see you mention that anywhere.
Ok, I am not sure I understand what you're after here. And as a side note, I see you referring to Pinker and Haidt and what psychology can teach us about morality, but what happened to the biology? I don't see you mention that anywhere.The biology of human morality includes 1) that responsible for our moral emotions (such as empathy, loyalty, shame,guilt, gratitude,and indignation), 2) the automatic right/wrong judgment capability of our conscience with its remarkable ability to integrate and internalize whatever our cultural moral norms are, such as "Eating pigs is wrong!", and 3) any biology dependent human universal foundations such as Haidt's moral 'foundations' (but since Haidt's universals could be from cultural universals, their biology basis is open to question). Some investigators, such as the neurobiologist Patrica Churchland, focus entirely on the details of the mechanisms of brain biology that motivate moral behaviors such as empathy and sexual fidelity. Others, such as the game theorists Herbert Gintis and Martin Nowak, focus on the origins in evolutionary game theory of costly cooperation strategies that 1) our moral biology motivates, and 2) our enforced cultural moral norms advocate. My interest is in what selection forces are responsible for moral behaviors that have shaped (through the processes of biological and cultural evolution) our moral biology and cultural moral codes. Note that specifically what moral biology and cultural moral codes have been selected for in humans is an accident of our specific biological and cultural evolutionary history. What fascinates me is that there appears to be a cross-species (as well as cross-culturally) universal selection force, the benefits of costly cooperation in groups, that has selected for both what specifically human moral biology is and our diverse, contradictory, and even bizarre enforced moral codes.
No, I meant real biology with real data, such as, for example, relatedness of people within a group vs. that of an outside group. IOW, inbreeding.
To see what I mean, check out, for example, this article by Steve Sailer: http://www.isteve.com/cousin_marriage_conundrum.htm (included by Pinker in “Best Science and Nature Writing, 2004,”) or Napoleon Chagnon’s “Noble Savages.”
I think you really need to dig deeper than Haidt’s psychology layer or game theories to understand what’s going on.
Interesting article, George. It suggests a course for peace in the Middle East. Russia, China, and the US, simply need to work together to install Dictators who will outlaw any level of inbreeding, then in a few generations, the populaces will be ready to work together.
Yes, that was food for thought thank you Mark. My key idea is that a lot of "bad" moralising is linked to belief in libertarian free will so I think research into that would be useful. StephenWhat is "libertarian free will"? Libertarian free will is the belief we could have done otherwise without anything out of our control being different. Since somethings out of our control would have had to be different for us to have done otherwise, we are merely lucky or unlucky how those things turned out.
Whether we actually have free will (in the common sense) or not seems to me best understood as a subtle problem in physics, not moral philosophy.The common sense is as I described and there is nothing subtle about it. It's the denial that people are merely lucky or unlucky to get the will they have and rather that they can overcome this luck somehow.
That is, the moral justification of cultural norms comes from their consequences such as increased overall well-being in the society.Right, and the point is belief in libertarian free will is a different justification, which is why it can be harmful. Anyhow it was not my intention to get into a debate about it, rather a suggestion for research into what affect the belief is having. And it seems akin to or perhaps it just is belief in foundational morality, just another way of putting it perhaps. Stephen Honestly, I don't see that belief or disbelief in free will has much effect on moral behavior. Perhaps to clarify, I see whether or not we actually have free will to be a subtle problem in physics which, as yet, has not been answered. But even if science comes to the conclusion we do not have free will, I don't see that as having any cause for concern except perhaps among some philosophy students. Groups will continue to punish immoral behavior to the extent it is in the group's interests to do so. That's right, they will, because they (we) will be determined to do that by factors beyond their (our) control. but it never hurts to know what the truth is. It might even help us to design more effective responses than what we are doing now with hardly any thought at all--and very little effectiveness.
Interesting article, George. It suggests a course for peace in the Middle East. Russia, China, and the US, simply need to work together to install Dictators who will outlaw any level of inbreeding, then in a few generations, the populaces will be ready to work together.Sure, why not? Bet you it would be more effective than moral philosophy. :-)
Interesting article, George. It suggests a course for peace in the Middle East. Russia, China, and the US, simply need to work together to install Dictators who will outlaw any level of inbreeding, then in a few generations, the populaces will be ready to work together.Sure, why not? Bet you it would be more effective than moral philosophy. :-) Why not? Well, Russia, China, and the US, are very unlikely to be able to work together for that long.
Mark, it seems that I am not so deep in moral philosophy as you are: I am not sure I understand everything you wrote here].
If I look at these examples:
1) it tells us why people have genuinely believed that slavery and even genocide was moral - because these acts could increase the benefits of cooperation in sub-groups and 2) why contradictory and bizarre moral norms (for example about homosexuality and eating pigs) could be selected for as strategies, again, to increase the benefits of cooperation in in-groupsI would say this is science: find the principle that best explains moral judgments, even those we despise of. Science is neutral in this respect: the explanation must be adequate to understand people and cultural phenomena, not to justify or condemn them. At the same time it seems to me that you want to 'ground' morality on the same principle, i.e. use it as a way to evaluate behavioural rules morally. I am not so sure this can work. It is like saying that because of science we know that atoms can be split, and therefore we should do so. (Scientific) truth and (moral) justification are two different things, isn't it?
Second, the requirement that the well-being benefits of cooperation be the sole means of achieving Utilitarian well-being goals appears to defeat common counter-examples to Utilitarianism. For example: That “it would be ‘moral’ to kill one innocent person to harvest his organs to save the life of five people" would, by my Rule-Utilitarianism, be immoral because the benefit is not produced by cooperation strategies.Maybe we agree, but use different wordings. I would say that moral judgments must be grounded in an ethical discourse between those who are effected by the consequences of actions and the actors. This should be a free, rational discourse in which the values and aims of our culture are used as guiding principle. 'Free' here might be very close to your 'cooperation'. However, your principle might not always work. As the person who is supposed to offer his organs, the criminal also might not agree to be put in prison, but we mostly feel justified to do so: without his cooperation. Just as a side note: my ethical thinking is highly influenced by Habermas] and his 'discourse ethics]'. Maybe you find it interesting too. As you probably noticed I mostly put the word 'grounding' between quotes, but I did not above. I think there is no principle outside the momentary cultural values, that is so to speak 'universally valid', except this one rooted in the possibility of a free discourse: it should always be possible to question moral judgments in an open, fair and rational discourse. I think this is best way to see moral judgments: not as objective facts, but also not as some subjective, or post-modern arbitrariness. It is also a counter argument against the idea that ethics is nonsense because it is not grounded in science.
In our “democratic republic” we have mechanisms for establishing laws and determining whether they are just. And this is open to public examination and some level of input for changing the laws. We are all pretty much subject to following these laws or else are potentially subject to similar consequences for not following the laws.
Morals, OTOH, are more typically selected by cultural subgroups. How and why the moral is established is not necessarily open to examination. There is not necessarily a mechanism for changing a moral that is irrational (in terms of new or unique contingencies). And the consequences for following a moral (or not) tend to be a product of social approval (or disapproval).
I like Gdb’s suggested moral, that “it should always be possible to question moral judgments in an open, fair and rational discourse”.
Mark, it seems that I am not so deep in moral philosophy as you are: I am not sure I understand everything you wrote here]. If I look at these examples:Exactly so.1) it tells us why people have genuinely believed that slavery and even genocide was moral - because these acts could increase the benefits of cooperation in sub-groups and 2) why contradictory and bizarre moral norms (for example about homosexuality and eating pigs) could be selected for as strategies, again, to increase the benefits of cooperation in in-groupsI would say this is science: find the principle that best explains moral judgments, even those we despise of. Science is neutral in this respect: the explanation must be adequate to understand people and cultural phenomena, not to justify or condemn them..
At the same time it seems to me that you want to 'ground' morality on the same principle, i.e. use it as a way to evaluate behavioural rules morally. I am not so sure this can work. It is like saying that because of science we know that atoms can be split, and therefore we should do so. (Scientific) truth and (moral) justification are two different things, isn't it?.Perhaps I should have phrased it that I want to ground the ‘means’ of morality in science as costly cooperation strategies such as “Do to others as you would have them do to you" (indirect reciprocity). The science of morality is silent on ultimate ‘ends’ (as a matter of logic due to the difficulty of driving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’). So science provides no grounding for ultimate moral ends such as who deserves moral concern and is it our moral duty to help everyone who is worse off than we are. I agree with you that the best source on ultimate ends is rational debate. (Though science can enlighten that rational debate by revealing why we have the moral intuitions we do, and why they vary.)
Second, the requirement that the well-being benefits of cooperation be the sole means of achieving Utilitarian well-being goals appears to defeat common counter-examples to Utilitarianism. For example: That “it would be ‘moral’ to kill one innocent person to harvest his organs to save the life of five people" would, by my Rule-Utilitarianism, be immoral because the benefit is not produced by cooperation strategies.
Maybe we agree, but use different wordings. I would say that moral judgments must be grounded in an ethical discourse between those who are effected by the consequences of actions and the actors. This should be a free, rational discourse in which the values and aims of our culture are used as guiding principle. 'Free' here might be very close to your 'cooperation'. However, your principle might not always work. As the person who is supposed to offer his organs, the criminal also might not agree to be put in prison, but we mostly feel justified to do so: without his cooperation..I expect we agree that blindly using “the values and aims of our culture(s) … as guiding principle" is not going to work well when two sub-cultures with different values and aims are trying to resolve their differences. Here, I think it would be highly useful to resolving differences to understand the science underlying why these values are different. It is ultimate, over-riding goals where science goes silent. On how to achieve those goals (‘means’), science has a lot to say. Regarding the criminal and the innocent person to be killed for parts, doing to the criminal “what you would not want done to you" is moral because doing so will increase the benefits of long term cooperation in that society by discouraging criminality. Killing the innocent person for parts is immoral because doing so will decrease the benefits of cooperation in that society by discouraging going anywhere where one might be unexpectedly killed for body parts. What is important is long term benefits of cooperation in the society – which requires high levels of trust in other people - not body count.
Just as a side note: my ethical thinking is highly influenced by Habermas] and his 'discourse ethics]'. Maybe you find it interesting too.From a quick scan, it sounds like the position is that all moral questions are open to rational debate. I disagree.The function of moral codes is not open to debate, their ultimate 'ends' are and which costly cooperation strategies are most likely to achieve those goals are. And,yes, that leaves a lot to talk about.
JAs you probably noticed I mostly put the word 'grounding' between quotes, but I did not above. I think there is no principle outside the momentary cultural values, that is so to speak 'universally valid', except this one rooted in the possibility of a free discourse: it should always be possible to question moral judgments in an open, fair and rational discourse. I think this is best way to see moral judgments: not as objective facts, but also not as some subjective, or post-modern arbitrariness. It is also a counter argument against the idea that ethics is nonsense because it is not grounded in science.I think we differ then. I argue it is objectively true, in the normal sense in science, that the universal function of morality is to increase the benefits of cooperation in groups. Therefore the function of morality cannot be changed by “free discourse" or “open, fair and rational discourse". Of course, people are free to define the word “morality" however they want. But if they try to define it such that its function in societies is something different from all past and present moral codes, then I argue they are no longer talking about “morality", but something new. On the other hand, I agree that the ultimate goals of morality and what specific means (as costly cooperation strategies) are most likely to achieve those goals are “rooted in the possibility of a free discourse: it should always be possible to question (ultimate goals) of morality in an open, fair and rational discourse". Probably the most important ultimate goal to be discussed is to answer the question “Who deserves our moral concern?" or as Peter Singer puts it “How big is our circle of moral concern?"
In our "democratic republic" we have mechanisms for establishing laws and determining whether they are just. And this is open to public examination and some level of input for changing the laws. We are all pretty much subject to following these laws or else are potentially subject to similar consequences for not following the laws. Morals, OTOH, are more typically selected by cultural subgroups. How and why the moral is established is not necessarily open to examination. There is not necessarily a mechanism for changing a moral that is irrational (in terms of new or unique contingencies). And the consequences for following a moral (or not) tend to be a product of social approval (or disapproval). I like Gdb's suggested moral, that "it should always be possible to question moral judgments in an open, fair and rational discourse".You might have a read of the last half of my comment #57 (just above) to Gdb.
You keep framing morals as an “agent”. We all say the phrase “moral behavior”, but that is technically incorrect.
It’s like saying the behavior of behavior.
Morals are based on human behavioral science. I already said that we probably exert just enough “moral behavior” to make the
social group work. It doesn’t need more than that. That’s the balance.
You keep saying “costly”. That’s a contrivance. Morals don’t cost anything.
That’s your problem, you keep saying that morals are an agent that is a force for good.
Wrong!
C’mon! And then you still want to discuss scientific roots of morals? Seriously?
We exert just enough morality to balance out with “dog eat dog”…so to speak.
I see you never wanted to address the importance of those behavioral dynamics? Alpha Behavior.
Is the society, looking upon the known existence of say… hunger, forgetting their moral behavior?
Hell No!!! That’s Dog eat Dog!!