Ok, well you're telling personal stories couched as philosophy (where person refers to those who believe in the perspectival notion). Very old school and way too personal or anthropocentric. Being and non-beings, perceptions, etc. are human characteristics, and so all your explanations and fancy talk are just limited personal stories told in a manner that seems to have something to do with the world. And that's really all the old philosophers did, though some way better than others.
But I guess to stay in your mode of thinking, because it is somewhat interesting, if small...what do these thinkers think about times prior to any sentient human? Is the idea that there has to be a sentient being of some sort to perceive things? And the notion of a being that has existence. How do we know whether those couple concepts, "being", "existence" are even relavent to understand the universe?
Again, we don't. In fact, "we" don't even know whether there is a "we". Maybe solipsism is true. In fact, maybe even solipsism is already going too far: after all, the notion that there must be a subject to do anything--for example, to think up Being--may already be mistaken. Maybe there is just a dream, and not even a dreamer. But we rebel against this idea. I mean, I rebel against it. I mean, in this dream there is a rebellion against the idea that it's just a dream. This rebellion leads to the assertion of an "I", and then to the assertion of multiple "Is", of a "we". Are you willing to grant this? May I speak of "we", as far as you're concerned?
I will presume that I may. Well then, what do "we" know? We only know our own being, human being. But whereas the beings with whom we can articulate the notion of a "we" all look and behave essentially alike, there are beings that look and behave a bit more different. These we call non-human animals. We suppose that, though their being is not human, like ours, it is still animal, also like ours. More broadly, we suppose that their being is still sentient, like ours (and even then we cannot but anthropomorphize). But what about "lifeless things"--my keyboard, for example? Based on our perceptions, we must suppose that they are far more different from us than any "sentient" being. However, we cannot imagine them to be absolutely different, as we ultimately only have experience of our own kind of being. We cannot imagine what it's like to be lifeless or non-sentient. Therefore, we can only suppose that even my keyboard is a sentient being, or (a part of) multiple sentient beings.
A line I heard: "I'm a solipsist and I don't understand why everyone else isn't."
LL